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In a world of inevitable regret, those governing risk must build practices that with-
stand the vicissitudes of actual events by demonstrating that reasonable efforts had
been and will continue to be taken despite those harms. However, what is reasonable
depends on one’s worldview, and so not giving different worldviews appropriate con-
sideration leads to deficits in the quality of risk governance. This project developed
foresight methods for eliciting, discovering, representing, and modeling scenarios which
capture the counterfactual forests created by disparate worldviews. These methods em-
ploy structural differences between objective and subjective relations toward physical
events to delineate the actual points of contention, while maintaining neutrality by re-
maining strictly grounded in the input of the stakeholders themselves. These methods
respect how people frame causal information psychologically, avoiding biases known to
affect political judgment. Overall, these methods serve as a reminder that how we ask
designs how we think.
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The Opportunity of a Technical Foresight for Risk Governance
Foresight: the Inverse of History
“I cannot take architecture out of thin air. . . but I certainly enjoy taking
it out of thick air!”
-from “The City, Seen as a Garden of Ideas” by Peter Cook [Cook, 2003]
History has a special privilege that is not shared by most subjects. This privilege is a
freedom to pay attention to any topic, in any form, with any focus, as long as that inves-
tigation yields an academically firm insight about the past. This freedom is appropriate,
as our histories must be as rich, diverse, deep, and thick with context as the varied
cultures, ideas, peoples, economies, and practices that inhabited that past. If there is
a field that is mandated to transcend disciplines, and further, to build the methods of
transcending discipline, it is history.
There is a subject that shares this freedom (and the concomitant responsibilities), and
that is its inverse, the study of possible futures and how they were, are, and will come
to be considered. This discipline is called foresight. It too studies every corner of the
future, from the visions put forth in popular culture, to feverish odd ideas bubbling
within science fiction, to every kind of prediction and projection, to all coordination and
institutional policies and arrangements, and to the everyday plans of individuals and how
they go wrong.
It is within this context that I recognize that doing work in foresight brings a special
responsibility, to put forth an academic lens appropriate for examining of the hopes,
dreams, fears, concerns, and uncertainties of our combined futures. In short, good
works of foresight present futures worthy of building a conceptual present in the same
way good histories builds us suitable pasts.
While I have little hope of accomplishing this, I can at least pick the right materials. A
great history will tell us of how a people attempted to come together to work through a
terrible threat, for which the outcomes were uncertain, and how they, despite inconsis-
tencies, false starts, and setbacks, were changed by those events, yielding either a story
of success worthy for emulation, or a story of woe and regrets producing warnings and
caution. It is for this reason that I focus on the risks of our time that seem to threaten
the most catastrophic consequences, how those risks are conceived, and the processes
at work by which the conception of those risks could serve our human ends.
The Distributed Risk of Infrastructure and its Transitions
The 2010 volcanic eruptions of Eyjafjallajo¨kull in Iceland disrupted the travel of ten
million passengers, leading to losses estimated between 1.5 and 2.5 billion Euros [Rincon,
2011]. How is it that these losses came about, with so many companies unprepared for
that contingency? It is not because there were never eruptions in Iceland before, and it
also is not because nobody imagined that Icelandic volcanoes might erupt again. It is
because volcanic eruptions of that nature are rare, have nothing to do directly with any
of the business or personal motivations that drove people to take the flights in the first
place, and are entirely divorced from the routine of everyday life. Volcanic eruptions are
just one of thousands of random possibilities that one effectively cannot think about if
one is to get anything done.
Fortunately, in the case of the 2010 Eyjafjallajo¨kull eruption, we as a civilization have
largely learned to compensate for these disasters. Although the disruption in business
was costly, and possibly could have been prevented to some degree, the risk mitigation
measures of shutting down the airspace prevented any actual flight disasters. Though
stranded in foreign countries, travelers did manage to find provisions. Altogether, insti-
tutions for understanding, monitoring, and mitigating the risk of specific events are in
place, although the tools to effectively spread the knowledge of these contingencies to
a broader risk-management audience may yet be limited. Indeed, it is more common to
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rely upon indemnifying these risks through business continuity insurance, or more com-
mon yet, given the assumption of an supporting institutional backdrop, simply enduring
them.
However, although we have set up institutions that arbitrate direct infrastructural risks
in the environments of our daily lives well enough for many, it is fair to say that we have
not figured out how to make sense of the risks posed by transitions in this infrastructure.
Everyday life entails a vast web of materials, processing, energy production, and land
use, but it is impossible to weigh our daily activities against the ongoing and eventual
consequences in any sensible way, especially given the diversity of existing stakes, in-
terests, perceptions, structures, processes, and biases involved in those subjects. Most
challenging are issues that are highly distributed in time, space, and context; pitting
alternatives with uncertain rewards and heavy short-term individual costs under specific
regulatory frameworks against scientifically-uncertain irreversible long-term public costs
that span borders (which we will refer to as distributed risk challenges). It has yet
to be demonstrated if our industrial infrastructure (and its supporting institutions) can
successfully make large-scale transitions in response to a changing portfolio of energy,
material, and ecosystem service availability.
At the time of this writing, the most salient catastrophe is the March 2011 earthquakes
and tsunamis striking Japan, and the ensuing issues in controlling the Fukushima nuclear
power plant. One may question why an island along the fault-lines of tectonic plates
would then turn to nuclear power, given its dangers. Yet, nuclear power, despite the
direct and long-term risks posed by radiation and reaction, is thought by some to be
a comparatively progressive technology, without the climate risks many attribute to
carbon-based energy technologies [Cravens, 2007] [Brand, 2009]. Would Japan’s nuclear
infrastructure have changed the anyone’s opinion of the overall acceptability to nuclear
power if not for this catastrophe? Is it appropriate that this catastrophe might disrupt
a progressive infrastructure of energy provision?
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The Imponderable Character of Irreversibility and Regret
“...trying to come to terms with how screwed up and unfair it is that we
only get to do this all once, with the intractability and general awfulness of
trying to parse the idea of once, trying to get any kind of handle on it,...
the slippery idea of onceness.”
-from “How to Live Safely In a Science Fictional Universe” by Charles Yu
[Yu, 2010]
Regret is the disparity between what did happen under what actions were undertaken and
what would be projected to happen under a different course of action. Following from
the previous section, we have many regrets that their infrastructure was not engineered
differently. However, regrets are curious things, for regrets are relative, not absolute,
harms. For there to be a regret, there must be another state-of-affairs that did not
occur, but that we take so seriously as a possibility that we judge ourselves in reference
to it [Gopnik, 2009]. These other states-of-affairs are counter to the facts of what
happened, and thus are called counterfactuals. As there are no future facts, but there
are many future states of affairs that could be. Therefore, it is appropriate that this
study of possible futures, or foresight, should concern itself with counterfactuals, how
they are understood, and how they are applied.
We would like to avoid regrets, but is impossible. Imagine that you are walking down
the street and are asked for spare change. Whether or not we comply with the request,
we experience regret, at either being taken advantage of and deprived of what is ours,
or for not showing mercy to fellow person with sufficient needs as to make that demand.
It is for this reason that there is no such thing as perfect precaution: we are, and will
be, in circumstances that require conflicting trade-offs between value choices that have
no objective answer.
Risk considered at broader scales does not escape the ambiguity of mutual regret. When
taken to its logical extreme, the Precautionary Principle, which is the guiding principle of
European regulatory philosophy, and advises to mitigate against costly risks even when
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the consequences cannot be scientifically assured, turns from wise council to a recipe for
paralysis [Sunstein, 2007]. The provision of infrastructure will always have consequences,
and change will always have the particular risks associated with the untried, untested,
and experimental. To mitigate against any action which might be risky would be to do
nothing, except for the extraordinary risk that doing nothing entails.
The bitterest regrets are those that are irreversible. An injured individual can be treated
and compensated, and an endangered species can be given special protections, but we
can give nothing to the dead and extinct. When facing infrastructural trade-offs with
irreversible consequences, how can we even conceive of right choices, much less how to
see that those choices get made?
Severe Risks and their Governance
Given the imponderable nature of risk and regret, it is essential to have a stronger
response than designing approaches assured of success. These approaches are far too
limited given the portfolio of regrets we face. A better way to meet that challenge is
to build governing approaches, approaches that will be recognized by those for whom it
fails that it was, nonetheless, a reasonable option given what was known and what con-
sensuses were achieved. The challenge is discovering options that we can all recognize,
given our limits, make the best trade-offs. In short, given that we cannot avoid risk, our
task will be to see that we have done due diligence in avoiding and mitigating it to the
degree possible.
This focus on risk does little to reduce the domain of foresight. There are few concepts
as trans-disciplinary as the future, but risk is one of them; consider the disciplinary
breadth to which risk is considered seriously: economics, law, sociology, psychology,
political science, applied mathematics, statistics, artificial intelligence, epidemiology,
philosophy, insurance, and finance. It is within this scope that we discover the field
of risk governance [Renn, 2008]. Risk governance combines such divergent approaches
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such as post-modern social criticism, engineering reliability studies, systems theory, and
insurance into a pragmatic, Habermassian framework containing the best of both the
analytical and deliberative worlds.
Risk governance provides two distinctive advantages as a framework. First of all, it
captures a high-level methodological preference, which is to favor a certain pluralism or
multiplicity, instead of unification, as the most appropriate way to frame problems at their
broadest sense. This captures the trend toward governance generally, where governance
embodies a horizontally organized structure of functional self-regulation encompassing
state and non-state actors bringing about collectively binding decisions without superior
authority [Rosenau, 1992] [Wolf, 2002] [Wolf, 2005]. This move toward accommodating
fragmentation may ultimately be a personal preference, and more adept designers may
be able to develop unified systems. Yet, this fragmentation is something culturally real,
as we perceive ourselves not as a participant of a single system, but many, serving
different roles within them.
This distinction will also reappear in terms of design methodology used here, where we
will see a clear preference for approaches used to make sense of one’s current context
over those that strictly define or delimit systems, in resonance with the multi-ontology
perspective that is demanded when making useful sense of our world [Snowden, 2005].
Further, this ability to engage multiplicity extends to embracing both sides of long-
standing distinctions and differences, such as evidence/values, objective/subjective, so-
cial constructivism/realism, qualitative/quantitative, and so forth. If nothing else, the
respect to these distinctions is pragmatic: the effectiveness of the risk governance de-
pends on appropriately engaging stakeholders with different views on these subjects.
The second core advantage of working within the risk governance framework is that
it offers us standards of due diligence. What does appropriate due diligence consist
of? One possible answer is that it means consistently and competently applying a
variety of common-sense measures known to eliminate common pitfalls. Fortunately,
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Table 1: Governance Deficits in Assessing and Understanding Risks
A1: The failure to detect early warnings of risk because of erroneous signals,
misinterpretation of information, or simply not enough information being
gathered
A2: The lack of adequate factual knowledge for robust risk assessment
because of existing gaps in scientific knowledge or failure to either source
existing information or appreciate its associated uncertainty
A3 : The omission of knowledge related to stakeholder risk perceptions and
concerns
A4: The failure to consult the relevant stakeholders, as their involvement
can improve the information input and the legitimacy of the risk assessment
process (provided that interests and bias are carefully managed)
A5: The failure to properly evaluate a risk as being acceptable or unaccept-
able to society
A6: The misrepresentation of information about risk, whereby biased, se-
lective or incomplete knowledge is used during, or communicated after, risk
assessment, either with or without intention
A7: A failure to understand how the components of a complex system
interact or how the system behaves as a whole, thus a failure to assess the
multiple dimensions of a risk and its potential consequences
A8: A failure to recognize fast or fundamental changes to a system, which
can cause new risks to emerge or old ones to change
A9: The inappropriate use of formal models as a way to create and un-
derstand knowledge about complex systems (over- and under-reliance on
models can be equally problematic)
A10: A failure to overcome cognitive barriers to imagining that events
outside expected paradigms are possible
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Table 2: Governance Deficits in Managing Risks
B1: A failure to respond adequately to early warnings of risk, which could
mean either under or over-reacting to warnings
B2: A failure to design effective risk management strategies. Such failure
may result from objectives, tools, or implementation plans being ill-defined
or absent
B3: A failure to consider all reasonable, available options before deciding
how to proceed
B4: Not conducting appropriate to assess the costs and benefits (efficiency)
of various options and how these are distributed (equity)
B5: A failure to implement risk management strategies or policies and to
enforce them
B6: A failure to anticipate the consequences, particularly negative side
effects, of a risk management decision, and to adequately monitor and react
to the outcomes
B7: An inability to reconcile the time-frame of the risk issue (which
may have far-off consequences and require a long-term perspective) with
decision-making pressures and incentives (which may prioritize visible, short-
term results or costly reductions)
B8: A failure to adequately balance transparency and confidentiality during
the decision-making process, which can have implications for stakeholder
trust or for security
B9: A lack of adequate organizational capacity (assets, skills, and capa-
bilities) and/or of a suitable culture (one that recognizes the value of risk
management) for ensuring managerial effectiveness when dealing with risks
B10: A failure of the multiple departments or organizations responsible for
a risk’s management to act individually but cohesively, or of one entity to
deal with several risks
B11: A failure to deal with the complex nature of commons problems, re-
sulting in inappropriate or inadequate decisions to mitigate commons-related
risks (e.g. risks to the atmosphere or oceans)
B12: A failure to resolve conflicts where different pathways to resolution
may be required in consideration of the nature of the conflict and of different
stakeholder interests and values
B13: Insufficient flexibility or capacity to respond adequately to unexpected
events because of bad planning, inflexible mindsets, and response structures,
or an inability to think creatively and innovate when necessary
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the risk governance community has developed lists of such common pitfalls, which they
refer to as risk governance deficits [Graham et al., 2009], including a list of deficits
in assessing and understanding risk (see Table 1) and a list for deficits in managing
risk (see Table 2). These lists are hard won, accumulating the reflections of what
went wrong in wide variety of risk issues, and as best as can reasonably be determined
constitute wise council. Furthermore, these deficits touch on a wide variety of general
considerations, including knowledge management, knowledge of stakeholder benefits and
harms, perceptions, preparation, timing, modeling, organizational structures, and other
issues. Therefore, it is a reasonable working assumption that these guidelines, even if
not comprehensive, are sufficient for building excellent risk governance methods and
tools.
Worldview as an Obstacle to Governing Risk
Policy problems can be made difficult by both their severity, their complexity, and their
ambiguity. A common-sense measure for severity of many policy problems is the com-
bined severity of the impact on those whom the policy will intervene. However, those
impacted may have such different worldviews that it is challenging to determine exactly
how these impacts function. One particular challenge is when different concerns are
in conflict, but the worldviews guiding those are so intractably different that the exact
conflicts are difficult to communicate appropriately.
Strikingly, problems with some of the most severe consequences (death, injury, property
damage, and environmental degradation) are physical in character, and can be connected
to physical causes. By separating these physical causes and the empirical processes
that govern them from the impacts as reported after these consequences have been
established, we formulate a useful barrier: those in which we can readily admit other
observations and explanations that contradict established evidence (i.e. the objective),
from those for which the unique rights of determination emerge from the coherent
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reaction of the experiencier (i.e. the subjective). For example, medical evidence cannot
determine that your leg hurts, but it can determine that it is broken. It is through
this distinction that distributed risk problems, although severe in their outcomes, seem
more addressable than certain cultural and social policy issues, by virtue of their widely-
recognized objective benefits and harms.
Unfortunately, the use of these distinctions is necessary, as high-impact problems pose
different kinds of conflicts between stakeholders. The stakeholders may have different
subjective views: i.e. if they were to come to a consensus on an objective, material
comparison of situations (and further, agreement that these situations are objective and
material), they will not come to the same normative conclusions as to the more signifi-
cant aspects of these situations, and thus have no consensus on which is desirable. Yet,
at the same time, it is entirely unclear to the degree that participants share a common
objective picture. They may interpret the same event as implying that different underly-
ing processes were taking place. Further, their assessment of the normative judgment of
other stakeholders may be suspect. To compound all of these factors, the stakeholders
may not differentiate between these kinds of assessments and misassessments.
An appropriate method for clarifying and arranging these distinctions should imply and
justify potentially unexpected consequences in the limited cases in which it is unam-
biguously successful, and draw critical attention to structural problems when they may
undermine other analysis. Finally, even though arbitrating between the differences of
the stakeholders is a serious and sustained challenge, it is still not enough for properly
governing risk. For example, all of them could all be objectively wrong about how key
underlying processes work. What we would like to do is to properly govern risk, such
that no matter the circumstances, all parties can attest that a good faith effort was
made in managing all relevant factors.
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Scenarios and Biases
Foresight has a standard approach for tackling the multiple counterfactual forests of
different stakeholders, namely to assemble them into distinct scenarios or storylines that
reflect plausible sequences of events as some set of driving factors prove to have stronger
consequences than others. This scenario approach [Schwartz, 1991], most famously
applied by Shell ([Team, 2005]), has come to develop sophisticated methods for eliciting
and representing the kind of temporal multiplicity faced in these issues (in particular,
see [List, 2004]). As such, this project looks at developing stakeholder-sensitive scenario
construction, simulation, and usage practices suitable for the risk governance of high-
hazard, long-term material commitments. Therefore, these methods are designed to
discover both the causal structures underlying risky phenomena, both in terms of their
objective effects as well as their subjectively perceived harms.
It is appropriate to question if the methods currently used within foresight provide the
right cognitive toolkit for considering questions of risk [Verdoux, 2010]. Unfortunately,
the answer appears to be negative, as scenario-based approaches can cause support-
theoretic biases [Tetlock, 2005a], or the bias of assessing that a given event is more
likely the more variations or reasons for it, no matter the likelihood of those variations
or the quality of those reasons. In order to address this barrier, we turned to new
research in causality developed in developmental cognitive psychology, which investigates
how people form the structure of dependencies leading to their expectations. Using
this framework, we can inquire not only into the predictions of stakeholders, but into
the structure of dependencies between events perceived by the stakeholders, while not
introducing additional criteria favoring particular options.
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This Project: Its Purposes, Objectives, and Scope
Foresight, like history, requires one to structure information in a way that allows the
reader to understand its narrative threads, but unlike history, the various strands that
form its rich tapestry have not yet come together. To govern risk means discovering
and keeping track of the tangle of mutually-inconsistent counterfactuals, and continually
interrogating them for their consequences. This project has developed an approach
designed for discovering the relevant facts and concerns of distributed risks and persisting
them for continual use, in an online1 fashion. This approach has three purposes:
• Discovery We would like for individuals attempting to govern distributed risk
to identify and understand as many of the relevant factors at play as possible.
Therefore, we have designed a way to elicit knowledge that assures that what we
learn is usefully structured, but only includes the very weakest of preconceptions.
• Knowledge Critique We have no prior preconception of how rich or complete
the mental models are, either with respect to empirical knowledge or with mutual
understanding. By eliciting structure, we can discover where those structures are
incomplete, inconsistent, impoverished, or vague.
• Analysis In the cases where stakeholders do have cohesive pictures of the scenarios
facing them, it is entirely possible that the consequences of this understanding,
when combined with the understanding of fellow stakeholders, is unclear. It might
simply be impossible to understand the tangled web of consequences without aide.
By formalizing and simulating these mental models, we may be able to build some
intuitions about the aggregate effects of their combined scenarios.
Given those purposes, this project has the following objectives:
1By online, we mean online in the sense of ’online planning’, or undertaken while the processes under
study are ongoing, as opposed to meaning ’accessible via the internet’.
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• Engineer scenario representation methods that allow for the capture, analysis,
storage, and reuse of causal and impact information.
• Develop elicitation methods that progressively delimit and arbitrate governance
deficits.
• Implement simulation methods capable of demonstrating plausible scenarios from
elicited causal structures.
• Position uncertainty discovery as a valid governance need.
As important as it is to specify what it is that a project will do, it is equally important
to say what it will not accomplish, and give a sense of the overall scope. While it
would be ideal if this project analyzed a distributed risk infrastructure problem in depth,
that would be a more appropriate scope for a doctorate. Instead, this project develops
theoretical foundations for representation, elicitation, and analysis.
It also would have been better if the elicitation method presented in this report was sub-
jected to field trials, but that was not undertaken due to circumstantial reasons. As it
stands, the elicitation procedure should be considered untested, offered as a demonstra-
tion of a method that could meet theoretical constraints. It is also important to say that
this project did not have a substantial public communications component nor an imme-
diate commercialization of its findings. This choice reflects the personal temperament
of the author, as either would have been suitable activities.
These methods of developed in this project are not above evaluation, and criteria for
evaluation is given. Yet, the scope of this project is such that these approaches were
developed theoretically, and thus should be considered unevaluated. As such, although
you may find applications, there is yet no warranty, either expressly stated nor implied.
We can say that given the preliminary nature of this attempt, it is extremely unlikely
that the methods found here are optimal by those measures.
13
Methodological Framework
Overall, the methodological framework developed here works according to a layered
approach (see Figure 1). In the innermost layer we find the exact distributed risk issues
that we are trying to deal with. If these problems are not entirely unique, then we can
learn from our mistakes and develop theories of what good governance and regulation
consists of, and how it can fail. We then have a more general body of knowledge for
governing risk issues in general, (next-to-innermost layer). As we will see later, these
mistakes often consist of not looking widely enough, to discover all of the relevant
phenomena, stakeholders, and options available. Therefore, one way to address these
challenges is to use methods that are designed to be grounded in the insights of the
participants (outermost layer). However, these methods are open to the extent that
it can be tricky to establish that they address the discovery challenges posed in the
risk domain. For that reason, we take on the insights of methods that pose additional
domain-general inductive constraints (next-to-outermost layer), which we show here
provide a structure that allows us to have some confidence that the design methods
in question are addressing the discovery problems in question. In short, open methods
that take on additional causal constraints can address the risk governance deficits often
encountered in distributed risk issues.
Let us now look to the sources of this methodological framework. First, we describe how
we have employed design research methods. Next, we describe why technical modeling
is an appropriate stage for a discovery process. After this, we describe the technical
approaches used here. Finally, we talk about how the discovery capabilities of design
offer a new horizon for technical analysis.
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Figure 1: A Methodology of Layered Inductive Constraints
Design Research as Research for Discovery
We hope to provide scenarios solidly grounded in the input of the participants2, at the
risk of not initially making inferences we could otherwise posit if we were to assume
background knowledge.
There are many ways to go about eliciting information from participants, but this work
uses an interview protocol. Although interviewing is not always the most appropriate
or engaging means of elicitation, it often entails a smaller time commitment for the
participants, and is ideal for projects of tightly-controlled duration. Furthermore, by
interviewing we can make sure that our participants does not collude, and thus assure
that our results could have been gathered in any order, allowing us to make some
assumptions in the mathematical analysis of our results. In any case, the criteria found
through crafting interview protocols can then be applied to other elicitation methods.
As mentioned before, one of our central challenges is to sort out the objective and
subjective perceptions of the stakeholders and observers. What we want to tease out
2We explicitly undertake neither the methodological approach of grounded theory [Glaser and Strauss,
1967] [Strauss and Corbin, 2008], nor explicitly adopt whatever ideologies lie at the root of the theory.
However, there is something in the general spirit of the idea that’s appropriate to invoke here.
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specifically is how the stakeholders understand the benefits and risks present within
the overall subject, as well as the risks and benefits of various activities within that
subject. However, one key challenge is that different stakeholders might have vastly
different cares and concerns. We need to discover what this mental model is, while at
the same time directing their attention to key questions. Our protocols therefore aim at
constructing their understanding of the causal structure of ongoing and future events,
and their stakes within those events.
We only have a first-order approximation of how our stakeholders understand the issue
at hand. Therefore, it is appropriate construct the elicitation procedure so that it will be
as open-ended as possible. The open-ended interview [Fontanella et al., 2006] [Jarratt,
1996] [Kuniavsky, 2002] attempts to use only the words of the source, touching only on
present experience. Unfortunately, given our problem, we can follow neither follow the
path of inquiry developed by the interviewee with complete fidelity, nor can we focus
on the present experience entirely, as we are trying to understand their perspective on
future problems. In order to develop a grounded understanding of their future actions
and concerns, we need to have the participant connect the current conditions to possible
future conditions.
The observation that follows is that although a fully open-ended elicitation may not
be appropriate, we can work in terms of broad, yet constrained, units of analysis. The
Dervin sense-making interview [Dervin, 2001] offered us a demonstration of how to make
generic questions that elicited the concerns of the stakeholders, as well as several key
generic features of problems (obstacles, goals, bridges, actions) that could be carried
into our own protocol3.
To get around the problem of needing both understanding and coverage, the elicitation
methods used for this project are iteratively deepening. In other words, we start with as
high-level of an overview question as we can, and then proceed to ask open-ended model
3However, we cannot claim any similarity with Dervin’s methods beyond these superficial features.
In particular, this method is not necessarily critical.
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eliciting questions (a broad sampling of examples is provided in the protocols section)
until either the different aspects of the model (current behavior, eventual consequences)
are joined or the participant admits that these are yet unconnected, at which point a
more specific question is asked. Then, the goal is to build a connected model around
both this question, and to the mental models outlined before.
Deepening can also occur across sessions, a feature this approach shares with the Delphi
process [Linstone and Turoff, 1975]. There are numerous instances in which this may
be appropriate to undertake another elicitation session. The reasons to do so might
be for many different methodological objectives, from simply prompting stakeholders
to think further to confronting stakeholders with divergent opinions. However, extreme
care should be taken not to introduce these factors into the first of the interview, as
to do so would compromise the criteria of avoiding support-theoretic biases, as well
as violate exchangability, a statistical property necessary to the evaluation of overall
elicitation completeness.
In our own model, we became concerned with the connectivity of actions: do cur-
rent actions have any understood correspondence with the future risks? However, we
found that we could ask open situation-posing questions in terms of participant-provided
entities, that made use of an objective/subjective lens [Pennefather and Jones, 2008]
[Pennefather and Jones, 2009] to build scenarios ready for analysis.
Why Technical Modeling?
“Welcome to the only game in town” -Achewood [Onstad, 2009]
As this work focuses on building stakeholder-sensitive, causal models of risk and us-
ing them for simulations, it is worthwhile understanding what models are and why we
would resort to building models. Although Miller and Page’s definition of models [Miller
and Page, 2007a] and their justifications for computational modeling [Miller and Page,
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2007b] are valid and could serve us well, they do not address a design audience directly.
Similarly, Bruce Bueno de Mesquita’s justifications for applying mathematical models
to political questions are salient for risk governance [de Mesquita, 2004], but yet still
does not frame modeling practices in a way clearly acceptable to a trans-disciplinary
audience. However, I have found a methodological framing that does suit both the
character of this work and the audience, namely the use of structural formalisms as a
clarifying device [Tilly, 2004]. Below I summarize this framing in my own words.
Models are formalisms for selecting particular aspects of the overall problem to be
analyzed and conducting that analysis, which is merely seeing how those aspects combine
or behave together under the assumptions that formalism entails. Model construction is
a design activity in which that selection is undertaken, and where those selected factors
are integrated. It is inappropriate to say that the results of a modeling activity should be
taken as any final word, but they provide new insights that either suggest or eliminate
particular design directions. We engage in modeling for the same reason we engage in
all design research activity: to view those aspects of the problem in a way we could not
otherwise.
Computational modeling has two singular benefits. The first is that it forces one to
attempt to state the problem in a way that a computational formalism can use. This
alone can uncover many aspects of the problem that were not thought through to the
level the formalism may require4. The second is that the resulting model will frequently
behave in an unexpected way, that then requires an explanation, and therefore uncovering
new insights about the problem5.
However, there is an even more fraught observation that must be made about modeling:
it is, to follow the Achewood quote, the only game in town. We are all limited to
4Having said that, it is not infrequent that one discovers that a particular method of computational
modeling is unsuitable for the problem at hand. No method is suitable for all stages of all problems.
5Again, it is also the case that problems in the result of the model can also indicate problems with
the suitability of the formalism employed. It is a risk governance deficit to put too much, or too little,
trust in models.
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where we can reach given our personal limits of observation and cognition. We have
to accept that, as inclusive as we may try to be, we will never take in the whole of
another’s experience. We are left to operate on what we know, and therefore having
many modalities for discovering our own limitations and inconsistencies can give us a
better sense of what is appropriate. Viewing the frailties of our assumptions is a way to
gain some humility and perspective on our own understanding.
Technical Methods
Given this framing, we can now introduce the technical methods we are using in proper
context. As a starting point, we turned to the paradigm of reinforcement learning [Sutton
and Barto, 1998], also called neuro-dynamic programming [Bertsekas and Tsitsiklis,
1996], and is widely used in applications such as robotic-motion planning [LaValle,
2006]. These methods were selected for their general, yet directly applicable, units of
analysis: states of affairs, actions, stakeholders, observations, rewards/losses of varying
criteria, and discount rates. At times, the similarity between the abstract domain of
these methods and those of risk governance is uncanny. For example, using the method
of value iteration, one could say rather simply that closed-loop supply chains can have
an unboundedly higher reward that those that consign their materials to the scrapheap
at the end-of-life.
These models are nearly appropriate, but need to be augmented in various ways. The
first is that the preferences of each stakeholder are dependent upon the current state-of-
affairs, but very often there is no distinction made between the external state-of-affairs
and the state of the stakeholder themselves. Therefore, we wish to be very explicit
in specifying that the agent is not proceeding according to some static set of utility
evaluations, but instead may change their preferences, but are not dictated to do so,
according to a variety of factors including sociological pressures. Given the pluralistic
nature of risk governance, just as we do not reduce every perceived risk to objectively
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verifiable harms but will welcome these simplifications when they are available, we do
not demand that every such pressure be decomposable into psychological effects but
will certainly welcome those decompositions whenever such conclusions are found within
analytical sociology (such as in [Hedstrom, 2005]) or can be attributed to structurational
effects [Orlikowski, 1992].
The abstract, control-theoretic states-of-affairs provided by reinforcement learning ac-
tually already have a powerful connection to the representation of time, due to their
foundations in Markov chains [Norris, 1997]. Some notions that they borrow include
memory, rates of change, irreversibility, mixing, and entropy. The actual implementation
of the simulation is done with conventional approaches [Law and Kelton, 2000].
Design as a Discovery Process
Early on in the SFIN program, I became suitably impressed with the ability of design
methods to discover useful insights from qualitatively rich information. Although some
of my colleagues trained in more classical statistics questioned the validity of this work, I
was rather more impressed. This is because, in particular cases, the observations gener-
ated were not just data, but all of the underlying conditions that were observable about
why that phenomenon was the case, and not some other. There existed a distribution
where this myriad of factors was able to come together in a way that was explainable,
and where few other counterexamples presented themselves. For an illustrative example,
one could do worse than to consider Go-Gurt [Squires, 2002].
Go-Gurt was created with the aide an anthropologist who stayed with a two-child family
as that family was waking up early to go to school. One of the children in the story,
despite the mother’s concern to serve a healthy breakfast, is not hungry at breakfast
time. This lack of hunger, given the physiology of small children, the hour of the day,
and the short period of time after waking before breakfast, is not surprising. This child
would then eat their lunch earlier in the day, leaving himself hungry in the afternoon.
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Given this single observation, we should not be surprised that a nutritious, fun-to-eat,
portable, breakfast product shaped in the familiar form of a banana shape served that
family’s needs well. I can tell you that both early schooldays and child physiology are
far from peculiar to this particular family. What this implies is that the mere fact
that this happened once, combined with prior knowledge about life in the consumer
market generally, should (and gladly did) make the commercial prospects of a market
intervention strongly salient. A Bayesian statistics capable of transferring priors and
capturing the causal salience of single insights would be a powerful tool indeed for
ethnography and other design research approaches.
This view is also shared by a recent article about design education by Don Norman
[Norman, 2010]. One does not have to agree with the polemical thrust of the article’s
application to either design or design education, found within there was an interesting
proposal to statisticians: investigate statistical methods suitable for the way designers
work.
Designers are practitioners, which means they are not trying to extend the
knowledge base of science but instead, to apply the knowledge. The de-
signer’s goal is to have large, important impact. Scientists are interested
in truth, often in the distinction between the predictions of two differing
theories. The differences they look for are quite small: often statistically
significant but in terms of applied impact, quite unimportant. Experiments
that carefully control for numerous possible biases and that use large num-
bers of experimental observers are inappropriate for designers.
The designer needs results immediately, in hours or at possibly a few days.
Quite often tests of 5 to 10 people are quite sufficient. Yes, attention must
be paid to the possible biases (such as experimenter biases and the impact
of order of presentation of tests), but if one is looking for large effect, it
should be possible to do tests that are simpler and faster than are used by
the scientific community will suffice. Designs do not have to be optimal or
perfect: results that are not quite optimum or less than perfect are often
completely satisfactory for everyday usage. No everyday product is perfect,
nor need they be. We need experimental techniques that recognize these
pragmatic, applied goals.
Design needs to develop its own experimental methods. They should be sim-
ple and quick, looking for large phenomena and conditions that are ”good
enough.” But they must still be sensitive to statistical variability and ex-
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perimental biases. These methods do not exist: we need some sympathetic
statisticians to work with designers to develop these new, appropriate meth-
ods.
From Why Design Education Must Change? by Donald Norman
Although this project only directly addresses scenario formation processes in the domain
of risk governance, I have hopes that analytical techniques for causal discovery might
also apply to foresight, design, and ethnographic activities.
Background Research
This project hopes to draw on the wisdom and insight of many different fields. As
such, the literature review for this project engaged the coarse material of survey papers,
textbooks, and established programs of research as resources, engaging current questions
only as necessary. We have already been introduced to the framework of risk governance,
which serves as both a context for the overall study, and through risk governance deficits
as guidelines that define the objectives of the methods discussed here. Similarly, we have
already introduced design research methods focused on elicitation and sensemaking and
technical methods of modeling multi-stakeholder decision processes under uncertainty,
which provide us our methodological and analytical backgrounds respectively.
With this backdrop, we can now focus on the core problems that this research engages
(see Figure 2). This research addresses the challenges posed to foresight by key set
of studies in the statistical quality of political expertise, which found terrible results in
terms of classical Bayesian norms ([Tetlock, 2005a]). This research occurs at a time in
which venerable approaches for assessing psychological performance to classical norms
[Tversky and Kahneman, 1974] is being brought into question using a new framework
of causal discovery [Krynski and Tenenbaum, 2007]. This work seriously engages the
possibility of using causal Bayesian norms for issues of political judgment.
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Figure 2: Core Research Engagements
approaches in the risk domain, including basic introductions to causality and catastrophic
risk policy. Finally, we will look at the policy challenges posed by distributed risk issues
specifically.
Statistical Model Elicitation
“What is it about politics that makes us so dumb?”-Philip Tetlock, quoting
Daniel Kahneman [Tetlock, 2007]
Although there have been attempts to elicit statistical models in complex areas such as
political science [Gill and Walker, 2005] and ecology [Kuhnert et al., 2010], a very am-
bitious and substantial research program has cast doubt on the applying these practices
to policy. In Expert Political Judgment by Philip Tetlock [Tetlock, 2005a], he shows
that by certain statistical norms, political experts rarely show a predictive understanding
of their areas of concern better than predicting the most recent rate of change, that the
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experts who are most consulted by those in power and by the media predict as badly
as random choice. Further, the experts who are regularly consulted despite doing the
worst are those that are most confident, are the most reluctant to change their fur-
ther estimates when some are shown wrong, are the least likely to entertain alternative
possibilities, and are so set in their views that even good historical evidence would be
unlikely to change their minds. Perhaps our more cynical side would not be impressed by
the possibility that qualified nuances do not engage our emotional registers in the same
way as indignant certainty, but it is unfortunate to have that sad intuition so broadly
confirmed.
One striking factor about these findings is that systems thinking is the root of both
good and bad predictive judgment. For good predictive judgment, it allows for the
possibility of forces to come together in a variety of ways, as various trends come to
dominate or be squelched by factors that occasionally have very tiny thresholds, and
have a good counterfactual imagination. Those with bad predictive judgment see an
unequivocal combination of reinforcing and balancing factors which will drive a particular
contingency while mitigating others. Therefore, the capable expert not only has to think
systematically, but must also be able to integrate multiple perspectives effectively.
Perhaps the most troubling result for foresight practitioners is that scenario exercises,
which are explicitly designed to boost the counterfactual imagination, fail to change the
mind of those with set beliefs, and distort the opinions of the open minded; in short,
making the best worst off while offering no improvement to the rest. This distortion hap-
pens through the introduction of support-theoretic biases, which increase the perception
that a given factor is more likely given the number of reasons listed to support it. In the
experiment described, experts were first to estimate the likelihood of violence breaking
out throughout the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, and then were to consider various sce-
narios in which different kinds of violent conflict broke out. The result left the opinions
of those who resisted counterfactuals unchanged, while it left the results of those will-
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ing to consider counterfactuals logically inconsistent, giving probability estimates of the
various events that summed to higher than one.
Admittedly, scenario exercises can be constructed in a variety of ways, and introducing
support for scenarios that were previously unconsidered can reduce the support for the
status quo, perhaps yielding yet broader experts. Nonetheless, it would be troubling
if the results of scenario exercises could be coolly manipulated by merely controlling
the number of facts considered. I can appreciate some views that would indicate that
we should not be concerned; in particular, it could be tempting to say that prediction
is an invalid measure of anything, and that the kinds of stories that develop visions
produce change-makers who will have a normative impact despite the content of their
objective beliefs. However, while that may be appropriate for some design activities, the
mitigation of risk governance deficits does involve being able to realistically integrate
and give simultaneous consideration to multiple conflicting accounts of objective and
subjective risks.
However, before once again riding this train to the inevitable destination of the ob-
jective/subjective divide, let us consider something that should give us pause: are the
findings using the appropriate objective standard? I have always been concerned about
the framing of biases: according to exactly which model are particular inclinations biases
to? When are biases actually artifacts of using different statistical models, which may
be more appropriate for navigating the risk environment actually faced by a given stake-
holder? This may be an especially appropriate question for political decision making,
where many core events are remote possibilities and that the appropriate handling of
which requires making sound trade-offs from limited information. In order to assess if
this is correct, Tetlock gives us a demanding but fair standard:
Promoters of “debiasing” schemes should shoulder a heavy burden of proof.
Would-be buyers should insist that schemes that purportedly improve “how
they think” be grounded in solid assumptions about (a) the workings of
the human mind and -in particular- how people go about translating vague
hunches about causality into the precise probabilistic claims measured here;
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(b) the workings of the external environment and -in particular- the likely
impact of proposed correctives on the mistakes that people most commonly
make in coping with frequently recurring challenges.
From Expert Political Judgment by Philip Tetlock [Tetlock, 2005b]
It is the hypothesis of this work that newly developed causal Bayesian statistical frame-
works offer a better explanation of human decision making, while also being more suited
for many kinds of realistic problem solving activities than “unstructured” statistical tech-
niques, which would not be able to converge to any sound assessment based upon the
limited sample sizes found in may problems posing risks [Krynski and Tenenbaum, 2007].
Indeed, it is to some extent a testimony to the existing body of expert knowledge that
the right variables are available to be provided to the statistical methods, enabling their
steady performance.
However, to be clear, it is not the position of this work that bad statistical performance
should readily be excused as a result. I would prefer to think that those who were
the most nuanced, most skeptical, and already had the best performance would be
in the best position to incorporate the statistical models that ’beat’ them into their
own toolkit, and would use them in an appropriate and integratively sophisticated way.
Further, Tetlock’s work has done the most admirable job in developing frameworks to
keep experts accountable to reality, and any criticism here should be taken as an attempt
to extend this work, instead of undo any of the foundations it offers.
As an example of one such extension, it would be useful to be able to not only consider
cognitive habits of those who show good political judgment, but to also discover the
characteristics of good cognitively-realistic models on their own terms. Is it true that
good expertise is formed by deferring judgment between mentally maintaining the com-
peting equilibriums between distinct counterfactual paths, while maintaining an ultimate
skepticism that gives boring but reliable trends their due?
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Learning Causality and Discovering Structure
“If we’re so dumb, how come we’re so smart?”-Clark Glymour [Glymour,
2001]
How is it that the activities done in design might function in reducing risk? One an-
swer is that design processes may discover previously unknown stakeholders, criteria,
perceptions, and influences in risky processes. Surely the processes most associated
with the creative (and therefore valuable) aspects of design, such as brainstorming and
prototyping, provide exactly this capacity for discovery. Other design processes, such as
ethnography, usability studies, and observation, provide a small number of samples with
a very rich feature set, demonstrating that certain factors dominate others in the way
that systems interact, and that at least in certain scenarios, we can say deterministically
that a certain path of cause and effect, as well as certain interpretations of them, was
observed.
Given this, what we want is a design statistics that effectively learns gross distinctions
from a small number of observations, that successfully incorporate an unknown number
of previously unknown distinctions and criteria, that assembles ’theories’ of interaction
that transfer as correct biases for related situations, and builds theories of the results of
interventions that are accurate enough to justify considerable expense in testing them.
It is remarkable that these are exactly the problems that must be solved by infants and
children in learning how to classify objects, learn languages, understand the consequences
of actions, and act socially. Perhaps it is not entirely surprising, given that both the
beginning of a project and the beginning of a life are both events that necessitate rapid
learning. In any case, even if there does not prove to be any actual connection in the
kinds of learning taken at these respective early stages, that is no reason not to borrow
methods designed to address these questions. Therefore, methods from statistics that
have proved useful for cognitive developmental psychology may also be useful for design
27
applications.
First of all, let us consider how to build models that successfully incorporate an unknown
number of previously unknown distinctions and criteria. This is very important to risk
governance, as we do not know whom all of the stakeholders are, or how much the con-
cerns and criteria of various stakeholders overlap, all of the different causal factors at
work, or in fact the appropriate extent of the scope of the problem, generally speaking.
However, there are now statistical processes which can flexibly accommodate learning
an unknown, and potentially infinite, number of parameters, namely the field of non-
parametric Bayesian statistics (as nicely surveyed in [Jordan, 2010]). The models from
this field can handle unknown numbers of categories [Aldous, 1985], infinite numbers of
potential overlapping features [Griffiths and Ghahramani, 2005] [Thibaux and Jordan,
2007], and even distinguish previously unknown hierarchies of shared features in poten-
tially infinite pools of features [Miller et al., 2008]. Let us now see how this statistical
work will help us.
In the case of this study, we might always yet discover new concerns, new stakeholders,
and new events affecting our existing assessments. Yet, at the same time, we have
reason to believe that whatever work we have already done is effective at discovering
what we have asked. As we ask more stakeholders, we expect that we will first discover
the most widely known phenomena and most widely shared interests, and as we continue
to ask we will continue to hit pockets of less known but still significant phenomena and
interests, but will progressively find diminishing returns as the number of sources elicited
from grows. We could say that there are possibly an infinite number of stakes held but
they become increasingly tangential, and at some point we have no practical way of
knowing what we are yet excluding.
An intuitive model for this distribution of discovery is the Chinese Restaurant Process
(CRP), in which we suspect that each concern discovered will either be a previous
concern, chosen randomly but distributed in proportion to the concerns discovered so
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far, or occasionally a new category, found decreasingly in proportion to the number of
samples already taken, with the ratio of new elements in initial proportion to the term γ.
The CRP is named after a genre of restaurant consisting of a (seemly) infinite number
of large tables, in which new restaurant goers join tables in proportion to the number of
people already sitting at them, as those tables are likely to have the best food or party
members known to the arriving guest, but will occasionally strike out and head to a
new table. Here is a mathematical expression for the CRP (a guide to the mathematical
notation used in this paper can be found in Appendix D):




i−1+γ if nk > 0
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i−1+γ k is a new class
It turns out that the random process underlying the CRP is the Dirichlet process,
DP(γ,G), where G is a permutable measure. What this means for us in practical
terms is that as long as our sampling process is exchangeable (or, in other words, as
long as we do not have any ordering dependencies in which we sample), we can still
trust the statistical validity of our results without making any assumptions that the
samples are identically distributed. Further, each of the underlying categories can define
distributions of their own, leading to a Dirichlet process mixture model, which is to say,
a set of statistical models who’s memberships are distributed according to the CRP. We
will say a category z is distributed CRP with an exploration γ through the following
notation: z|γ ∼ CRP (γ) .
What if instead of expecting to slowly discover categories, with each new sample we
expect to discover some factors. Fortunately, that too can be accommodated by the
Indian Buffet Process (IBP). In this process, we pick some number of factors in pro-
portion to those previous samples that already have it, selecting some number of new
factors otherwise. It is as though one were going from seemingly infinite buffet of Indian
food, trying dishes as one sees earlier guests trying them. We can say that, we expect
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a distribution Z of the nth sample over k factors to be distributed as a Bernoulli trial
in proportion to the factors found in previous samples along with a Poisson over the
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It has turned out that this IBP also has an underlying process that permits exchange-
ability, namely the Beta process. Like the Dirichlet process, the Beta process can also
serve as the basis of a mixture model.
One important feature of mixture models is that they can be assembled hierarchically
through trees of conditional inference. For example, given that we have identified a
given kind of stakeholder, say an insurance company, then we know it is likely that they
have some concerns and not others, though this is only a prior since insurance companies
are not homogeneous. We can also have a prior over the spread within a given kind of
stakeholder: for example, insurance companies are probably more homogeneous in their
concerns than protesters. In short, this implies another of our attributes for a good design
statistics: it should learn ’theories’ of interaction that transfer correct biases for related
situations. Hierarchical non-parametric Bayesian models have been demonstrated to
learn this kind of theoretical homogeneity [Kemp et al., 2007], and have been extended
to discover complicated qualitative structure, including medical ontologies, aboriginal
Australian kinship systems, and political alliances [Kemp et al., 2006].
When combined with a very tiny amount of prior capability, such as the ability to
form graphs, grammars, or predicates, the capability to transfer knowledge implies the
capability to effectively learn gross distinctions from a small number of observations,
which was another of our desired features of a design statistics. Simple graphical con-
straints make it possible to learn complicated relationships, such as clusters, spaces,
6←−
n should be read as “all samples up to, but not including, the current sample.”
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grids, chains, grids, and rings; for example, that animals form a tree-like hierarchy and
that the distances between world cities can be well described by a grid of rings [Kemp
and Tenenbaum, 2008].
Perhaps most relevantly for this work, a statistics suitable for foresight should account
for the ability to learn reliable theories about the result of interventions, even if these
interventions have not been taken, and remain ’counterfactual’. Developmental psy-
chologists have posed the possibility that children, at a very young age, learn mental
representations called ’causal maps’ [Gopnik et al., 2004], which allow them to make
sensible inferences about the results of possible actions, without actually having to un-
dertake them. These results follow a near revolution in the philosophy of causality and
its applications in statistics and computer science [Pearl, 2000] [Spirtes et al., 2000].
This work finally puts common intuitions about the difference between causality and
correlation into a workable framework. For example, we should be able to capture such
clear intuitions that tampering with your barometer does not mean you can control the
weather, nor does accidentally setting off your burglar alarm imply someone is robbing
your house.
Beyond the success this work has enjoyed serving as an experimental research paradigm
for developmental psychology [Gopnik and Tenenbaum, 2007], this has important con-
sequence for risk governance: even in the policy sphere, we should expect that while
some interventions cannot be easily untangled from complex webs of mutual interac-
tion, while others clearly have no substantive dependence on earlier events, while having
strong downstream consequences. Consider the following examples of counterfactuals
from Expert Political Judgment:
“If the carriage driver of Archduke Ferdinand had not taken a fateful wrong
turn that gave the Serbian assassins a remarkable second chance to carry
out their previously botched assassination plot, war would not have broken
out in August 1914.”
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“If Stalin had lived several years longer (surviving his stroke but in an irra-
tional state of mind that encouraged high-risk adventures), World War III
could easily have broken out in the mid-1950s.”
“If bad weather had delayed the discovery by U-2 reconnaissance planes
of Soviet missiles in Cuba until the missiles were operational, the Soviets
would have refused the American demands to dismantle and withdraw the
weapons.”
It seems entirely appropriate that each of the antecedent in these statements should be
judged independently of how politically likely their consequents are assessed. In other
words, despite how likely different political ideologies assess these statements overall,
we should find no correlation between political preference and the assessed likelihood
of a lost driver, an individual medical outcome, or the vagaries of the weather, and the
fact that Tetlock finds such correlations is strong testimony to the problems of bias in
political expertise.
The consequence of all of these factors taken together is that, given domain-general
inductive constraints, causal effects can be learned effectively [Goodman et al., 2008b]
[Tenenbaum and Griffiths, 2003] [Griffiths and Tenenbaum, 2007] [Kemp et al., 2010].
Therefore, given the loose units of analysis defined by the overlap of risk governance
and reinforcement learning as inductive categories, the challenge is to develop elicitation
strategies that effectively learn the causal models of the stakeholders, allowing for a clear
understanding about the perception of interventions, and thus lead to the mitigation of
risk governance deficits.
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A Very Brief Introduction to Causality
Given the fundamental role causality has in this research, it is important to review
the basic concepts and definitions 7. Causality, for our purposes, is the study of the
dependences between events, and how interventions change those dependences. If I
were to ask you “What is the likelihood of it raining on any given day in Toronto
next year?”, the answer would be something along the lines of the percentage of days
it typically ranges in a given year, perhaps weighted more strongly by recent years to
account for changes in the local climate. On the other hand, if I were to ask “What is
the likelihood of it raining in Toronto on a spring day next year?”, a better answer would
likely no longer be the yearly average, but an average taken over days in spring, as we
know that the weather depends upon the seasons. For this reason, we might say that the
first is P (rain), and the second is P (rain|season), which we take to mean “the probability
of rain” and “the probability of rain, depending upon the season” (although both are
implicitly given the ground conditions of being evaluated per day in Toronto). Even in
the case of the first question, I might might be able to provide a better estimate through
knowledge about the proportion of the year that each season lasts, and the likelihood





Sometimes phenomena have no detectable paths of dependence between them, such
as whether it is raining (P (rain)) and if I receive an email from my friend in Japan
P (email from Japan) on any given day 8. Then, we would see that the probability of
rain is not influenced by the email, (P (rain) = P (rain|email from Japan)), and we could
say that these two events are independent (rain ⊥⊥ email from Japan).
Although the likelihood of one event is useful information about the likelihood of another
7See [Pearl, 2000] for a thorough introduction
8In some ways, this example already demonstrates the inescapable nature of background conditions,
such as to divide units of time in comparable ways, or to enjoy the perceptual richness to distinguish
both of these phenomena. We will, as throughout much of the rest of this paper, leave these questions
to philosophers and psychologists, and instead enjoy the fruits of their work uncritically.
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event, it does not mean that this event causes or is caused by that event, as these two
events may have some common cause. Consider that classic Midwestern observation,
“Every time you wash your car, it sure seems it’s more likely to rain.” In this case,
these events have a common cause, namely the time since it last rained, which was long
enough for the car to get sufficiently dirty as to have needed it. So, these two events,
while often having an uncanny correlation, do not cause each other, and are independent
given their common cause (rain ⊥⊥ wash car|days since last rain).
Now suppose that I go out on the back porch for breakfast, and find that the garden
has been watered, or P (garden watered). With negligible exceptions, I know that this
is a result of either that it had rained (P (garden watered|rain)), or that my wife ran
the sprinkler after I went to bed (P (garden watered|sprinkler) ). I may be interested
to know whether it rained (P (rain|garden watered)) or whether the sprinkler was run
(sprinkler|garden watered).
Now suppose I learn from my wife that she had run the sprinkler. As a result, the
watered garden has been explained, and I now presume that it probably did not rain, or
at the very least that the likelihood that it rained overnight is no greater than usual.
Although the likelihood that it rain given that the garden has been watered does not
change substantially (P (rain|garden watered)), it certainly changes in this case! The
use of the sprinkler is then said to “explain away” the fact that the garden has been
watered. In general, when an intervention is taken, we will know that this particular
cause offering its full contribution to the immediate effects, and the knowledge that it
is been undertaken will reduce the knowledge those effects might give use about the
likelihood of any other potential causes.
When we intervene, we ’sever’ the path of dependences between events, such that other
possible causes of the event are as likely as they were if the factor we intervened upon
had no relation. For example, in a town in central Illinois, they test the tornado sirens
on the first Tuesday of every month at 10 am. Given a tornado siren at this time, a
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tornado is no more or less likely than it would be on any day at 10 am, and thus we can
say that this testing severs the dependency between the tornado and the tornado siren.
Causality is study of how dependences change based upon interventions. Causal de-
pendence is different than the statistical definition of dependence. I may notice with
a strong probability that I am too hot when a thermometer is above a certain level,
but it would be ineffective to cool down by tampering with the thermometer. Although
correlation is not causation, causation can be discovered through interventions.
Systems can change drastically upon interventions. Although a system may counterbal-
ance the effect of an intervention, it is equally true that an intervention may sever the
flow of events leading to reinforcing and balancing events, changing the dynamics of
a system entirely. If we understand the causes that might bring about an intervention
regularly, it is appropriate to describe a larger system that includes it, to which statisti-
cal dependence then applies. Yet it is equally true that the number of potential system
topologies is combinatorially large, and even among the systems that we have observed
any number of causal topologies are statistically indistinguishable without intervention
[Spirtes et al., 2000]. Further, the combination of multiple paths of intervention would
undermine otherwise straightforward changes in the dynamics of a ’single’ system.
Risk Policy Basics
“Really, the risk to each of us is very small. At worst, we lose our lives.”-
William T. Vollman
If we are going to understand how to govern catastrophic risks, we need to understand
the policy concerns specific to catastrophic risks. For this, I turned to Catastrophe:
Risk and Response by Richard Posner [Posner, 2004] and Worst-case Scenarios by
Cass Sunstein [Sunstein, 2007], which are fine guides to catastrophic risk policy issues
written for a general audience. These volumes cover many of the challenges encountered
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when placing the ethically imponderable into the realm of the legally actionable, such as
the effective monetary value of lives, appropriate discount rates for different contexts,
and precaution versus estimation under extreme uncertainty. This section also refers
to content from Risk Governance [Renn, 2008] and from Mark de Figueiredo’s Ph.D.
dissertation [de Figueiredo, 2007].
Criteria for Risk Regulation
Considering the imponderables where we had left them, it is clearly impossible to have
an infinite degree of precaution, as risks are an inherent part of life. We cope with
this by treating risks differently: some we deem normal, others tolerable given measures
for protection and risk reduction, and yet others are intolerable. Yet, how do we decide
when risks are appropriate, or in other words, which risks should be subject to regulatory
measures?
One standard is the demonstrated willingness to pay to avoid risks. Willingness to pay
may be determined by observing all of the conditions in which a population currently
does pay to reduce their risk, or demand compensation for increasing their risk, and
aggregate these situations to determine a cost for a given risk. These studies reveal
complications which do not allow a strict price for mortal risk.
First of all, the price that people are willing to pay to avoid risk declines faster than the
likelihood of the risk. If we take each risk on its own, then this is not very sensible, as
this preference pays for larger risks disproportionately larger than smaller ones. However,
I have had an independent idea on this subject. Suppose that the number the number of
risks grows as we look down the scale of likelihood. This is a reasonable assumption, as
there are progressively more paths between chains of remote events at lower degrees of
likelihood. Further, suppose that we can only afford to eliminate some number of them.
In this case, picking the optimal combination of what we can afford is equivalent to
the 0-1 knapsack problem, and thus is computationally hard [Karp, 1972]. If evaluating
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these possibilities takes some expense, then it would be infeasible to expect people to pay
proportionately, and instead pricing more likely risks disproportionately higher would be
a reasonable heuristic for achieving a balanced overall protection. Given this complexity,
determining the actuarial cost of risks should be recognized as a valuable activity, worth
compensating a firm or department for undertaking on one’s behalf.
Another consideration is a consequence of risk being undertaken socially. Consider two
risks that pose equal risks on an individual basis, but in one case, the risk to individuals
is dependent, while in another case, it is independent. Surely we would like to pay more
to prevent the dependent case, as the losses imposed on society are greater.
Even taking into account social and heuristic considerations for risk perception, the
actuarial conception of risk still does not capture many relevant factors. The first of
all, it is often not normatively appropriate to assess different risks identically. First of
all, there is a difference between risks that individuals voluntarily agree to, and have
some responsibility in controlling, versus those that they are subjected to without their
consent. When risks are imposed, people distinguish between whether it is imposed by
other individuals, who are presumably profiting from it, or whether the risk is natural,
and thus is to the advantage of nobody. People also distinguish between the kinds of
harms that risks impose, whether they are physical, financial, or otherwise. One way to
get a handle on the resulting conception of risk is to consider some semantic categories
for risk, and consider how people respond to them differently:
• Emerging Danger (fatal threat) Industrial facilities and other installations
can break down, imposing a random and catastrophic risk on the surrounding
population. Such facilities may be run with profit to their owners, where it is
uncertain if that profit will be used to compensate the surrounding population in
this case of catastrophe. People will demand high reductions to the risks imposed
by this situation, but will have a low willingness to pay for this reduction without
some share of the benefit.
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• Stroke of Fate Natural disasters are posed as risks beyond human control,
quirks of fate or acts of God. Due to rarity, individuals perceive natural disasters
as proceeding according to natural cycles or to divine purpose, instead of specific
random processes. For this reason, people will underestimate these kinds of risk,
and will, for example, return to areas that are prone to flooding. This perception
has made it politically difficult to mitigate against natural risks, leading to regula-
tory choices that are difficult to justify in areas such as flood insurance [Holladay
and Schwartz, 2010].
• Personal Thrill In these activities, people directly undertake activities knowing
that they are risky, and that they will have to exercise skill to overcome these risks.
In order to be considered appropriate, these activities are completely voluntary,
involving only those who agree to (and usually pay others for) them.
• Gamble In gambles, people make undertake risks in order to gain potential
rewards. Gambles for any stakes other than monetary gains and losses are seen as
ethically troubled. Gambles are characterized by probabilistic thinking.
• Indicator of insidious danger (slow killer) These risks are related to unobserv-
able dangers found in air, water, and food. These risks are effectively invisible, and
often cause their harm slowly over a long period, such that there is no personal sen-
sation relating to these harms. Individuals are often willing to accept a reasonable
level of risk given that they trust the institutions responsible for monitoring and
regulating them. However, if such trust is lost, then individuals will demand very
low risks in these areas, and that this reduction in risk is independently verified.
Other semantic categories may exist. I suspect that there are a large class of risks
related to the conception of everyday life, in which individuals are expected to take and
personally manage risks through skill in order to be considered competent in society.
Such risks might include driving, shopping for food and other essentials, and risks related
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to conventional professions and workplaces. In all cases the political question of who
should pay to reduce a risk affects how much any individual is willing to pay. Under the
expectation that risks may be fairly adjudicated, this may be a rational response to risk
when considered in aggregate.
Finally, there are times in which risk preferences reflect neither actuarial nor normative
conceptions. In many of these cases, it may genuinely be the case that destructive
biases are at work. One such bias is the availability bias, in which events that the
individual experienced or are familiar with are evaluated as much more likely than their
naturally occurring rate. As an extreme example, consider that following the 9/11
terrorist attacks, airline travelers were willing to pay more for flight insurance against
damages due to terrorism than flight insurance against all causes (including terrorism).
These biases, outside of their role as heuristics for social costs and social norms, represent
vicissitudes which effective risk governance institutions must be able to resist.
Distributed Risk Basics
Distributed risks are created by problems that appear to have scientifically-uncertain irre-
versible long-term public costs that span borders, while the mitigation to those problems
appear to have uncertain rewards and heavy short-term individual costs under specific
regulatory frameworks (for an easier comparison, see Table 3).
Table 3: Disparities for Distributed Risk Phenomena and Mitigation Approaches
Risk Aspect Phenomena Mitigation
Responsibility Bearer Public Private
Magnitude Scientifically-uncertain Untestable
Temporal Extent Intergeneration (unlimited) Generational
Regulatory Regime International National
Spatial Extent Worldwide Unknown
Liability No Retroactive Basis Potentially Retroactive
Scope of Impact Total Incomplete
Temporal Origin Uncertain Immediate
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Let us briefly consider two distributed risk issues. The first of these is the adoption
of closed-loop supply chains as a remediation measure for raw material depletion. In
its most basic form, raw material depletion is simply a restatement of the third law
of thermodynamics, in that it is easier to convert an ordered or pure substance into
a disordered or impure substance than vice-versa. Although we may be far away from
these physical limits, it is safe to say that it is unclear if viable technologies for the
restoration of materials can be figured out well enough to keep supplying demand levels
that are hard to move away from. Collectively, we may not be clever enough to solve
these thermodynamic problems, in which case we might suffer from an “Ingenuity Gap”
[Homer-Dixon, 1995].
One proposed remedy has been to develop systems for maintaining and upcycling tech-
nical and biological materials, creating a closed-loop that does not suffer the thermody-
namic decline so readily [McDonough and Braungart, 2002]. Unfortunately, the usage
side of the loop currently introduces uncertainty in the rate at which resources will be
available, posing short-term logistical challenges to closed-loop practitioners in compar-
ison to their peers using conventional supply chains [Pochampally et al., 2009]. Thus,
we see costs imposed internally to firms who attempt mitigation, while the bulk of par-
ticipants endure longer-term supply risks, which in turn depletes the common pool of
raw resources, leading to mitigation attempts being negligible in their overall effect.
As raw resources become scarcer, that also means turning to resources that are more
difficult to discover and extract. As discovery becomes more difficult, there is progres-
sively larger uncertainty about how much of a resource exists at all, such that the error
in the estimate is a greater percentage of the tail of resources available [Taleb, 2011].
The onset of material scarcity may be diffuse, masked by unknown reserve levels in
politically closed countries. Having said that, I have not yet convinced myself that an
economic treatment of scarce resources will not arbitrate an equilibrium, and Posner’s
dismissal of the issue [Posner, 2004] has given me pause.
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Another interesting distributed risk issue is the effects of climate change versus the
measures designed to address greenhouse gasses. Imagine that you own an airline. An
increase in the incidence of severe weather could present any number of problems: a
greater risk of weather-related dangers when flying, more volatility in flight times and
routes, hail damage to aircraft, extreme temperature wear on supporting airports and
runways, a larger number of extreme weather events such as tornadoes and hurricanes,
and greater insurance premiums against all of these concerns.
Now, as an airline owner, let us think about a different problem. Aircraft currently
have few technical choices when it comes to emissions. Concerns about these emissions
include regulations affecting the level of allowed pollutants, public expectations about
the current efforts to reduce them, the appropriate level of investment into alternative
fuels is appropriate, offsetting activities and how they are offered as part of the business,
future liabilities for current pollution activities, and insuring current activities against
regulatory and business continuity risks.
As an airline owner, even if you grant that these problems are fundamentally related
in the conventional causal understanding of climate change9, namely that emissions
lead to climate change, which in turn, leads to a greater incidence of extreme weather.
However, it is currently impractical to act as though mitigating emissions will have any
bearing on weather-related risks. The atmosphere is a commons, such that most actions
taken unilaterally will only have a symbolic impact, as the power to intervene directly is
distributed across many different stakeholders.
These two distributed risk issues demonstrate the challenge of managing commons re-
sources under dispersed control. How is it that any kind of mitigation infrastructure could
ever be deployed to handle these sorts of issues? One way to understand the deployment
9I’ve had the pleasure of knowing intelligent individuals who held well-informed critiques of conven-
tional views on climate change, where they were in no position to be rewarded for their positions, and
often quite the reverse. The question is not whether they are right or wrong, as the most serious claims
focus around hidden common causes and are untestable except by experiments at full-scale, which are
unthinkable. Instead, the right question is what exactly their claims are and how they integrate into the
overall body of knowledge about the problem.
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of new technological infrastructure at any scale is as a development pipeline (see Ta-
ble 4). In this pipeline, publicly-funded general research is transitioned to infrastructure
with privately run components, in which the risk becomes progressively more privately
undertaken and normalized within an ordinary liability framework, until which time fa-
cilities need to be decommissioned, at which time earlier profits, as well as the profits
from new infrastructure, can see to their maintenance. In this way, publicly-funded
research and site monitoring are financed by the value generated from the productive
period of similar infrastructures. The challenge of distributed risk problems is ’merely’
financing a mitigation infrastructure portfolio using value captured from those activities
that generate uncertain risks, and we can ’merely’ sample the stakeholders of a given
mitigation technology to assess its likely adoption.
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Table 4: Infrastructure Development Pipeline
Early Stage Research
Objective: Must obtain grants from research sponsors and approval from
peers through peer-reviewed publication
Funding: public or philanthropic (whether through a specific company or
individual, industry association, or charitable organization)
Kind of Risk: public and professional (academic reputation, catastrophic
experiments)
Liability: held by institution of membership, sponsoring institution, and by
individual researchers
Pilot Studies
Objective: must demonstrate technical competence in an area of need
Funding: Ministry-specific public scientific funding, very early stage invest-
ment
Kind of Risk: Public (limited experimental danger and political risk)
Liability: still held by the public, likely needs approval from regional risk
management officials
Incentive-driven Deployment
Objective: build the business and technical pipeline which will come to serve
the needs of customers
Funding: Largely private,business development public funding
Kind of Risk: Public and private
Liability: Publicly and privately shared
Commercial Operation
Objective: Run the infrastructure as a successful business, fulfilling its role
in the market
Funding: Private, should be self sustaining
Kind of Risk: Private
Liability: Privately held, and privately insurable
Maintenance and Optimization
Objective: Continue to operate effectively as a utility or public site
Funding: Public (monitoring body)
Kind of Risk: Public (failures in maintenance)
Liability: Publicly held, unless earlier negligence clearly demonstrated
Decommissioning
Objective: Transition resources to other roles
Funding: Public
Kind of Risk: Public (misappraisal of reduced risk)
Liability: Public
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This pipeline suggests certain parties that will be involved no matter the underlying prob-
lem. Each stage includes primary participants, the regulators of that participation, and
activists that act as meta-regulators (driving or squelching the overall process). Overall,
we should expect that a new infrastructure technology will involve researchers and inven-
tors of new infrastructure technologies; engineers and technical reviewers determining if
the infrastructure is appropriate; investors and finance; clients and market makers; fi-
nance regulation; operators and facility staff; facility regulators, including environmental
regulators; insurers and insurance regulators; and activists and other meta-regulators.
While not definitive, this list can be checked against the methods provided later for
evaluating the completeness of stakeholder coverage.
Core of the Project
This section describes a method for representing, simulating, modeling, and eliciting
the stakeholder worldviews in a way which mitigates risk governance deficits and elides
support-theoretic risks to political judgment. First, we will provide an overview that
will explain these methods and their advantages. Next, we will describe exactly the
structural and perceptual distinctions we hope to capture. Then, we will show how
to capture and assemble these distinctions into risk models. Finally, we will give an
elicitation procedure for producing these models.
The Complete Process: An Overview
Let us start with the big picture by considering the complete process (as shown in
Figure 3) and its advantages over methods that don’t include similar procedures. This
process can begin at any time, and should begin as early as possible. In the beginning
is a research stage, which addresses or attempts to discover any undertaking which
might have a widespread physical effect, whether or not it is currently known to be
risky. This document says very little about how to undertake such research processes,
which may include environmental scanning, traditionally-undertaken intelligence work,
or automated text analysis. This research may lead to an initial coding that establishes
a baseline comparison against what is learned through interviewing. Immediately after
learning a very rough constellation of stakeholders and body of general concerns, the
interviewing begins. This is one point where this approach diverges from many other
methods. While survey methods attempt to answer specific questions using classical
confidence intervals, this method uses non-parametric Bayesian methods to peer into
an open universe. Unlike open-ended interviewing, which is often constrained to the
general impressions of a particular experience or service, this interview approach can
discover unknown aspects of the problem domain. Further, this method then forms a
more inductively powerful model than a free-form response.
After each interview, one then attempts to code the results. While the interview process
is tailored to discover complete elements, it is in this stage of analysis that one finds the
structure the interview has discovered. On the positive side, new patterns, overlaps, and
concurrent interactions can be found. On the other hand, we will see failures to make
connections, such that elements mentioned in one circumstance might never mentioned
in other circumstances where they might be equally applicable. Overall, coding allows
us to draw finer distinctions between the relationships between various elements than
methods that do not have a formal component.
With the results of the coding, one can then undertake making inferences about the
models. This inference lets us talk about how far we are in the discovery process, by
talking about the rate that we discover new model elements and their features. It also
lets us find differences between stakeholders, by observing differences in the models
that they tend to form. These differences may highlight where strategic interaction
will fail due to different underlying assumptions. Methods that don’t build models of






































Figure 3: A Process Diagram for these Scenario Modeling Practices
they abdicate responsibility for their coverage. Models of inference also help discover
variance between the facts reported about different phenomena, and variances in what
different groups report about different phenomena, without which we can say very little
about the overall state of knowledge.
Once a partial model is developed, one can begin to learn about potential implications
through simulation. Although the participants may know about all of the phenomena
and interests at play, that does not imply that they know about all of the consequences
and interactions that knowledge implies. Even with an incomplete model, one can
discover new paths of events. Approaches that do not undertake simulation or other
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methods of elaboration may not discover these interactions.
From each simulation, one should attempt to find a narrative that fits it. This narration
acts as a sanity check to the modeling practices. If the process finds models that
don’t make any sense, this is an indication that further development of the model (or
underlying formalism) is necessary10. Modeling processes that fail to check that their
outputs are reasonable may lose their fidelity to the real world. This project is not yet
prepared to offer guidance for the narration process, and leaves this kind of “sanity
checking” to the practitioner. However, it is important to underline that this is a very
important step, without which the process is sorely incomplete, and offering narration
guidelines is a worthy undertaking for future work.
Finally, one can use these results for action. These actions include socializing the findings
through a re-interviewing process or directly intervening in the processes discovered. It
is useful to maintain a separation between those responsible for direct interventions and
those responsible for continuing to discover new aspects to the problems, so that the
findings of this processes are not distorted by an attempt to represent their stakes in a
particular light.
Overall, this process may be undertaken continuously in an online fashion. In particular,
we can talk about the rate at which we are discovering previously unknown impacts, and
the distribution of those impacts, and therefore focus resources into discovery processes,
versus other operational priorities, in a principled way. Although design is characterized
as an early stage activity (which is appropriate), this process can begin at any time and
should continue to be carried out as the cost of undiscovered risks is the most pressing
improvement that can be made with available resources.
10Of course, failing to find a story from a sequence of simulated events can also be a sign that the
narrator is not recognizing an unusual, but possible, scenario.
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Structural and Perceptual Distinctions
We are interested in building models composed of participant-provided entities, but in
order to build scenarios, we have to impose some inductive structure. The protocol is
designed to elicit distinctions of:
• the structure of the stakeholder’s objective understanding: Stakeholders will
have different structures of objective knowledge. First of all, the scope of their
understanding about different processes will be different. For example, a concrete
process engineer will have a rigorous understanding of the process of making con-
crete, including its costs and alternatives, but may have a limited grasp on the
impacts of climate change. Similarly, a climate scientist may have a solid under-
standing of the ecosystem impacts of climate change, but may not understand
the economic challenges created by shifting between technologies with different
performance characteristics. Next, their understanding about the correspondences
between events will be different. The same observed phenomena might have dif-
ferent causes, indicating that different processes are at work, and that different
actions are appropriate. Even if the underlying current condition is agreed upon,
the consequences of further actions and events may be disputed. Also, they may
disagree in their assessment of how the nature of these correspondences could be
altered by the dynamics at which phenomena interact. They may believe that par-
ticular phenomena will unfold with different rates or intensities of change. Even if
stakeholders agree about the potential correspondences between phenomena, their
assessment of the likelihoods of these correspondences holding may be different.
A stakeholder may think one consequence is much more likely than another, or
that some occurrence will indicate one cause much more likely instead of another.
Finally, although stakeholders may agree on underlying processes in every respect,
they may disagree on the salience of observable factors in determining the con-
dition of the underlying process. In summary, the mental models of stakeholders
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might disagree in objective content, in causal connectivity, in dynamic interaction,
in magnitude of correlation, and in the degree of observability.
• the structure of the stakeholder’s subjective perceptions: Stakeholders will
also have different subjective perceptions. First of all, each stakeholder will iden-
tify different kinds of losses they may endure, including loss of life, loved ones,
livelihood, property, resources, comfort, opportunity, and knowledge in the secu-
rity of natural world and future generations. Next, the different stakeholders will
experience different magnitude of these losses in different situations. Also, when
faced with many different kinds and magnitudes of losses, stakeholders may choose
different trade-offs between mixtures of losses. Finally, each stakeholder will assess
the different kinds, magnitudes, and trade-offs of other stakeholders differently.
What one stakeholder will value, another may not. However, at the same time,
there is a difference between what one imagines the impact of a loss will be like,
so the assessment of other stakeholders may not be a misassessment. Altogether,
the assessment of loss of stakeholders may be different by kind, magnitude, trade,
and observer.
• the stakeholder’s understanding of objective orientation: Given the stake-
holder’s understanding of the objective structures and subjective concerns for the
matter at hand, there is still their perception of what the current situation is.
This includes both the current condition, but also any ongoing trends, processes,
or activities. This may also imply a perception of benefits or losses being conferred
upon stakeholders currently. The understanding of the current situation includes
what is believed about the past.
• subjective perception of objective knowledge: Stakeholders may also have
different appraisal of the objective understanding of other stakeholders. This works
both positively and negatively, as they might believe that other stakeholders have
better or worse understandings of particular knowledge areas, grasps on the factors
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determining causal outcomes, and expectations of likeliness. The awareness that
others know more may occasionally serve as an indication of trust, and often an
expectation of responsibility for management or regulation. Similarly, the suspicion
that another stakeholder does not understand an area with an impact upon other
stakeholders may be taken as an impression of negligence.
Assembling Structure into Cohesive Risk Models
Given our commitment to model the distinctions above, we would like to model input
from the stakeholders such that we capture that input with fidelity, and yet do not
introduce any background information beyond those distinctions. At the same time,
we wish to not irritate our stakeholders by asking about common knowledge, nor to
produce models that are incomprehensibly large, but largely composed of trivialities. This
produces a very challenging representation problem, in that we want to capture the right
features for risk models while maintaining usability. This section first creates modeling
primitives to meet this objective. Then, we demonstrate how these model components
come together in order to simulate potential outcomes. Finally, we show how this model
comes to be built in elicitation procedures by giving a statistical characterization of its
discovery process.
Structural Elements
In this section, we introduce the structures of our scenario model. Here, we are aiming
to create a scheme for representation that can be suitably complete and precise, yet
realistic and flexible. In order to explain this model specifically, the following employs
notations from mathematics (see Appendix D for a guide to the mathematical notation
used within this paper), although hopefully the explanations will suffice. Along with
the mathematics, we also present a programming language for representing this model
that demonstrates how to put these structures to work (a complete grammar of this
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programming language can be found in Appendix A). Given this introduction, let us
begin.
The first thing that needs to be established is the objective content of the observer:
what is it they are talking about? A structure is a description of physical facts and
the relationships between them. Let us call a particular example of such a description
s, and that there is a set of all possible structures, S, such that s ∈ S. Without
loss of generality, we can confine the description of a structure to a given point or
interval of time11, t, if we can say for every component and relationship was present
(or absent) throughout12 this time. Let us denote this confinement as s[t]. However,
what we are trying to capture is components or behavior that are static with respect to
the phenomenon under analysis, so structures should not generally include changes of
conditions. However, structures can represent unchanging rates or norms, even though
those imply activity; for example, a steady flow or an average day of sales are perfectly
fine to include in a structure. In general, it may be very difficult to tell if the descriptions
of structures are contradictory or not. For example, if a house is white, but somebody
else says it is brown, it may be a brown and white house, or we could have conflicting
accounts.
There are many ways these structures can be modeled. The absolute minimum we could
do would be to list out all the participant said when elicited about the situation. Let us
say first that a structure could be a bag of descriptions. We have some number of short
textual labels, or tags, that describe a particular condition, and that each of these tags
is one of the overall set of tags used in the model (tags ∈ Tags). It could be that these
tags designate quantities, percentages, or are only true in some fuzzy sense, so it is
useful to associate each of these tags with a real-valued weight (w ∈ ℜ), such that each
additional point of data is taken to be an ordered pair d = (tag,w) ∈ (Tags,ℜ) = D.
By default, the tag value is 1, which we interpret to mean that the proposition suggested
11As a rough approximation, interval temporal logic [Allen and Ferguson, 1994] will serve as a guide.
12Optionally, during semantics can also be specified, but they are not the default.
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by the tag is true. Therefore, a structure contains weighted tags.
This is fine, as far as it goes, and it can go far, but there will often be more structure to
the structure, so to speak, than a flat list. Therefore, it makes sense for structures to
contain other structures, and so we can arbitrarily nest structures, and define structures
recursively as s ∈ S = D
⋃
P(S). In summary, structures are nested, weighted tag
clouds. Although it will not be shown here, this is sufficient to represent an arbitrary
set of relations between boolean and real-valued quantities.
Now that we have introduced structures, let us show how to represent them. Here’s an
example, where we are saying that the United States’s Great Plains region is at the risk
of transitioning to a desert ecosystem, and that this is currently the case according to
a Canadian carbon air capture technology expert:
structure usGreatPlainsAtDesertRisk
(usGreatPlains atDesertRisk)
current according to CanadianCACTechExpert.
We see that first we declare a structure with the name ’usGreatPlainsAtDesertRisk’ and
that this structure consists of a cloud with two tags (with default weight one). Giving
the cloud is optional, in which case the structure is taken to be the cloud with one tag,
the name. Anytime we declare that a particular condition is, was, or will be the case, it
becomes necessary to identify which stakeholder asserted that it was so.
It is useful to talk about structural expressions, se ∈ Se, which are equivalence classes
defined by logical expressions over structures. For example, we might be interested in
all structures with the tag ’atDesertRisk’. We could say that as contains($region,
atDesertRisk), such that CanadianCACTechExpert would say that $region could
currently be satisfied by (usGreatPlains atDesertRisk).
Structures are always partial descriptions, so multiple structures are used to describe the
overall condition at the same time. The complete set of structures at any given time
describes the state-of-affairs, or state for short, which itself is a member in all possible
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states (x ∈ X). Every state is merely the structures it is composed of (x ⊂ S), and
states admit temporal confinement in the same way as structures, such that we can talk
about x[t] in the same way as s[t].
It’s very useful to distinguish some structural elements from others. Prime among these
are stakeholders, sk ∈ Sk ⊂ S. Stakeholders indicate what they perceive to be the
case, but they also can participate in those perceptions. Stakeholders who are providing
the information are called the ’observing stakeholders’, ob ∈ OB ⊂ Sk. Here are two
stakeholders that we have seen before:
stakeholder UnitedStates.
stakeholder CanadianCACTechExpert.
Stakeholders are structures for a very important reason: stakeholders are not simply
labels, but instead can represent composites of different interests based upon varying
conditions. A farmer who loses their farm to a flood likely has a different set of concerns
about agricultural policies afterwords.
Stakeholders are informed of states-of-affairs through observations, or rather observable
factors, which are structures composing the state-of-affairs in their own right, such that
o ∈ O ⊂ S. Observations can be declared in a straightforward way. Each stakeholder
will report some subset of the observations as being the case at some particular time,
Oob[t] ⊂ O. Here is an example of an observation:
observation drought.
Every underlying set of states can potentially generate some set of observable factors,
according to some distribution θ ∈ Θ : P(S) → P (P(O)). These distributions can be
subject to various dependency structures, but can also be expressed in an uncomplicated
way when a stakeholder expresses them as such. As different observation functions, or
sensings, are provided by different observers, we designate the observation functions
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elicited from a particular observer as Θob ⊂ Θ. Here is an example of an observation
function:
observe (drought) when (climateChangeCurrent)
according to CanadianCACTechExpert.
As we have direct access to observables, but not the underlying conditions that caused
them, it is often appropriate to talk in terms of the inverse of θ, or θ−1 ∈ Θ−1 : P(O)→
P (P(S)).
It may be important to consider whether stakeholders will actually observe these factors,
but to ’notice’ is just one of many actions a stakeholder may undertake. As such, we
generally designate actions as another kind of structure a ∈ A ⊂ S.
action doNothing.
Given that we can represent actions, structures, and states, we are now prepared to
understand how actions initiate change in the state through events that affect structures.
Events change one structure into another over a period of time according to some
probability distribution, such that E : X → P (X × T ). This is accomplished in terms
of its structures, such that each event only changes some portions of some of the
structures, leaving the rest unchanged. So, we can say that each event will change
structures in the state that match some structure expressions into structures that match
other structural expressions, or E : P(Se) → P (P(Se) × T ). This implies that, for all
the states-of-affairs that might be affected by the event in the same way, and all of the
substructures which satisfy the expressions in the same way, we only need to specify a
given event once. A given observer will report some subset of events, which we designate
as Eob ⊂ E. For a given event (e ∈ E), let us describe the set of structural expressions
forming the precondition as Pre(e) ⊂ P(Se), and postconditions as Post(e) ⊂ P(Se).
Symmetrically, we can talk about the subsets of events that have a given expression
(se ∈ Se) as a precondition PreSet(se) ∈ E or postcondition PostSet(se) ∈ E. Let
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pe,t be the distribution of the duration of event e, given that it does occur. Here is an
example of an event that leaves both probability and timescale unspecified:
event climateChangeRegionalImpacts
if $climate contains [climateChange, unmitigated]
and $region contains [atDesertRisk]
and $region does [doNothing]
then $region becomes (Desertification) from (atDesertRisk)
according to CanadianCACTechExpert.
This example states “if climate change continues unmitigated, should those regions at
desert risk take no measures otherwise, then the region will experience desertification.”
Notice the use of ’does’, which is a special form of structural expression for handling
the actions of stakeholders.
As a technical concern, it can be useful to divide an event into two events, from the initial
structure to an intermediate structure, and from that intermediate structure to a final
structure. This prevents the structure from triggering other events inappropriately while
in progress. It should also be noted that while processes are often cyclic and concurrent,
that does not preclude us from representing them through point-wise events, such that
the overall result of a process on the structure in a given time period is merely the
composition of events between those periods.
However, there is one more technical concern that does need to be handled in order
for events to make sense. Events are often dependent upon each other, and sometimes
completely so. Suppose a student takes an exam. This may lead to the student passing
the exam, or failing the exam, but not both. These two events are mutually exclusive,




In general, dependences mean that if some condition occurs, then the likelihood of
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another condition is then modified. We can say that these dependencies are d ∈ D,D :
P(Dt) → P (P(Dt)), where dt ∈ Dt is the set of dependency terms, or expressions
that can be used in dependences. Events are dependency terms (E ⊂ Dt), as are
sensings (Θ ⊂ Dt) and the yet-to-be-introduced anticipations (An ⊂ Dt). We can
also designate subsets of dependences that have terms of these various types (DE ⊂
D,DΘ ⊂ D,DAn ⊂ D, respectively). In general, if a distribution is associated with
an element, it is also appropriate to be able to specify conditional distributions for that
element. Dependences are generally unidirectional unless designated to be mutual or as
independent (which is necessarily mutual). Similar to how events have preconditions and
postconditions, we can refer to the antecedent (dt ∈ Ante(d) ⊂ Dt) and consequents
(dt ∈ Cons(d) ⊂ Dt) of a dependency. Symmetrically, we can talk about the set of
dependencies that are dependent upon a given antecedent, UponSet(dt) ⊂ D, or those
that have a given term as a dependent consequent, DepSet(dt) ⊂ D.
Now that we can represent the structure in the world, and have the dynamics to put it
into motion, let us now look into the pragmatics of those structures, or why stakeholders
are motivated to act in the ways that they do.
Each stakeholder has some set of criteria c ∈ C to which they respond, and which they
are motivated by. These criteria are incommensurate, and as such different stakeholders
will trade-off between these criteria differently at different times, if they find themselves
able to make a trade-off at all, to the extent that any of these criteria, improved at
the cost of another, leads to regret. With each criteria, one also specifies the way it
should be assessed, whether to maximize, minimize, or to pursue a certain value. For
every criteria there is also a margin of indifference, ǫc, for which every stakeholder is




Agricultural production is not a good criteria, because it does not indicate a direct harm
felt by any particular stakeholder. We can understand it to be proxy for farmers having
to leave their farms, for individuals going hungry for being unable to afford food, and
so on. On the other hand, it might mean that individuals are becoming employed in
other jobs, and more food is being imported through trade. On the other hand, the
stakeholder from which this information is being elicited may very well think of this as
a good in itself, having never contemplated that changes in agriculture production is a
proxy for a whole host of goods and harms, and may not be prepared to think of them
in this way.
Each stakeholder is impacted by a different set of goods and harms in different ways.
We represent the total impact of any given structure, to any particular stakeholder, for
any particular criteria, as a reward function yielding a real number R : S×Sk×C → ℜ.
Impacts can also be specified relative to the scale of the weights in the structure, which
implies that impacts can also be supplied qualitatively. A given observer will report some
subset of the overall impacts: Rob ⊂ R. It is important to note that each observer does
not only report their own overall impact, nor is each observer’s reported impact taken
as the final word. Additionally, let us say that Rc is the set of rewards that yields a
particular criteria, and that value(r) is the reward or loss assessed (ℜ).
impact cropLoss
high declining agricultureProduction
to agricultureRegion if (drought)
according to CanadianCACTechExpert.
At this point, it is worthwhile calling attention to some of the features of this model.
First of all, it can represent incommensurate forms of evaluation. The same state
can cause a stakeholder both benefits and harms, by different criteria, such that both
acting to cause the state and acting to avoid it cause regret. More novel, but of equal
importance, is the fact that the stakeholder is constituted of structures, which means
that the same stakeholder can experience different rewards and harms based upon their
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current condition. Although the ability of actions to change desires or preferences is
not typically explicitly represented in computational planning approaches, to do so is
the basic operation of analytical sociology [Hedstrom, 2005], and is essential to these
models being sociologically plausible. There are ways the stake of a stakeholder can
change. They may be persuaded, or the environment of the stakeholder can change,
in response to which the stakeholder adapts their preferences, in a kind of cognitive
dissonance. The preferences of a stakeholder may also change due to changes in their
material stakes; for example, a farmer who has had their farm repossessed by a bank
would certainly have less reason to care about agricultural policies.
Stakeholders will often anticipate that they or others will respond particular ways in a
given situation. We model these anticipations as saying that if the current conditions
match some structural expressions, then particular stakeholders will undertake actions
with some distribution, sometimes with respect to particular structures identified by a
structural expression, or more formally an ∈ An,An : X → P (Sk,A, Se). Here is an
example of such an anticipation:
anticipate usDoesNothing stakeholder UnitedStates will doNothing
according to CanadianCACTechExpert.
Finally, let us say that all of the elements that we have described so far, are model
elements, ME, portions of an overall model. For any of these, a stakeholder may
choose to defer to the knowledge of a stakeholder. Similarly, a stakeholder may indicate
the opposite: that when it comes to this kind of matter, the other stakeholder has no
idea what they are talking about. df ∈ Df,Df : ME×Sk×Sk → [0, 1], where [0, 1] is
set of real numbers from zero to one, inclusive. This number is the degree of deference
that the first stakeholder will grant the second stakeholder. Dfob ⊂ Df is the subset
of deferences granted or reserved by a particular stakeholder.
Together, structures, states-of-affairs, stakeholders, rewards, criteria, events, depen-
dences, actions, observations, sensings, anticipations, and deferences are the structural
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elements we need to represent an object-level causal model of multiple impacts, M
(such that M = (S,X, Sk,R,C,E,D,A,O,Θ, An,Df)). We can see that M is a
causal model, with S playing the role of variables, and E, An, Θ, and Df playing the
role of functions.
The Challenge of Loss Over Time
Using the tools of the previous section, we can now describe any number of situations,
but we have not described how these elements interact with each other and lead to
situations unfolding into each other. This section hopes to rectify this deficiency by
describing how the elements in the last section come together in a simulable way. This
section focuses on some of the challenges in appropriately framing how to evaluate
concerns over (potentially intergenerational) periods of time, while Appendix E does
the technical work of assembling these elements into time-series and giving a more
mathematical account of the simulation process.
How do we think about the rewards and losses to stakeholders over time? One way
is to consider all of the losses over time, either in sum or averaged across time. This
formulation has a quirky behavior: if we sum them, then recurring rewards and losses
go to infinity, while if we average them, one-time gains and losses disappear entirely.
The sum of rewards and losses is fine for an individual stakeholder, who is objectively
finite, but if we want to think about ongoing populations of similar stakeholders, then
these mathematical complications render assessment difficult to interpret. Despite those
complications, the average quantity has some desirable properties. For example, suppose
that a renewable resource is destroyed. In this case, all future generations may be
deprived from its use, and an infinite amount of potential reward was squandered. It
may be that this average method of evaluating costs has virtues in certain resource
management problems.
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Unfortunately, the average cost formulation has severe problems in the context of our
formalism. First of all, if the individual stakeholders have limited lifetimes, then no
particular stakeholder interest is represented by this formulation. Even worse, the average
stakeholder interest is arbitrarily far away in time from that of any current stakeholder, so
we would expect any change would become compounded, leaving this estimate useless
for many. It also shows a fair amount of arrogance to presume that the objective
state-of-affairs is going to be similar enough, and predictable enough, to be evaluated.
Although we would like to represent the cross-time interests of potential stakeholders,
these complications suggest it is better to assume that we can only anticipate our
conditions and their consequences in a more limited way, that decreases the further we
move from our current time. Let us say that discounting is the process for decreasing
the evaluated rewards and losses in proportion to their distance in time, and that the
rate of this decrease is done according to some discount parameter (represented here as
α).
This discount parameter has a number of pitfalls that one should watch out for. One
common mistake is to forget that the discount rate should be different depending upon
the kind of harm it is arbitrating [Sunstein, 2007]. It is always true that we would prefer
that harms occur further into the future as opposed to the present time. Therefore, it
is only sensible that we would be willing to pay slightly more to avoid a harm that will
manifest itself soon as opposed to one that will occur at some time away. However, this
does not imply that the difference will correspond to existing interest rates. Therefore,
when doing a financial analysis comparing the cost-benefit analysis of various programs,
it is inappropriate to depreciate other risks at the same rate as financial assets. Therefore,
discount rates are criteria specific (αc).
Discount rates can also be problematic for approaches that mitigate long-lasting phe-
nomena. If we were to undertake an economic analysis of carbon sequestration, then
one would think that it is appropriate to account for the expected period of contain-
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ment for the method under study [Herzog et al., 2003]. However, a shorter discount
rate, including the expected lifespan of everyone currently living, may also be deemed
appropriate, pushing the assessment from an economic issue to one of intergenerational
fairness.
Given these caveats, we can now describe a simulation process that evaluates how
individuals are impacted by given conditions, how they act given those conditions, and
the conditions that result from the events caused by their actions.
Algorithm 1 Scenario Model Simulation Run
Sample initial conditions
while Possible absolute discounted risk is greater than some small quantity of indif-
ference for any criteria do
Evaluate the rewards and losses for each stakeholder
Sample the actions that stakeholders will take
Sample the events that result from the current state and those actions
Based on those events, determine the resulting state-of-affairs
end while
return Everything that happened in the simulation
When we sample, we are evaluating probability distributions while respecting dependen-
cies. Dependencies are handled by first resolving all terms that have no dependencies,
and then resolving their dependents. When all terms are resolved except those that are
mutually dependent, the cycle of mutual dependence is broken by resolving terms at
random until at least one term has its ancestors resolved.
This simulation procedure is likely the simplest simulation procedure that will work
for this model, but for now we leave writing a simulator that supports different event
durations and similar improvements for future work.
Assembling Pragmatic Causal Categories
Although we have gone quite far, we have not yet covered an important aspect of this
work, namely how we can tell where we stand in the discovery process. It turns out
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that there are some fundamental questions that have to be answered to address this
question.
For example, what does it mean for the interests of two stakeholders to be the same?
Consider two neighboring farmers who have been friends for a long time. If one of their
farms experiences a catastrophe, say a long period of flooding that renders their land
underwater, and thus unfarmable, then both will experience negative consequences. The
farmer with the flooded land will experience financial ruin and the associated challenges
with losing part of one’s home, while the farmer who has been spared will experience
the challenges associated with a friend making a difficult transition. These farmers have
identical concerns, even though it makes a great deal of difference to them who’s farm
is underwater, in that discovering the concerns of one is enough to posit the concerns
of the other. We can also say that these concerns sufficiently similar even if there are
some salient differences between them, for example if one of the farmers has a bit more
savings, then the consequences of a flood might not be as immediately dire, but their
concerns would be still be similar. However, if one of the farmers was independently
wealthy or actually primarily employed otherwise, then these farmers may actually have
substantially different concerns.
We can say that a given stakeholder (sk1) shares a situational preference similar to
another stakeholder (sk2), for a given criteria c, if sk2 prefers some structure s1 to s2
by that criteria, then sk1 either has the same preference, or at the very least dislikes it
by some margin of indifference (ǫc).
sharePref(sk1, sk2, s1, s2, c) = R(s1, sk1, c) −R(s2, sk2, c) > 0
=⇒ R(s1, sk2, c)−R(s2, sk1, c) + ǫc > 0
This is trivially true if sk2 has no such preference, so we say that in order for two
stakeholders to have a similar preference, if either of them has a preference, then the
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other shares it or is at least marginally indifferent.
simPref(sk1, sk2, s1, s2, c) = sharePref(sk1, sk2, s1, s2, c)
∧ sharePref(sk2, sk1, s1, s2, c)
We can say that two stakeholders have the similar concerns if and only if, for all the
concerns under consideration, and comparing all situations, they have similar preferences.
sk1 ∼C sk2 ⇐⇒ ∀c ∈ C,∀s1 ∈ S,∀s2 ∈ S, simPref(sk1, sk2, s1, s2, c)
This is a useful intuition to have for understanding how to assess if we have discovered
the stakeholders, but there are three problems worth understanding.
For one thing, although these farmers have similar concerns, they may not be similar
stakeholders, for we are also concerned with differences in their capabilities to mitigate
risks. For example, if one farmer had, due to differences in the physical geography of
the farms, the capability to install an effective drainage system, while the other farmer
did not, then these farmers would still be substantially different.
Secondly, from a risk governance perspective, this definition may be overdoing it. When
doing the analysis of a given risk situation, we are often not as interested in risks to
specific individuals per se, as compared to individuals in particular roles. For example, if
a given company is designing a coal-fired power plant, then although the designers of the
plant may very much like Bruce, who will be employed as an operator mechanic in fuel
prep, they are merely analyzing the risk to him due to his role as an operator mechanic,
and not to the risks undertaken in other aspects of his life, which we presume are either
undertaken solely at his discretion or under the regulatory responsibility of others. The
methods described so far are, for this reason, already cut across categories. However,
what they do not do is to reassemble the full risks or capabilities of any particular class
of actor, but only the apparently relevant situational risks.
Finally, and most importantly, it is simply unrealistic that any kind of elicitation will pin
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down all of the concerns of a stakeholder, instead of the ones that are merely currently
salient to the situations that happen to come to mind. The definition is obviously an
idealization of what we could learn.
What it is practical to learn are approximate categories and rough attribute sets cor-
responding to the elements that we are eliciting. We know a stakeholder is similar
enough if, in the same kinds of situations, they experience the same kinds of impacts.
We can now put the non-parametric statistics we have developed earlier to work. The
mathematical version of this model can be found in Appendix F.
First of all, we would hope to discover approximate categories of stakeholders, the
kinds of general situational structures they will encounter, the different reward and loss
criterion that they have, and the sorts of actions they might take. There could be
an infinite number of each of these, but will be found in different percentages in the
population with diminishing returns, so let us say they are distributed according to the
CRP. The degree to which we expect to discover new categories for each of these is
interesting, as they determine the overall level of exploration, and we will revisit them.
For now, we just say that stakeholder categories, structure categories, criteria categories,
and action categories are modeled with a CRP distribution.
Although each structure category may vary in terms of the tags that describe it13,
we expect that some will be used more frequently than others, again with diminishing
returns, and thus we can say that the tag distribution with respect to a given structure
category has an IBP distribution with a small exploration parameter, reflecting the fact
that we expect the most salient details to be applied readily and more subtle insights to
be rare.
Does a stakeholder experience an impact relative to a concern in a particular stage? We
can say whether or not a stakeholder category tends to have a particular criteria for a
13We know that structures contain more, well, structure, than is captured by a tag set. We will save
a model that probabilistically builds predicates for future work.
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particular structural category, which we would expect to have a beta distribution with
a small gamma (say 0.1), indicating that it should be very likely or very unlikely that
a stakeholder category should have a particular stake given particular conditions, that
being the definition of a stakeholder category.
For simplicity, we can treat the magnitude of concern14 as a multinomial over the
discrete categories “strong reward”, “weak reward”, “no reward, no loss”, “weak loss”,
and “strong loss”. We will use a uniform prior.
We can say that a state-of-affairs consists of all of the structures that are currently the
case within it. We expect to receive different lists of structures each time we elicit,
but again that the variation of structures we find has diminishing returns. Therefore,
states-of-affairs could reasonably be represented as a IBP mixture model over structures,
generated from an underlying CRP mixture model.
How should the expected state-of-affairs discovery rate and the structural-diversity of
states-of-affairs be chosen? If set smaller, it assumes that structures are more likely to
be concurrently the case, while if larger, it presumes that different structures are more
likely to correspond to different states of affairs. As it stands, we expect both that the
states-of-affairs are highly-overlapped, but also that when the stakeholder is describing
different outcomes, these descriptions are largely similar except for key factors15 Overall,
it isn’t clear at this time what this implies, and we recommend observing the diversity
of elicited structures to find appropriate parameterizations.
The multiplicity of structures in states-of-affairs is not the only time we will want to
talk about combinations of elements occurring together. For example, we might want to
say some set of events is dependent upon another set of events. For this reason, let us
also refer to categories within states-of-affairs as categories of structural combinations.
14You may wonder why we would represent “no reward, no loss” as a magnitude of concern, and the
answer is that it is a matter of relative comparison to the conditions connected by events; consider the
phrase “stop hitting me” for example.
15Indeed, this similarity between possible worlds is a popular philosophical framework for counterfac-
tuals [Lewis, 1973], although it is prior to the intervention-based conception used here.
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Let us say that sets of events categories occur together in such a way that they can be
sampled as an IBP mixture model with a CRP prior.
Given that we can talk about states-of-affairs, we would like to be able to talk about
which actions are possible and relevant for stakeholders in those states-of-affairs, no
matter how likely they are. We can say that such an action is specified as being salient,
event if deemed impossibly unlikely, if the relationship is indicated. The distribution
over possible anticipations is beta.
If a given action is possible, how likely is to to be undertaken? We would say that it
is likely that if the observer knows how to specify it as a possibility, they also likely
have a suspicion of whether or not it will be undertaken. For that reason, we can say
that the distribution is almost uniform but slightly favoring the extremes, as in a beta
distribution with parameters slightly less than one.
Of course, as established before, actions do not stand alone, but they are anticipated to
have their compliments and substitutes, so there might be a dependence between sets
of anticipations, where were need to specify both a likelihood of the dependence (or
the indicator) and the likelihood given the dependence. These are specified as beta and
uniform, respectively.
Given a categorical state-of-affairs and some combination of actions, we can ask if
another state-of-affairs is the result of that event, and if so, how likely that is. These in
turn are specified as beta and uniform, respectively.
Event categories may also have dependencies, parameterized by both presence of effect
and their likelihood given the dependence. These are also beta and uniform, respectively.
The distribution over sensings given observations and underlying structures is similar to
anticipations and events is also taken to be beta and uniform, as are the dependencies
between sets of sense categories.
Finally, a category of deferences means that over any set of model elements a deference
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may be given to a particular category of stakeholders. This deference also has a like-
lihood, where negative deference is to cast suspicion on the knowledge of a particular
stakeholder. These too is distributed beta and uniform for occurrence and strength,
respectively.
What are we to make of the expected rates for discovering new stakeholders, structures,
criteria, and actions? Is it not the case that, if we take unknown harms to unknown
stakeholders, in unknown conditions, that we must, as a matter of precaution, assume
that these parameters are very large and that, as we appear to hit diminishing returns we
are merely unlucky and need to persevere? Or is it instead the case that, in representing
the interests of any significant group of the general public, we merely have to capture
the most generally held values and stakes, as well as the conditions and actions that
could possibly disrupt them, and that we must let marginal concerns be marginal?
Whether one pursues diversity or representativeness is a topic of debate in the framing
of deliberation and its purposes [Renn, 2008], so the question is very likely insoluble.
However, framing this choice as picking between discovery rates allows for some trans-
ideological guidelines:
1. At all times, once a design activity has been undertaken, we can assess the rate
at which the number of these factors has been growing. Although it may be
important to assume a rate to gage the number of initial participants, there is no
reason not to reassess the most likely rate of discovery, given some examples.
2. Some design activities are much less expensive than others. For this reason,
generative activities such as brainstorming should initially aim for quantity, while
more costly elicitation activities may expect this to be smaller. In all cases, it
is possible to overlap the results of activities to see if field results support or
undermine generated results.
Finally, let us take a step back, and think about the overall model presented here. As
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we ask, we discover dependencies between different clusters, and this model allows us
to look at changes in the structure of what we know as we ask. However, in order for
the relationships in this section to hold, the processes that discover them must obey a
particular constraint: the elicitation processes must be exchangeable. In other words,
the individual samples underlying inference this this model must be undertaken in any
order. In practical terms, this means that we should not tell a participant what another
participant has said until we have first listened to what they have to say.
An Interview-based Elicitation Process
In this section we turn from structure to process. We have a domain-general model for
discovering causal information, but how do discovery processes actually construct it?
The strategy that we use here replicates a forward simulation of potential outcomes,
































Figure 4: The Potential Paths for Questions
An interview using this approach are undertaken in segments. These segments may ei-
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ther be exhaustive (where every possible question in the search tree is asked) or bounded
to a preagreed time. In each of these segments, first a domain-specific, but still generic,
prompt question is asked. For distributed risk problems, choose separate prompt ques-
tions at the problem impact and mitigation adoption scales, to check to see where these
two aspects join together for the stakeholder, if at all. The segment then proceeds by
asking general questions that, in effect, simulate what what they suspect will happen,
how that will affect the stakeholders involved, and how they will behave as a result.
The number of paths that potential questions could be taken grows quickly and is very
complex (see Figure 4)16. As a result, two measures are undertaken to assist in keeping
track of the interview. Ideally, the interviewer can use a scenario acquisition tool that
keeps track of what questions yet need to be asked (see Figure 5). This tool allows
for different threads of potential events to be pursued while automatically returning to
previous questions as lines of inquiry are exhausted. Although it is far easier to use such
a tool, it can be undertaken by hand using an arrow-based notation, examples of which
are given in Appendix B.
Figure 5: A Scenario Acquisition Tool
As you can see in the tool screenshot, each question is numbered. Provide participants
with numbered form with empty boxes to write notes for their references. When we
16Note that the expectations of what others know, which I call deferences, are asked about in all
stages and thus are not shown on the graph for simplicity
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want to ask questions about answers earlier in the interview, the participant will have
a context to answer. A complete example of a telephone script is given in Appendix
C. After the end of questioning, participants should be given an opportunity to make
additional comments clarifying their earlier responses.
Undertaking the path of questions in a depth-first ordering is an assumption-free traversal
of the question tree that promises completeness. In an interview without time-bounds,
it is guaranteed that the interviewee will be asked every line of inquiry. Furthermore,
of the paths that are complete, this method promises the minimum number of digres-
sions: every question will correspond to the most recent possible previous question. The
downside to the depth-first method is that it can be a long time before alternatives that
occur early in the process. As an alternative, the interview can be directed by rules that
balance questions back to more recent events while preserving eventual completeness.
For example, we could allow only a maximum disparity in the tree depth between topics
with unanswered follow-up questions. However, the advantages of balancing methods
is made at the cost of making unnecessary topic switches, which you really would not
want to do if the interviewee was right in the middle of answering questions well.
Let us now look through examples of each step along the potential paths of non-prompt
questions. All of the other statements necessary to undertake a prototypical interview
with two prompt questions is given in Appendix C. Here, as elsewhere, we use italics to
indicate when the participant is quoted.
Prompt → Impact
• Is anyone impacted by participant response to prompt question, either positively
or negatively?
• Is anyone else impacted by participant response to prompt question?
Prompt → Structure
• What is happening right now in regard to participant response to prompt question?
• Is anything happening now besides participant response to prompt question?
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Prompt → Observable
• What can we observe as a result of that happening?
• Regarding that, what could the average person observe that would indicate to
them that this is the case?
• What else might we observe that indicates these conditions?
Structure → Sense
• Are there things we could observe to tell us if this is the case?
• When this happens, what will we observe that lets us know what has happened?
Event (all kinds) → Consequence
• What happens as a result of described event?
• Does described event have any other consequences?
Event (all kinds) → Precondition
• What could cause described event?
• Is anything else needed to cause described event?
• Are there any other causes for described event?
Event (all kinds) → Duration
• And how long will that take to occur?
• After that starts to happen, how long will that take to really get going?
• How long will it take before we see the affects of that?
Event (all kinds) → Anticipation
• And if that happens, will anybody take actions as a result?
• Might any other actions result from described event happening?
Impact → Stakeholder
• Who will be affected by this?
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• Who will be affected this way?
• Will anyone else be affected in this way?
Impact → Criteria
• How are they harmed (for example, physically, financially, reputationally)?
• How exactly do they benefit?
Impact → Magnitude
• How many direct quote of stakeholders impacted are affected in this way?
• How much does this harm direct quote of stakeholders impacted
Impact → Anticipation
• As a result of described impact, how could described stakeholder respond?
• Are there any other ways described stakeholder could respond to described impact?
Impact → Observable
• When described impacted stakeholder is described impact, what might we observe?
• What are some signs that we will be able to tell that described impacted stake-
holder is experiencing described impact?
Impact → Structure
• Under what conditions might described stakeholder be described impact?
• Are there any other conditions under which described stakeholder might be im-
pacted in this way?
Structure (all kinds) → Impact
• As a result of being in that condition, would any of the stakeholders experience
gains or losses?
• Are there any potential harms to being in this condition, or any rewards for that
matter?
Structure (all kinds) → Sense
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• Is there any signs that this has become the current condition?
• What would be some indicators that described structure has come to pass?
Structure (all kinds) → Event
• Could this state-of-affairs cause any other events?
• What might happen as a result of described structure?
Event (all varieties) → Dependence between events
• Is this more or less likely if something else happens?
• Are there any other events that could cause or prevent this from happening
Event (all varieties) → Likelihood
• How likely is that to occur?
• When you say described event will happen, how likely is that?
• What do you think the odds of that happening are?
Observable → Sense
• If one observes described observable, does that tell us anything else about the
current conditions?
• Is there anything else that might be true about the underlying conditions if we
observe described observable?
Sense → Observable
• What signs might we able to observe indicating that?
• What are some of those indicators?
• Is there anything else we might be able to observe that would allow us to infer
that might be going on?
Sense → Structure
• When described observation supports some underlying facts about the current
conditions, what are some of the conditions it indicates?
• When we see described observation, what to we know to be going on?
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• What else can be inferred when we see described observation?
Sense → Likelihood
• How likely is it that when described observation, it indicates that described struc-
ture is going on?
• How likely is it that when describe structure is happening, if we see described
observation?
Action → Event
• As a result of described action, what might happen?
• Besides other described resulting event, do you think that anything else might
happen as a result of described action?
Dependence between events→ Mutually-dependent event
• Does described event dependence become more or less likely in tandem with any
other events?
• Do any other events cause described event dependence to become more or less
likely?
Dependence between events→ Independent event
• What events does described dependent events depends depend on?
• Are there any other events which described dependent events depends?
• Which event cause described dependent events depends?
Dependence between events → Dependent event
• Are there any events that are made more or less likely by those occurring described
dependent events?
Dependence between events→ Likelihood
• How likely is it that if antecedent events in participant’s words occurs, that con-
sequent events in stakeholder’s words will happen.
Stakeholder → Anticipation
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• And as a result of them experiencing that, do you think they will do anything in
response?
• Are there any other possibilities for how they might act in response?
• What else do you think that participant description of stakeholder might do?
• Is it possible that described stakeholder could do something else in addition to
described anticipation?
Anticipation (all kinds) → Stakeholder
• Who do you think will do this?
• Who might act in this situation?
• Is there anyone else who might do this?
• Is there anyone else who might act in this situation?
Anticipation (all kinds) → Dependence between anticipations
• Will this action be more or less likely if other actions are taken?
• Are there other actions that either increase or decrease the likelihood of this action
being taken?
Anticipation (all kinds) → Action
• What do you think they will do?
• What will described stakeholder do?
• Is there anything else they might do?
• Is there anything else that described stakeholder might do?
Anticipation (all kinds) → Structure
• Under what conditions will they take this action?
• What conditions have to true for direct quote naming stakeholder to do direct
quote describing action?
Dependence between anticipations → Independent anticipation
• Are there any actions that other stakeholders might take that would make de-
scribed action of other stakeholder more or less likely?
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Dependence between anticipations → Mutually-dependent anticipation
• What actions depend on this action to be taken or not to be taken?
• What actions do you anticipate not being taken if this action is undertaken?
• What actions will be taken if this action is undertaken?
Dependence between anticipations→ Dependent anticipation
• Are the actions of any other stakeholders dependent on this action being under-
taken?
All items → Deference
• Is there anyone who knows about described item more than you do, or alternatively,
is there anyone that we should not listen to?
Deference → Stakeholder
• Who is that?
• Who are they?
Deference → Likelihood
• How likely are they to understand this better than you?
• How likely are they to understand this worse than you?
Let us take a look at two of these questions to understand what they establish.
“When described event happens, besides causing described result, what else might occur
as a result?”
This question is establishing the objective understanding of the stakeholder, and in par-
ticular their causal connectivity between events. This question provides the opportunity
to develop how events could be more complicated than a simple story of cause an effect.
“When described event happens, who benefits/suffers as result?”
This question is establishing the subjective perceptions of the stakeholder. This question
provides the opportunity for new stakeholders to be discovered.
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Follow-up Interviews
After the initial interview, we might be less interested in discovering what stakeholders
think and more interested in discovering how their understand reacts with findings from
other stakeholders. At this point we can undertake a follow-up interview, or engage in
follow-up interviewing in the initial interview session.
Of course, the kind of following-up that is appropriate depends upon one’s methodolog-
ical objectives. However, using this particular scenario elicitation and modeling practice
allows one to engage concurrently in three research objectives that are traditionally un-
derstood to be mutually exclusive: understanding, reduction, and intervention [Braa
and Vidgen, 1999]. Through these interviews, we come to understand the mental model
of participants. This approach also allows the construction of probability models that
afford a precise interpretation of risk. The intervention component of the model is the
most subtle. By allowing participants to go on public record, it allows them to correct
any view previously held about them incorrectly. Yet, at the same time to declare such a
model is to make a speech act, which makes a commitment by which to judge their later
action. This also allows those with oppositional viewpoints to make directed criticism
about specific promises. At the same time, this forces opponents to articulate more spe-
cific accusations and suspicions. By sharing these models, participants are socializing
their values and perceptions, which can help them constitute a broader strategy [Jones,
2007].
So, how does follow-up interviewing work in this particular interviewing strategy? First
of all, it is useful to follow up if the interview reveals incompletenesses or contradictions
between the participants. These incompletenesses and contradictions include:
• Another stakeholder successfully connects the models of a stakeholder, connecting
different losses to the same overall situation.
• Another stakeholder expresses a major concern about an action the stakeholder
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may be involved with that the stakeholder did not know.
• A trusted stakeholder belies the mental model of another stakeholder.
• A distrusted stakeholder demonstrates a shared understanding with the distrusting
stakeholder about a point believed under contention.
Once one has discovered this kind of contradiction, one can ask such questions as
“What about stakeholder described by other participant, would they experience impact
described by other participant in this situation? What do you think they might do as a
result?”
Of course, it is only appropriate to engage in these kind of follow-up interviews if the
viewpoints of the participants have been completely explored, as best as the interviewer
can be determined, and the point at which follow-up interviewing begins should be
clearly denoted. The reason for this is to preserve the exchangeability constraint so that
we can assess the what we have discovered honestly.
Interviewing Software Design
As the interviewing process is made substantially easier through software, potential users
should understand the underlying design so that they can build and adapt versions for
their own purposes. This design uses the classic Model/View/Controller implementation
pattern which separates the data model (model) from the presentation of the data (view)
from the logic needed to retrieve and process the data to make it suitable for presentation
(controller). Let us look at each of these in turn.
The initial data model is simply a list for each model element which specifies what other
elements can be connected to it via questioning, such as from impact to stakeholder.
This specification also admits inheritance relationships, so that we can say “if x connects
to y, z also connects to y”, which simplifies matters a great deal when x has many
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connections. For example, all preconditions are structures, so since a structure can
connect to an impact, a precondition can also connect to an impact.
As the interview is undertaken, another data model is populated, corresponding to the
tree of interview questions and answers. Each node within the tree contains a question
number and answer text, and each link between nodes represents a question referencing
the parent node. Each node contains the text of the interviewees answer, as well as a
check box to indicate that there were no further answers to that question. The tree
starts with a root representing notes gathered before any question has been asked.
Having established the model, let us turn to the view. The overall interview data is
viewed as a tree, whether the current pending answer is the node selected in that tree.
The contents of the selected node are shown, and are presented as a text-box to write
the answer, buttons for each kind of question that remains to be asked about it, and
a check box if there is no answer. Also provided are open and save menu options for
opening a previous model and saving the current model, respectively.
Given this model and view, we can talk about the controller. When the user clicks to
ask a new question, a new node in the tree is created as the child of the node currently
in focus, and then focus is transferred to that node. When the no-answer checkbox is
clicked, the parent of the active node is checked to see if it has any possible further
questions. If so, that becomes the active node, and if not its parent is checked in a
similar way, recursively. If the save menu item is clicked, the tree is converted into a text
file that summarizes each node of the tree, while open returns files of the same format.
Interviewing and Bias Avoidance
Given that we have described an interviewing process, it is worthwhile to see how this
approach addresses our core concern, which is to use the psychology of how individuals
understand counterfactual knowledge to address the biases of political expertise. First of
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all, by grounding ourselves strictly in the words of the participant, we avoid introducing
support-theoretic biases. Next, by eliciting paths of events instead of asking for pre-
dictions, including the ways that they intercede and cancel, we help mitigate base-rate
neglect. Further, by always asking for more, from the perspective of all of the elements
involved, we avoid availability biases that might result from purely open-ended lines of
questioning. Finally, by separating facts from concerns, we can gain an understanding
of where individuals actually disagree. We will later see how the paths found through
this process help mitigate risk governance deficits.
A Synthesis of Design Methods and Risk Governance Needs
Now that we have constructed a methodology for representation, simulation, discovery,
and elicitation scheme, what can we say about it? First, we will both synthesize the
work done so far, and analyze it carefully to show that we have met Tetlock’s criteria,
at least theoretically. Next, we will look at the project objectives, and show that these
were met as well. Then, we will give a brief example of how to begin such a project
by looking at some of the perspectives involved in the risk governance of sequestration-
based carbon mitigation technologies. Following this, we will provide a tiny example of
how this analysis works in practice. Finally, we will look at the future work, and see
what potential directions this work can take next.
Analysis and Synthesis
In this section, we take on the criteria that Tetlock provided for debiasing methodologies
such as the one we have developed. To review, the criteria is given here:
Promoters of “debiasing” schemes should shoulder a heavy burden of proof.
Would-be buyers should insist that schemes that purportedly improve “how
they think” be grounded in solid assumptions about (a) the workings of
the human mind and -in particular- how people go about translating vague
hunches about causality into the precise probabilistic claims measured here;
(b) the workings of the external environment and -in particular- the likely
impact of proposed correctives on the mistakes that people most commonly
make in coping with frequently recurring challenges.
From Expert Political Judgment by Philip Tetlock [Tetlock, 2005b]
First, we will take on criteria (b), and show that these methods help cope with frequently
recurring challenges by showing how risk governance deficits lead to risks, and how the
methods we describe intercede. Second, we will take on (a), by showing that the causal
paths of our model can be converted into precise probability scores, and further offer
another analytical tool, which is a measure of the expert’s assessment of the contingency
of predicted events. In the course of this discussion, we will demonstrate a synthetic
view of how these methods might operate in the context of risk governance.
Modeling Risk Governance Deficits
The Risk Governance Council supplies at total of twenty three risk governance deficits,
ten of which (labeled A1 to A10) are devoted to assessing and understanding risks, while
the remaining thirteen (labeled B1 to B13) are devoted to managing risks. As mentioned
previously, this paper takes these deficits as hard-won empirical observations from risk
governance failures, and therefore they serve as appropriate guidelines for shaping risk
governance approaches.
Using these deficits, we can attempt to respond to one of the two criteria that Tetlock’s
Expert Political Judgment sets for us earlier, namely “Would-be buyers should insist that
schemes that purportedly improve ’how they think’ be grounded in solid assumptions
about . . . the workings of the external environment and -in particular- the likely impact
of proposed correctives on the mistakes that people most commonly make in coping
with frequently recurring challenges.” [Tetlock, 2005b]. If we limit ourselves to the risk
governance context and we accept this list as the mistakes faced within risk governance,
then should we be able to show that measures could help with these deficits, we can
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consider this obligation met.
How is it that these deficits can be linked to the formalization we have described so
far? One way to understand this is if each deficit represents either a path to an im-
pact, or a missing link in an intervention preventing a path to impact. If we can then
represent a path disrupting the impact by building an intervention, then we can talk
about procedures aimed to elicit or induce paths of intervention, while simultaneously
not compromising other such paths. This approach is very familiar to risk management
audiences, finding one of many other manifestations in fault-trees (see [Leveson, 1995]
for a fine survey).
Let us now describe a way to construct these kinds of paths17. We can describe this
path as a repeated application of relations. For example, suppose that from the current
conditions (s), we correctly make an observation of the current conditions (θ(s) 7→ o),
which leads us to take a different anticipation of how to act (an(o) 7→ a), which leads
to a sequences of events occurring over some period of time (e∗(s, a) 7→ (s2, t)), which
leads to a different set of impacts for some stakeholder R(s2, sk) 7→ ℜ
c, as desired.
We can then talk about that entire string of relationships in a single expression, as in
s; θ(s) 7→ o; an(o) 7→ a; e∗(a, s) 7→ (s2, t); r(s2, sk) 7→ ℜ
c. We can now represent risk
governance deficits as disruptions in these intervention paths, for which we will use a
’hat’ notation (such that a failure to interpret an observation as a symptom of a potential
risk would be θˆ). We could then represent impacts caused by such a misinterpretation
as s; ˆθ(s) 7→ o; an(o) 7→ a; e(s, a) 7→ s2; r(s2, sk) 7→ ℜ
c. By convention, we shall take
terms separated by ; and , to be effectively sequential and concurrent, respectively.
Given this formalization, let us examine the twenty-three risk governance deficits and
see which of them are easily formalized, to see if the basic framework theory presented
earlier interprets them sensibly.
A1: The failure to detect early warnings of risk because of erroneous signals, misinter-
17If the notation of these paths needs more explanation, it may be handy to consult Appendix E.
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pretation of information, or simply not enough information being gathered
This deficit could be described as a deficiency in knowing of potential observations,
mapping those observations to structures correctly, or in practically capturing those
observations. There are number of ways this deficiency could manifest itself. Perhaps
we did not capture knowledge of the observation itself (we were missing an o ∈ O).
Another way to make a mistake here is to misinterpret what the observation entails: say
we did not associate that observation with the state that was actually implied (we missed
a structure/observation mapping in Θ), or we misspecified the probabilistic elements of
the mapping, leading us to misinterpret the information we had (the distributions inΘ are
wrong). Finally, even if the general knowledge is correct, the specific observations that
were reported could be erroneous, either falsely observed or omitted (Osk is misspecified).
Given this, a path to risk caused by this deficit could be formalized as s; θˆ(sˆ) 7→
oˆ; an(o) 7→ a; e(a) 7→ s2; r(s) 7→ ℜ
c.
A knowledge discovery procedure aimed to eliminate this deficit should inquire, in all
relevant states, what one would observe in those states, what other states one might
also make the same observations, what factors would make the states more likely relative
to each other, given those observations; and which of these observations are currently
observable. The interview procedure we have described meets this requirement.
A2: The lack of adequate factual knowledge for robust risk assessment because of
existing gaps in scientific knowledge or failure to either source existing information or
appreciate its associated uncertainty
We can characterize this deficit as failing to understand correctly how events transition
between structures. As before, this failing manifests itself in multiple ways. This could
be due to the omission of events entirely (missing an e ∈ E), misunderstanding the
causes that events turn out differently (misspecifying the se in the input of an event,
e), neglecting or misunderstanding the consequences of an event (misspecifying the
83
se in the output of an event, e), mischaracterizing the likelihood of events causing
between structures in particular ways (misspecifying the event distribution, P (E), or
dependencies between events), or mischaracterizing the dynamics of structures.
The path to harm described by this deficit is: s, θ(s) 7→ o; θ−1(o) 7→ s; eˆ∗(sˆ) 7→
sˆ2; r(s2) 7→ ℜ
c.
A knowledge discovery procedure aimed to eliminate this deficit should inquire, in all
relevant states, what events could occur those states, what other states one might also
make the same observations, what factors would make the states more likely relative
to each other, given those observations; and which of these observations are currently
observable. The interview procedure we have described meets this requirement.
A3 : The omission of knowledge related to stakeholder risk perceptions and concerns
The most basic omission of stakeholder concerns is to neglect an entire set of criteria
(missing a c ∈ C). It is also possible to misspecify the magnitude of one or many of
those concerns (misspecifying a ℜc in ℜ
C). In addition, it is possible to make mistakes
about the stakeholders affected (misspecifying sk ∈ Sk), as well as the conditions under
which various impacts occur (misspecifying s2 ∈ S).
Such misspecification could cause this path to risk: s, θ(s) 7→ o; an(o) 7→ a; e∗(a, s) 7→
s2; r(sˆ2, sˆk) 7→ ℜˆ
cˆ.
A knowledge discovery procedure aimed at eliminating this deficit would inquire, in all
relevant states, what impacts could occur, which stakeholders would be affected, how
would those stakeholders be affected, and to what degree those stakeholders would be
affected or how the effect of the impact should be quantified. The interview procedure
we have described meets this requirement.
A4: The failure to consult the relevant stakeholders, as their involvement can improve
the information input and the legitimacy of the risk assessment process (provided that
interests and bias are carefully managed)
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Failing to consult stakeholders can be understood as a failure to take an action involving a
stakeholder (e(a, sk) ∈ E : (a, sk) ∈ P(Se)), leading to an event undertaken incorrectly.
Given this, a path to risk described by this deficit is s; θ(s) 7→ o; an(o) 7→ aˆ; eˆ∗(aˆ, sˆk) 7→
sˆ2; e
∗(a, s2) 7→ s3; r(s3, sk2) 7→ ℜ
c.
A knowledge discovery procedure aimed at eliminating this deficit would need to include
stakeholders that incorporate both the diversity of relevant knowledge and the breadth
of relevant value experience. For example, in site-selection for some new infrastructure,
relevant knowledge could be concerned with both the general scientific understanding
of the benefits and risks imposed by that kind of infrastructural installation as well as
specific local knowledge about the site. By adding the requirement that interviews must
be taken with all discovered stakeholder categories, the interview procedure we have
described meets this requirement.
Value experience is also vital to producing legitimate risk assessments. knowledge dis-
covery procedures need to consult both the stakeholders impacted by risk governance
decisions, as well as those with relevant prior interactions, experience, and expertise with
the kinds of harms experienced. Both is highlighted, as it reflects a particular kind of
ambiguity faced by the risk domain. Consider legislation requiring wearing motorcycle
helmets. A motorcyclist with a libertarian bent may insist on their right not to wear such
a helmet and insist that they would forgo any treatment in the event they are injured.
A physician with experience treating motorcycle injuries may equally insist that it this
is inappropriate, as those employed in medicine work under a professional ethic where
care is paramount and an institutional context where treatment is not withheld. Both
of these parties have relevant, but not total, knowledge toward arbitrating this claim.
An individual who experienced such an accident, and who either changed their stance
or who persevered with their view at personal cost, would bring even stronger relevant
evidence, although it would still not be definitive.
A5: The failure to properly evaluate a risk as being acceptable or unacceptable to society
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Acceptability is an extremely curious idea. Identical risks, arbitrated through identical
measures, will have different levels of acceptability to different individuals. Therefore,
to violate the acceptability of a risk is to cause a second-order harm, namely to offend
cultural sensibilities. Conversely, if a risk is acceptable, but treated otherwise, then
mitigation activities will be seen as wasteful, and the cost of which will be seen as a loss
by stakeholders. Even though offenses to acceptability can lead to other harms, such
as the social amplification of risk and the loss of institutional credibility and support,
transgressions of acceptability are harms in themselves.
Given this, a path to a preventable loss can be described by the following path: s; θ(s) 7→
o; an(o) 7→ a; e∗(a, sk) 7→ s2; r(s2, sk) 7→ ℜ
c1; ℜc1 7→ s3; s3 7→ r(s3, sk2); rˆ(s3, ˆsk2) 7→
ℜˆcˆ2. As mentioned before, the single most interesting about this kind of path to risk is
that there may be no deficit between the phenomena all the way to and including the
primary risk itself. An important factor that this path leaves out is the other factors
that determine risk acceptability. It is insufficient for a harm merely to be conferred for
that harm to be unacceptable, but often must be accompanied by an inability of those
suffering the harm to have either known of it or have acted to prevent it. Symmetrically,
knowledge that a stakeholder was capable of preventing the harm, but did not, can
prevent the risk being deemed unacceptable. It is also possible for those experiencing
the acceptability harm to be mistaken about these additional acceptability factors. In
any case, s3 should be interpreted broadly to potentially incorporate these potential
understandings and misapprehensions.
To mitigate this risk governance deficits, knowledge discovery procedures should not stop
at the harm, but then ask who may come to observe the harm, as well as the actions
of those experiencing harm and their supporters. It is essential to remember that the
implications of a harm never stop with the harm itself. The interview procedure we have
described meets this requirement.
A6: The misrepresentation of information about risk, whereby biased, selective or in-
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complete knowledge is used during, or communicated after, risk assessment, either with
or without intention
It is reasonable to construe the communication of information as an action that causes
the event of one state of knowledge being transformed into other. For this reason, it
is appropriate to model the selection and dissemination of knowledge as communicative
actions. Given this, we can treat misrepresentations as flaws in the actions of those
selecting or disseminating the information (mistakes in choosing the actions a ∈ A of
communicative events e ∈ E, leading to errors in the state of knowledge of s2 ∈ S). The
corresponding risk pathway is s; θ(s) 7→ o; an(o) 7→ a; eˆ∗(aˆ, s) 7→ (sˆ2, tˆ); an(sk, sˆ2) 7→
a2; e
∗a2, s2 7→ s3; r(s3, sk3) 7→ ℜ
c
In order to avoid this deficit, a knowledge discovery procedure should aim to eliminate
two different kinds of errors. First, to be assured that one discovers and selects in-
formation correctly, or that is to say, that one communicates information to oneself in
an unbiased way. This requires explicitly asking about how information was discovered,
including the prior conceptions, new conditions, and actions which lead to it. Second, to
be assured that communicative actions are having the intended effect on those receiving
the information. Such a method may be more effective when it attempts to make sense
of the domain alongside those it is communicating to, rather than attempting to see
merely if a transmitted message has been retained [Dervin, 2001]. By remaining domain
neutral, the interview procedure we have described meets this requirement.
A7: A failure to understand how the components of a complex system interact or how
the system behaves as a whole, thus a failure to assess the multiple dimensions of a risk
and its potential consequences
It is entirely possible to understand the local dynamics of each event perfectly, in-
cluding its preconditions, distribution of likelihood, distribution of duration, and de-
pendencies upon other events, yet still fail to understand the behavior of a complex
system. This is because this knowledge does not explicitly construct the pathways
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between events, nor does it posit which phenomena may come to interact when pro-
duced through independent pathways. For this reason, we should note that although
there is little notational difference between misunderstanding the behavior of given
events in a particular timeslice (eˆ∗) and misunderstanding the interactions between
events across a timeslice (eˆ∗), the difference between these understandings is profound.
We could equally well describe this deficit as misunderstanding the dynamics of se-
quences of dependencies (d∗). With these caveats, we describe this risk pathway as
s; θ(s) 7→ o; an(o) 7→ a; eˆ∗(a, s) 7→ (s2, t); r(s2, sk) 7→ ℜ
c.
It is in the interaction of complex systems that computational formalisms show their
strength, due to the ability to search and simulate combinatorial possibilities. Although
a well-known catalog of systemic interactions can be recognized through more straight-
forward modeling activities, it is progressively more difficult as systems grow larger and
more dynamic in their interactivity. Elicitation alone is likely insufficient in this case,
although it is always important to ask about the dependences (d ∈ DE) between events.
However, by providing a simulation procedure, our method meets this requirement.
A8: A failure to recognize fast or fundamental changes to a system, which can cause
new risks to emerge or old ones to change
In some ways, this deficit is a curious one, in that it conflates two kinds of system changes
(fast and fundamental) that are apparently very different. However, both of these are
failures to observe changes at a timescale appropriate to deal with them after initial
observations have been made. These deficits could come from failing to recognize the
possibility of a new condition (s2 ∈ S), failing to recognize a new temporal regime for
the pace of events (t ∈ T ), failing to observe a new condition (o ∈ O), or misinterpreting
that observation as not providing the correct warning of new conditions (θ ∈ Theta).
These correspond to the following path to risk: s; θ(s) 7→ o; an(o) 7→ a; eˆ∗(a, s) 7→
(sˆ2, tˆ); θˆ(sˆ2) 7→ oˆ; an(o) 7→ a2; eˆ
∗
2(a2, s2) 7→ (s3, t2); r(s3, sk) 7→ ℜ
c
To mitigate against this deficit, knowledge discovery procedures should, in addition to
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asking about all possible event dynamics, continue to ask about potential observations
that may reveal those underlying changes. The interview procedure we have described
meets this requirement.
A9: The inappropriate use of formal models as a way to create and understand knowl-
edge about complex systems (over- and under-reliance on models can be equally prob-
lematic)
The discussion in the section “Why Technical Modeling?” also applies to discussions
of this deficit. In the middle of formalizations it is worthwhile to take a brief pause to
remind the reader that the purpose of formalization is always to generate new insights
about governing risk, and the use of formalization is to efficiently generate insights where
more straightforward reasoning becomes bogged down in complexity. As it stands, to
use models inappropriately is to develop and act upon a state of knowledge (s2 in
S) inappropriately. In this way, this deficit is very similar to biases in selecting and
communicating information (A6), and therefore shares the same risk pathway: s; θ(s) 7→
o; an(o) 7→ a; eˆ∗(aˆ, s) 7→ (sˆ2, tˆ); an(sk, sˆ2) → a2; e
∗a2, s2 7→ s3; r(s3, sk3) 7→ ℜ
c.
However, by providing a model for the discovery process generated by the model, this
method provides a way to critique the method’s appropriateness, and thus helps mitigate
this deficit.
A10: A failure to overcome cognitive barriers to imagining that events outside expected
paradigms are possible
While it would be possible to characterize missing any of the terms in this model as
possibly being a sign of cognitive barriers, there are definitely some effects worth noting
that correspond well to the model itself. In particular, there are many opportunity
to look for signs of integrative complexity, or lack thereof. First of all, if the mental
model of an individual is dominated by one-to-one relationships when many-to-many are
allowed. Some of the possible many-to-many relationships include multiple results of a
given event, multiple causes of an observation, multiple observations corresponding to
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a given phenomena, multiple possibilities of anticipated response, and multiple impacts
of a given state-of-affairs (to multiple stakeholders, along multiple criteria). In the
same vein, another sign of integrative complexity is expressing uncertainty or giving
probabilistic judgments instead of making deterministic remarks.
In any case, a knowledge discovery procedure can guard against this by always asking
for further possibilities, until the stakeholder can think of no further responses. In
modeling, setting high priors on the number of possibilities can against closing models
too soon. Furthermore, an explicitly open modeling paradigm that makes no assumptions
as to its own finality, as well as the operational support to continually revisit and revise
assumptions, allows for modeling to become a tool against cognitive barriers instead of
a static asset who’s viability depends upon maintaining them.
However, we can make even stronger assurances against outside-of-paradigm events, by
engaging in the analysis of the discovery activity itself, and attempt to assess its current
progress in an online fashion. To the degree that these tools are applied and maintained
continuously, this method can assist with such assurances.
B1: A failure to respond adequately to early warnings of risk, which could mean either
under or over-reacting to warnings
It is entirely possible to understand a warning sign correctly, yet react incorrectly to it,
yielding a chain of events that undermines risk mitigation activities. For this reason,
there may be a misspecification of the action that should be undertaken (a ∈ a). The
resulting risk pathway is s; θ(s) 7→ o; an(o) 7→ aˆ; e∗(a, s) 7→ (s2, t); r(s2, sk) 7→ ℜ
c
In order to guard against this risk, a knowledge discovery strategy should ask about
all available actions to early warning observations, and follow up on the potential con-
sequences of those actions. The interview procedure we have described meets this
requirement.
B2: A failure to design effective risk management strategies. Such failure may result
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from objectives, tools, or implementation plans being ill-defined or absent
What does a failure to design risk management strategies mean? In this context, design
needs to be understood as a response to observable factors. It is incoherent to say “we
need to design a risk management strategy that causes unknown harms, in an unknown
way, according to an unknown mechanism”, as that offers no clue of what the identity
of the problem may be. However, as observations are made, that may incite novel
discoveries, combinations, and concepts. Therefore, we can say that a failure in design
is to fail to take action to generate the necessary planning and knowledge from more
poorly understood knowledge, such that when observations of a developing situation
occurs, we have made measures to be prepared. Thus, when we have a chance to react
to observable factors, and fail to design appropriately (aˆ), this leads to us fail to gather
those designs (eˆ), leading to a risk pathway of s; θ(s) 7→ o; eˆ∗(o, aˆ) 7→ (s2, t); s2;
θ2(s) 7→ o2; an(o) 7→ a; e
∗(a, s2) 7→ s3; r(s3, sk3) 7→ ℜ
c.
Knowledge discovery strategies play two roles here. The first is to ask how observations
about situations are being converted into plans handling their risk. However, a second
role of a knowledge discovery strategy is to act as a design strategy. That is to say that
knowledge discovery procedures, among which our procedure is a member, are design
methodologies themselves, designed to address this deficit.
B3: A failure to consider all reasonable, available options before deciding how to proceed
Although failing to consider all possible actions seems to be a straightforward failure in
building anticipations and their resulting actions correctly, there are notable variations.
These include not being aware of the existence of potential actions (missing a ∈ A), not
recognizing known actions as being applicable to the present conditions (misspecifying
the anticipation, an, by not linking the action as being applicable given the current
observations), not recognizing the saliency of actions to changing events (misspecify-
ing the actions in the precondition of events, as in e∗(aˆ, s)), and not recognizing the
possibility of not acting at all.
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Given this, a risk pathway corresponding to this deficit is s; θ(s) 7→ o; aˆn(o) 7→ aˆ;
e∗(aˆ, s) 7→ (s2, t); r(s2, sk) 7→ ℜ
c
A knowledge discovery procedure that would guard against such a risk would ask about
which actions are available to all stakeholders under all conditions, and would ask again
after some number of actions had been mentioned, until the stakeholder providing the
information could think of nothing further. Our method does exactly this.
B4: Not conducting appropriate to assess the costs and benefits (efficiency) of various
options and how these are distributed (equity)
Most risk governance decisions will require trade-offs. For the cost of some precaution,
we can enjoy freedom from a particular class of risk. Sometimes these trade-offs are
very straightforward: for a given expense, a given stakeholder decided that they are
willing to pay to mitigate a certain risk, but then discover that they could instead use
those funds to eliminate a more dangerous risk. However, in the aggregate, it can be
the case that different individuals benefit from different risk reductions. In this case, we
may be treating the overall benefit as a comparison between statistical aggregate, with
corrections assigned for the distribution of who endures various risks and expenses. In
both matters of efficiency and equity, we are judging one class of risks and versus another,
and therefore the deficit does not necessarily arise from the failure to assess or respond
to either of the losses being traded between, but to judge that trade-off correctly. We
can say that between the losses between two stakeholders, there has been a significant
imbalance (an imbalance more significant than some negligible quantity within a margin




risk pathway is described as: s; θ(s) 7→ o; an(o) 7→ a; e∗(a, s) 7→ (s2, t); r(s2, sk) 7→








Knowledge discovery strategies that are designed to address this deficit include always
asking about the specific magnitude and likelihood of particular risks, including follow-
on costs and asking about the resources needed for the various mitigation strategies
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proposed, as well as their risks. Analysis strategies for uncovering these deficits in-
clude examining the risk portfolio held by each stakeholder category, as well as their
contributions to risk-eliminating resources. It should also be appropriate to attempt to
characterize the norms of each community in equity questions. The methods described
here undertake all these measures.
B5: A failure to implement risk management strategies or policies and to enforce them
The failure to implement or enforce strategies is the analogue of risk deficit B2, the
failure to design risk management strategies. Here, the actions after the first hint
of the risk are just fine, but when an observation that they need to be undertaken
arrives, the action that was designated is either not taken or taken poorly, leading to
events failing to manage risk. Such a risk pathway could be described as: s; θ(s) 7→
o; e∗(o, a) 7→ (s2, t); s2; θ2(s) 7→ o2; an(o) 7→ aˆ; eˆ
∗(aˆ, s2) 7→ s3; r(s3, sk3) 7→ ℜ
c.
Outside of ordinary human folly, this could also result from a miscommunication or
misunderstanding between those designing and implementing these strategies.
A knowledge discovery strategy designed to mitigate this risk is to not only engage those
planning the risk response, but also to those responsible for implementing and enforcing
these measures. It also cannot hurt to check about the resources needed for particular
strategies, and the guarantees of their availability. The methods described here do not
directly address this particular problem, although they can aide risk policy implements
to think about potential contingencies.
B6: A failure to anticipate the consequences, particularly negative side effects, of a risk
management decision, and to adequately monitor and react to the outcomes
A risk management strategy, well-designed and competently executed, can lead to fail-
ures if the unintended effects are not mitigated. In this risk pathway, we describe
the results of actions as producing an unexpected state-of-affairs (sˆ2) leading to loss:
s, θ(s) 7→ o, an(o) 7→ a, e∗(a, s) 7→ (sˆ2, t), r(s2, ˆsk2) 7→ ℜ
cˆ2
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A knowledge discovery strategy designed to eliminate this deficit would ask about the
various consequences of mitigation actions, for all stakeholders. Further, it would ask if
there are stakeholders tasked with monitoring the results in the event the effects could
be unknown. The elicitation method does ask about the extended outcomes of particular
paths, so it may offer a slight contribution. Of course, ongoing storage and simulation of
possibilities may assist monitoring in being mindful of contingencies. Overall, however,
the effective use of these tools for monitoring purposes is entirely contingent on their
discretionary use by those with operational responsibilities.
B7: An inability to reconcile the time-frame of the risk issue (which may have far-off
consequences and require a long-term perspective) with decision-making pressures and
incentives (which may prioritize visible, short-term results or costly reductions)
This deficit is one of the core issues of distributed risk problems. One way to conceive of
this is deficit is as a variation on B4, or a mistake in analyzing the effectiveness or equity
of an action. Here, risk mitigation actions lead to two different sets of benefits and
losses, which would again be judged to have a substantial disparity (ℜc1<ˆǫℜ
c
2), but this
time, in addition, the time between these effects is substantial (t1>ǫt2). As an additional
complication, this disparity might not be observable to any stakeholder, given the time-
difference between them, and might only be assessed in the abstract. Given this, we
can describe the risk pathway as: s; θ(s) 7→ o; an(o) 7→ a; e∗(a, s) 7→ (s2, t2) ∧ (s3, t3);
r(s2, sk) 7→ ℜ
c






2, t1 > t2.
For a knowledge discovery strategy, the first line of defense is to establish the duration
of the effects of events, being sure to capture those that are a long distance away. Addi-
tionally, it is important to account for scientific knowledge that, although not giving us
direct insight, allows some demographic projections about the stakeholder communities
likely to be affected. Of similar importance is eliciting information from institutional
stakeholders, who may be able to stand in for ongoing populations of similar stakehold-
ers. Economic strategies to understanding the value of future losses also provide helpful
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tools, through the notion of option value [Posner, 2004] [Sunstein, 2007], or the right to
a particular resource, for a fixed price, at a later time, such that potential future losses
can be described as losses of current assets (namely the futures contracts in question).
The methods in this paper, by using a formulation that allows for the implementation
of neuro-dynamic programming methods, allows for simulations to effectively propagate
probabilistic risk, and thus can be modified to address this challenge.
B8: A failure to adequately balance transparency and confidentiality during the decision-
making process, which can have implications for stakeholder trust or for security
The boundary between confidentiality and transparency is a tricky wrinkle in the already
difficult challenge of managing communication actions. In order to understand the
dynamics of this, let us work our way through the risk pathway: s; e∗(sk1, a1) 7→
s2; eˆ
∗(sk2, aˆ2, s2) 7→ sˆ3; e
∗sk3, a2, s3 7→ s4; r(s4, sk4) 7→ ℜ
c
Here, a stakeholder (sk1), either deliberately or inadvertently, discloses (a1) some infor-
mation, leading to a state where those attempting to govern risk know some additional
aspect of information (s2). This information is then either inappropriately disclosed or
inappropriately withheld (aˆ2) by the stakeholder to whom the information was disclosed
(sk2). This disclosure leads to a state of knowledge where this information is either
inappropriately known or unknown (sˆ3). As a result of this state, a different stake-
holder (sk3) act differently according to that knowledge, leading to a harm dealt to a
stakeholder (sk4), who may be any of the previous stakeholders.
In order for this to be navigated directly, those using knowledge discovery procedures
should be very careful to make clear exactly how the knowledge will be used. Another
concern is accidentally revealing knowledge in the knowledge discovery processes. This is
a significant advantage for open-ended interviewing, grounded theory, or non-parametric
methodologies aiming at participant-specific discovery and exchangability (such as those
described here), as the formation of questions includes no domain-specific knowledge,
and thus no chance of unintended cross-communication.
95
B9: A lack of adequate organizational capacity (assets, skills, and capabilities) and/or
of a suitable culture (one that recognizes the value of risk management) for ensuring
managerial effectiveness when dealing with risks
One way to think of managerial effectiveness is as the skill of cultivating stakeholders;
to shepherd them into mutually suitable knowledge and interests, and to see that this
knowledge and interest is maintained and further cultivated. So, a failure to develop or-
ganizational capacity is a failure to take the actions that lead from one set of stakeholders
becoming another, or remaining competent as another (eˆ∗(aˆ, ˆsk1) 7→ ( ˆsk2)), leading to
an overall risk pathway of s; θ(s) 7→ o; an(o) 7→ a; eˆ∗(aˆ, ˆsk1) 7→ ( ˆsk2); e
∗(sk2, a, s) 7→
(s2); r(s2, sk) 7→ ℜ
c.
A knowledge discovery strategy aimed at discovering this deficit is always to inquire who
will be undertaking risk mitigation, either the design, implementation, enforcement, or
monitoring. This is another reason why it’s particularly important to attempt to interview
relevant groups of stakeholders, as they can be found not to yet exist. This method
addresses this deficit by incorporating risk mitigation actions, events, and stakeholders
within these models.
B10: A failure of the multiple departments or organizations responsible for a risk’s
management to act individually but cohesively, or of one entity to deal with several risks
Another way to consider this deficit is as a failure in coordination. This means that at
least one stakeholder fails to act in a way that takes another action into account,
or eˆ∗(aˆ1, ˆsk1, aˆ2, sk2, s), leading to a risk pathway of s; θ(s) 7→ o; an(o) 7→ a;
eˆ∗(aˆ1, ˆsk1, aˆ2, sk2, s) 7→ (s2, t); r(s2, sk3) 7→ ℜ
c.
A knowledge discovery strategy aimed at understanding this deficit is to consult stake-
holders engaging in risk management activities, to make sure that they are aware of the
actions being undertaken throughout their organization, as well as in other organizations
with related activities. In other words, an effective knowledge discovery practice may
96
have to take multiple samples even within a single organization to come to an effective
picture. This can be addressed in this method by incorporating risk mitigation activities
into the overall risk model.
B11: A failure to deal with the complex nature of commons problems, resulting in
inappropriate or inadequate decisions to mitigate commons-related risks (e.g. risks to
the atmosphere or oceans)
Commons-related risks pose a special challenge to coordinating risk governance activi-
ties, due to the large number of stakeholders with an inescapable interest in, and claim
to, a common resource. I’ve chosen to represent this risk as an unplanned sequence
of events resulting from many populations of stakeholders taking many actions to a
single state, or eˆ∗(aˆ∗, s, ˆsk∗). Given this formulation, a path to a potential harm is
s; θ(s) 7→ o; an(o) 7→ a; eˆ∗(aˆ∗, s, ˆsk∗) 7→ (s2, t); r(s2, sk) 7→ ℜ
c.
Commons-related risks pose a special challenge to the scalability of risk governance
methods, as everyone has a stake in the condition of the atmosphere. For this reason,
the place to begin is likely at the largest institutional representative for a population
of stakeholders, such as the responsible departments of governments. They could then
direct one to specific groups with conflicting interests within their domain, as well as to
known issues they are currently engaged in with their peers in other jurisdictions. Of
equal importance is discovering those on top of emerging commons issues with little
institutional representation, such as the international jurisdiction for climate geoengi-
neering measures [Cascio, 2010]. These methods, by allowing for distributed elicitation,
allow for model building to scale across commons.
B12: A failure to resolve conflicts where different pathways to resolution may be required
in consideration of the nature of the conflict and of different stakeholder interests and
values
In a certain way, this deficit does not have a risk pathway, in the model we have
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described, exactly because this deficit is mistake of one stakeholder in understanding
the pathways as understood by another stakeholder, and in particular misunderstanding
the misunderstandings of the other stakeholder. In some ways, more than any other,
it is in this kind of deficit where elicitation processes matter. Examples of this deficit
include mistakes regarding the subjective assessment of other stakeholders, particularly
confusing objective validity with subjective assessment, which this protocol is designed
to unravel.
However, when understood in a different way, this deficit does have a clear path to risk.
Namely, this is a mistake in the kind of conflict resolution actions applied (aˆ) due to
misunderstanding the mental model of the stakeholders in question (sˆk), so we can write
a risk pathway as s; θ(s) 7→ o; an(o) 7→ a; eˆ∗(aˆ, s, sˆk) 7→ (s2, t); r(s2, sk) 7→ ℜ
c, even if
to do so is to hide the mechanisms of this deficit. Given this, one way to understand
the value of open-ended elicitation aimed at recovering the difference between objective
and subjective understandings is to aide in the selection and design of the appropriate
conflict resolution channels.
B13: Insufficient flexibility or capacity to respond adequately to unexpected events
because of bad planning, inflexible mindsets, and response structures, or an inability to
think creatively and innovate when necessary
The simple way to state such a deficit is as poor anticipation (aˆn) and action (aˆ) to an
unplanned state-of-affairs (s2), resulting from an unexpected sequence of events, as in
the risk pathway e∗(s) 7→ s2; aˆn(s2) 7→ aˆ; e
∗(a) 7→ s3; r(s3, sk) 7→ ℜ
c . However, this
largely fails to capture the flavor of this problem. Flexibility and creativity are in some
ways developed capacities. In this way, deficits in this area, to the degree that they can
be mitigated at all, are developed through practices that build flexibility and creativity.
For this reason, it is the use of the results of elicitation and analysis that is important to
mitigating this deficit. Stakeholders should, to the degree that privacy and effectiveness
concerns allow, have a chance to be given alternatives discovered from others, outside
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of their current perspective, and come to terms with these results.
Overall, what does this exercise of mapping risk governance deficits into risk paths tell
us? There are two conclusions. First, we see that the model presented here can usually
capture the risk imposed the deficit, but at the cost of losing some of the semantics of
the original deficit. This has the advantage of still being completely relevant to those
stakeholders who are not involved with those particular aspects of the risk governance
process, but loses some inductive power in putting relevant questions to those who are.
Altogether, we can say that this domain-general framework of objective and subjective
causal knowledge would strike an appropriate balance if it recovers those criteria when
they are relevant to the stakeholder even without explicit mention, while discovering the
potential of deficits even if the stakeholder does not think about their concerns in those
terms.
Second, we can also say that many of the concerns expressed in these deficits are better
resolved not through direct formalization, but through methodological heuristics in how
to structure the process of elicitation. This is entirely appropriate, as the central question
is how to structure a knowledge discovery and analysis process within the larger processes
of risk governance.
Addressing the Deficits: A Summary
Given all this, it is useful to go back and see how the methods describe here addresses
these risk governance deficits. This is the dual view of the above information: instead
of describing, for each deficit, how these methods address them, here we are describing,
for each method, which deficits they address. Given that we have already described
this information in a different form, this section will aim for brevity, and will list only
the most direct ways in which the deficits are addressed. personnel Interviewing: A1
(inquires into all possible observations given underlying conditions and their likelihoods),
A2 (inquires into all possible events, results of those events, likelihoods of those results,
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and duration of those events), A3 (inquires into all stakeholders, their concerns, and the
magnitudes of those concerns), A4 (discovers additional stakeholders), A5 (asks about
follow-on “acceptability” harms), A8 (asks about observations revealing changes to
system dynamics), B1 (asking about all available actions responding to observations that
indicate early warnings), B2 (inquiring into current design activities for risk governance),
B3 (asking about all available actions), B4 (inquiry into all costs, including mitigation
costs, as well as stakeholder norms), B6 (inquires into the actions of all stakeholders
including monitoring ), B7 (asks with no fixed ending to the timespan inquired into),
B8 (addresses each stakeholder separately with domain neutral questions)
Coding: A6 (avoids bias through domain neutrality and separation of objective/subjective
concerns), A9 (guards against ambiguities due to insufficient formalization), B12 (sep-
arates objective and subjective concerns)
Inference: A4 (discovers the need to inquire into more stakeholder interests), A10 (in-
ference of ’unknown unknowns’), B3 (inferring unmentioned actions), B10 (multiple
samples within and across organizations)
Simulation: A7 (discovers unknown complex interactions by attempting to characterize
patterns of interaction), B7 (simulates for the entire duration in which discounted risks
remain)
Narration: A9 (guards against implausible codings and simulations by sanity checking
simulation trajectories)
Re-interviewing: A13 (confronts fixed mental models with the results of other elicitation,
allowing for reflection)
Overall: B2 (acting as a design method for building risk-governance strategies), B5
(discovering lack of implementation or enforcement), B9 (attempts to engage all stake-
holder groups), B11 (engages every stakeholder independently, allowing for the process
to scale)
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Not addressed: B5 (method does not actually enforce or implement mitigation measures)
The Relation between Classical and Causal Bayesian Norms
Let us now look at the other criteria that Tetlock’s Expert Political Judgment set for us
earlier, namely Would-be buyers should insist that schemes that purportedly improve
“how they think” be grounded in solid assumptions about the workings of the human
mind and -in particular- how people go about translating vague hunches about causality
into the precise probabilistic claims measured here. [Tetlock, 2005b].
This criteria is looser than it appears. We make no claim that this work corresponds di-
rectly to the ’the workings of the human mind’. The cognitive science we reference does
not address the working of the human minds directly, but instead looks at computational
models of human behavior. However, we can say that this science has generated ’solid
assumptions about the working of the human mind’ by virtue of replicating human be-
havior in controlled experiments. This research indicates that presenting paths of causal
factors yields better judgment, and translating these paths into precise probabilistic
claims is what we will do here.
In Rescober and Tetlock’s analysis [Rescober and Tetlock, 2005], experts receive proba-
bility scores for their predictions about events. Using their notation18, the expert’s prob-
ability score for an event partitioned into M outcomes is the disparity between the prob-
ability assessed to each outcome pi and an indicator variable assigned to the outcome’s





subject to the constraint that
M∑
i=1
pi = 1, with the low score of zero being the best,
and the high score of one the worst. Almost all experts polled were stymied by a
competition consisting of a simple autoregressive model predicting y, where y[i] =
α+β1y[i−1]+β2y[i−2]+γ1x1[i−1]+γ2x2[i−1]+γ3x3[i−1], where x1, x2, and x3
18Or rather, mostly their notation, instead using [] for temporal indexing.
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are, among the factors polled, are the three strongest factors by correlation analysis. In
other words, what is measured under classical norms are point predictions. In that work,
most of these prediction sets refer to a single factor, corresponding well to a structural
expression over a single structure in this work. Therefore, we can talk about predictions
of s as though they were predictions of Tetlock’s xi without loss of generality. Let us
say that Tetlock’s probability score, PS, is actually the set of predictions made some
time prior using the information available at that time about the time of the event, or
PS(t−n, t−n, t). For point predictions, this distinction makes little sense, but observe
that if one can make predictions contingent on events yet to occur, then it would be
possible to render a different prediction after the time of the prediction, but before the
event occurred.
What we would like to do is to develop a causal probability score that reduces to point
predictions, but includes causal structures. In other words, specifying a causal model will
result in a set of point predictions that can be scored identically to those of Tetlock’s
analysis, but can be elicited causally. In order to have a causal, instead of a classical
model, we need to allow the expert to provide two additional elements:
1. Dependencies We would need not only to score point predictions, but would also
need to score paths of causal dependencies predicting those factors.
2. Interventions We would need to elicit the conditions under which those paths are
intervened upon, or severed.
Predictive elicitation methods that allow for conditional dependencies are far from un-
precedented. One of the best known is combinatorial prediction markets, which allows
for conditional bets to be assembled by trading boolean combinations of combinato-
rial bets [Hanson, 2007]. It is a matter for future work to determine if the measures
suggested here are equivalent.
Before proceeding with an algorithm to generate point predictions from dependencies
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and interventions, let us describe what we are going to do. For every predicted point,
the expert can describe any number of events that could lead to that point, and their
likelihood of the event occurring and bringing it about, as well as the likelihood of the
event being the case. They can also provide dependencies between events, that sever
the effects of another event. If two events together make an outcome more likely, or if
two events occurring together might lead to a mixed outcome, it is better to specify a
third event based upon this joint precondition. Each point prediction is the average of
the independent paths of potential events, with their weights appropriately reduced by
severing effects.
By default, the expert should be held accountable for all predictions leading to the
predicted point, which is to say all paths of causal dependency. Similarly, we should not
hold experts accountable to predictions dependent on events with antecedents that did
not occur, except to the degree that the expert specifically predicted those antecedents.
Given this, an algorithm for calculating the point prediction is merely reduce the weight
of each path by the maximum degree that is severed, but doing so iteratively to avoid
cycles in the severing, and then taking the average of the resulting independent weighted
paths (see Appendix G for formalisms related to this section).
Algorithm 2 Building Point Predictions from Event Paths and Interventions
Mark all events causing interventions as changed
while At least one dependency is still marked as changing do
for all Paths where path has changed weight do
Apply dampened change to weight of path
if The change of the weight of the path is small then
Remove change mark on path
end if
Calculate the weight of paths the path intervenes on
if The change of the weight of the intervened path is large then




Average the predictions of the resulting disjoint weighted paths











Figure 6: An Example of Event Predictions and Severability
In Tetlock’s analysis, he required that a prediction be rendered for every point. A
similar requirement is that every point considered to be predicted must either a point
prediction or have a path of events and dependencies to predicates that either can be
resolved currently or have point predictions of their own. Further, every path of events
that cannot currently be resolved would be counted neither for nor against the experts
present assessment as far as the PS(t− n, t− n, t) was concerned. However, it would
also be possible to compare this probability score against a prediction using all the
information known up to the event itself (PS(t − n, t − 1, t)) or any time in between
(PS(t − n, t − k, t)). The disparity between the score at the time of the assessment
and just before the event could represent how contingent the expert believes the event
is, and thus we call it the predicted contingency19.
In order to see how this works, let us take a look at an example (see Figure 6). Let us
consider the likelihood of some structure at time (p(s1[t])), say that the majority party
has had its leader reelected. This probability may change drastically if majority party
19The predicted contingency has interesting variants. For example, we could describe the maximum
possible disparity between these two scores as the maximum contingency, and the difference between
them given what actually occurred as the actual contingency.
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was in leadership previously (s1[t − 1]) and there was economic prosperity during that
time (e1). If we know about this event, then we would expect that the election result
would be contingent upon the economic prosperity (p(s1[t]|e1, s1[t − 1])), and would
say that our prediction independent of this knowledge is now irrelevant (w(e∅, e1)),
which we take as the inverse likelihood). However, at the same time as prosperity, the
majority leader may have passed legislation on a controversial moral issue (e2). Then,
we expect that this will cause another candidate taking a leadership position in opposing
the legislation to be more likely to be elected (s3[t] becomes more likely via p(s3[t]|e2)),
make it less likely that that the current majority leader will be elected (p(s1[t]|e2)), and
reduce the effect of the economic prosperity contributing to support (w(e1, e2)).
Overall, there are any number of modifications to this scheme that might yet be ap-
propriate. If we credit experts for their contingent predictions, then in order to give
the expert the best circumstances, we would also need to elicit dependencies that would
’explain away’ consequences due to hidden antecedents. If a consequence does not occur
despite its antecedent being satisfied, this could offer evidence that other consequences
will or will not occur, despite neither being caused or prevented by the non-occurring
consequence. This is due to an unknown hidden intervention that has severed known
paths of events.
As another example, we might want to allow experts to create predictions with more
sophisticated structures. Consider the phrase “I do not know why it’s happening, but
there seem to be more and more incidents of bankruptcy in Atlanta, and we should take
that into account in with all the other factors I’ve described.” In that case, we would
want to have different point-wise predictions determined by temporal index instead of
any particular event.
However, even through further improvements are possible, we have accomplished what
we intended to do, which was to provide a way to elicit causal predictions that ac-
commodate both paths of predictions and severings in those prediction paths while still
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resolving to point predictions accountable to a Tetlock-style probability score.
Review of Objectives
This section looks at the project as a whole and demonstrates that it accomplishes what
it set out to do. First of all, in order to make such an assessment, let us review the
objectives.
• Engineer scenario representation methods that allow for the capture, analysis,
storage, and reuse of causal and impact information.
• Develop elicitation methods that progressively delimit and arbitrate governance
deficits.
• Implement simulation methods capable of demonstrating plausible scenarios from
elicited causal structures.
• Position uncertainty discovery as a valid governance need.
Now, let us take a look at each of them individually, to see where in the text that these
were met.
• Engineer scenario representation methods that allow for the capture, analysis,
storage, and reuse of causal and impact information.
This has been done. A scenario description language given in the section entitled Struc-
tural Elements, when supplemented by the coding grammar in Appendix A, allows for
scenarios to be represented with an open ontology, allowing for new elements to be freely
added, while capturing the core notions of how events unfold leading to stakeholder
impacts. The results of this representation can be analyzed both through simulation
methods and through an equivalent to Tetlock’s probability score (as described in the
section The Relation between Classical and Causal Bayesian Norms).
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• Develop elicitation methods that progressively delimit and arbitrate governance
deficits.
This has been done. In the section entitled Modeling Risk Governance Deficits, we
showed that the scenario representation we engineered, when paired with certain method-
ological safeguards avoiding support biases and attempting comprehensiveness, could
help arbitrate risk governance deficits by eliciting paths of risk. The section Interview-
based Discovery Process, as described in detail in the telephone script in Appendix
C, is an elicitation process which gathers the model structures while honoring those
methodological safeguards.
• Implement simulation methods capable of demonstrating plausible scenarios from
elicited causal structures.
This has been done. Given care, this method can simulate how scenarios will play
out from particular points of view. The section Assembling Structural Elements into
Processes explains how such simulations are undertaken. Having said that, there is
certainly no end to the kinds of simulation analysis the could be yet undertaken on these
models, and an integration with other systems and methods is an exciting direction for
future work.
• Position uncertainty discovery as a valid governance need.
Depending on one’s interpretation, this objective has either been met or has just begun.
This paper demonstrates that recognized governance deficits may be addressed through
discovery processes that find the incompletenesses and implicit uncertainties among the
relevant stakeholders. However, positioning not only means to place it in its proper
context, but to place it in the view of those who can use it. However, this is not the
work of a single project, and I am confident that this project offers a solid foundation for
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this experimental work, which will demonstrate effectiveness of these methods or their
successors to those who can use them appropriately.
Carbon Mitigation Technologies: An Example Problem
Let’s now look at carbon mitigation technologies as an example problem. It has all the
hallmarks of a distributed risk problem: a very widely distributed common resource with
contention about the underlying dynamics (in this case, the atmospheric concentration
of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gasses that can be supported with causing
certain levels of harm) and widely varying distribution to whom the harms impact, and
also local mitigation measures that may be ineffective and, when taken individually, are
likely insignificant.
Given this, what we would like to do is connect the risks of climate change with the
costs of their mitigation. We can use the infrastructure development pipeline to discover
some of the perspectives of those it would be essential to involve in the initial interview
process for the risk governance of a new sequestration-based mitigation technology20.
These perspectives include those of businesses with carbon liabilities, climate scientists
and technologists, technology investors, business investment programs, environmental
regulators, insurance companies and insurance regulators, global environmental activists,
and individuals in proximity to facilities, as well as carbon market makers and their critics.
Of those, let’s look in detail at some of the potential perspectives of three of these
stakeholder groups: businesses with carbon liabilities, environmental regulation, and
insurance regulation.
20Carbon air capture would be a good example, although it is currently facing strong feasibility
challenges Ranjana and Herzog [2010].
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Potential Perspectives for Businesses with Carbon Liabilities
Not all industries are capable of reducing their emissions. The cement industry, for
instance, currently has no proven economical alternative to the highly-emitting process
currently used, which is one-for-one in CO2 emitted per ton of cement produced, with
one half of that fundamental to the calcination of CaCO3 [Greer et al., 2000]. Airlines
might also be hard-pressed to find substitutes. Despite these challenges, any number of
potential viewpoints prevent their willingness to consider sequestration as an option.
Basic viewpoints:
• Sequestration, or perhaps emissions generally, is entirely off of their radar (it’s not
an airline problem, it’s an aerospace engineering problem)
• Thinks of it carbon sequestration as only an alternative for direct emitters (it’s for
companies that have coal plants) and doesn’t think about sponsoring sequestration
activities as an alternative.
Technical viewpoints:
• Believe that it is technically infeasible, and that current scientific results are ques-
tionable
• Believe that it is technically feasible, but cannot scale
Core business viewpoints:
• Think that it will be more expensive at its final stages as compared to the alter-
natives that they are invested in
• Think that it will be competitive, but don’t want to pay for it now (free-riders)
• Think that it has too risky a business pipeline and that investment won’t reward
them
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• Think that the deployed business will have too many, too severe, or too long-term
risks (pollution, leakage, etc)
Competitive viewpoints:
• Have already partnered with companies working on alternative mitigation strate-
gies
Governance viewpoints:
• Thinks that investing in this field won’t save them from regulatory penalties for
carbon
• Thinks that showing interest may invite early regulatory pressure to adopt
Public relations issues (interested as a business, but not part of public strategy):
• Thinks public will find it to be a cop-out for not working on more front-end
reductions
• Thinks public will find political issues in being affiliated with strategies that are
not output-reduction or directly biologically/ecologically-driven
Potential Perspectives for Environmental Regulation
One early observation is that current recommendations are being made with respect
to a ppm ceiling [Stern, 2007]. Approaches based solely on this number are likely to
be problematic, as there may be different risks for concentrations over time, as well
as risks due to sudden changes in concentration. Rapidly approaching the ceiling and
then leveling off is particularly risky, as other ecological balances may shut down due
to steep change or unexpected saturations in mitigating processes [Lenton et al., 2009].
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One possible policy approach is liability above a certain concentration (you pay the cost
of remediation for what you output above that point), but retroactive liability above a
higher concentration (the polluter pays the cost of remediation for what the polluter
has output in some substantial percentage of history). There also needs to be a way to
make incentives for reducing the overall volume of the carbon overage over time.
One question this brings up is how to make a transition to a correctly priced carbon
market when most firms may not be able to pay the current cost of capture and seques-
tration. A similar problem can be found in the analysis of leaking underground storage
tanks (USTs) at gas stations [Boyd and Kunreuther, 1995]. Many gas stations don’t
have a high profit margin, so the cost of cleaning up after a leak may mean that they
have to skimp on upgrades, leading to a greater likelihood of leak in the future, or exit
the market entirely, leaving the mess for public cleanup in any case. So, if due care is
taken in reporting leaks, then the public might appropriately bear the cost of cleanup,
as not to discourage reporting, and to allow for upgrades. Carbon sequestration is also
a leaky technology, where its effectiveness needs to be measured in terms of the time-
to-leak [Herzog et al., 2003]. Given this, let us see if the analysis of leaky tanks applies
to carbon sequestration.
Let us temporarily make the assumption that we can appropriately price costs, previous
arguments notwithstanding. There is a cost of sequestering a given volume of carbon
to a given depth at a particular time. Importantly, this cost is composed of both a fixed
cost related to having the technology, infrastructure (piping, equipment, operational
personnel, etc.), and superstructure (monitoring and governance) in place (decreasing
over time to a fixed, and still not insubstantial, point), as well as a marginal cost per
volume. There is then also percentage of this sequestered carbon leaked at a given time,
given when it was sequestered and to what depth. Let us further say that the technology
of mass sequestration is largely dependent on geology and can’t be engineered to any
great extent, such that any carbon sequestered to a particular depth at a particular time
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will leak at the same rate. We can also talk to about losses due to particular levels
of greenhouse carbon, and also say that above some threshold this loss is accelerating
due to feedback effects (or, in other words, that its derivative strictly increasing), and
that also there are some points where the acceleration accelerates (due to new feedback
effects). Let us also take into consideration the total assets of a particular firm with
potential carbon liabilities, where we designate the break-even point as zero, below which
the firm exits the market. Such a firm would have a particular rate of emissions, and
that the damage done by those emissions corresponds to We say that the damage done
by a particular firm is the sum of the losses caused by this rate of emissions across time
given the greenhouse gas levels at that time, and that therefore the value of sequestering
to a given depth is the total loss deferred until leakage.
It would be tempting for a firm to delay cleanup, saying that if they sequester later,
the marginal value of the amount sequestered is much higher, as it likely occurs against
a larger carbon background. This is deceptively attractive, as that would imply that
later efforts are marginally more effective in decreasing risk. However, this discounts
any lasting damages from earlier periods, assumes a strictly increasing greenhouse gas
background, and ignores any discount factor that might have made it more economical
to defer the losses. This also assumes that more stringent penalties aren’t assessed
the closer one gets to a threshold, as the losses from crossing may be appropriate to
merit a retroactive regime even if it causes the market exit of the firm. Nonetheless,
delaying may be merited in the case where the leakage from sequestering earlier would
have caused a threshold crossing.
Trickier still are capital improvements that reduce the amount of emissions (or, worse yet
in terms of analysis, research into capital improvements which may or may not reduce
the amount of emissions). However, if we permit ourselves to talk about an expected
reduction in emissions given this research, despite how poorly this expectation is formed,
we can make the following observations:
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• If participants perceive a transition to a retroactive regime as a valid possibility, it
may have similar effects to retroactive regulation itself. Unfortunately, this is not
all good, as it may withhold credit from firms at critical times, firms who later
would have been able to pay for damages.
• It may be that, after a threshold concentration is passed, there is nonetheless
a window for the positive feedback loops that cause the threshold to truly take
hold. In this case, it would make sense to undertake immediate remediation, by
switching to a retroactive regime.
• The expected, temporally discounted improvement caused by an emissions reduc-
tion must be greater than the leaky, discounted reduction caused by using some
amount of assets to sequester, and applying later profit to the improvement
• A firm that cannot sequester its output will only be viable if an expected improve-
ment will create reduction that can be paid for with later sequestration, even with
discounting.
• Policy could do worse than to charge fixed costs to those that can pay for it, and
marginal costs to those responsible for the damages.
• One particular problem is that firms will not mitigate if the probability of discovery
is so low as to mitigate the expected cost of penalties [Boyd and Kunreuther,
1995]. Therefore, penalties for misreporting should be severe, including jail time
for decision makers and executives.
Potential Perspectives for Insurance Regulation
Climate change presents the insurance industry the potential for losses nearly across.
This cornucopia of risks include product liability for carbon-intensive products; geolog-
ical damage to buildings and infrastructure; impacts to public lands; increased risk of
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respiratory illness and heat mortality; loss of private lands that impact commercial use;
decreasing agricultural yields and increased food prices; reduction in fishery populations;
mobilization of wastes and post-weather mold; poor financial performance and business
failure; interruptions to supply chains, telecommunications, transportation, and opera-
tions; disruptions of energy, water, and other public utilities; weather-related increases
in commercial and personal vehicle damages; claims of disinformation and professional
malfeasance in climate-related decisions; increased need for disaster preparedness and
adaptation by third parties; cross-border economic damages from new regulatory and
tax exposure; cross-border carbon market policy asymmetry risk; and the risk associated
with supply-side technology migration and mitigation measures [Ross et al., 2007].
Despite this wide array of legal liabilities for climate change, the liabilities for carbon se-
questration itself are much better understood [de Figueiredo et al., 2005] [de Figueiredo,
2007]. Pumping pressurized carbon-dioxide is already a technique for drawing more oil
from wells, legally operational today [Sharp et al., 2009]. Further, the liability of carbon
sequestration itself is much better understood today. These risks are summarized in
[Leiss, 2009], and very briefly include suffocation due to pipeline or storage breach, in-
duced seismicity, and groundwater contamination. Given that these risks are understood
and mirror those in practice today, it seems likely that sequestration research will be
able to proceed.
Demonstrating Model Making
Despite having met the objectives we set out to accomplish, the reader may be justified
in feeling that they do not have an intuitive understanding of how this approach works.
How is it that this technical modeling practice described here actually functions in
finding risk governance deficits? Therefore, let me present an example of modeling a
few phrases of a document in detail. As we go along, I’ll analyze what we learn about the
domain, the document, and the modeling formalism. Let me say ahead of time, however,
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what is reasonable to expect. Documents are in no way subject to the same kind of
methodological control as an interview or a computer program designed to ask questions
in particular ways. There is no promise that documents will not take any number of
assumptions about shared knowledge or worldview for granted, or will actually describe
any particular set of situations cohesively. Although writing with clarity and specificity
makes it more likely that a reasonably structured worldview is articulated, it is certainly
not guaranteed. Even documents that aim for exemplary specificity fall short.
One such exemplary document is “Major Tipping Points in the Earth’s Climate System
and Consequences for the Insurance Sector”, which was mutually produced by Allianz
SE and the World Wide Fund for Nature [Lenton et al., 2009]. This document had
the advantage of being told from the perspective of both ecological and economic
concerns, and also described with specificity the specific tipping points and their expected
consequences.
Suppose one tries to represent this phrase: “A global sea level rise of 0.5 m by 2050 is
estimated to increase the value of assets exposed in all 136 port megacities worldwide
by a total of $US 25,158 billion to $US 28,213 billion in 2050”. I ran into two repre-
sentational problems in the model, both of which resulted in straightforward fixes. First
of all, impacts were often described in terms of absolute time. In order to represent
this, it was important to make sure that impacts could be parameterized by temporal
expressions. It was also necessary to give a model a current date that would serve as a
reference point of what defined the present.
The second issue was also straightforward. Although events can change the topology of
structures, it is not necessary that they do so. Many events are better represented as
change in the values of existing structures. Therefore, I added ’shifts’ to the grammar
for consequences and implemented the underlying machinery for those transitions. As a
result of these modifications, I could write the following model:
event globalSeaLevelRise
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if $time after [time, 2050, 1, 1]
and $climateChange
contains [climateChange, continuesUnabated]
and $seaLevel contains [global, seaLevel]
then $seaLevel shifts meters=meters+0.500001
according to AllianzSE, WorldWideFundForNature.
impact portAssetExposureIncreasesInGlobalSeaLevelRise
3055000000000 usDollarsExposure to insuranceSector
if (global seaLevel meters:>0.5)
according to AllianzSE, WorldWideFundForNature.
However, the phrase “A global sea level rise of 0.5 m by 2050 is estimated to increase
the value of assets exposed in all 136 port megacities worldwide by a total of $US 25,158
billion to $US 28,213 billion in 2050” also presented unresolvable interpretive challenges.
For example, what happens if the global sea level rises to this 0.5 before or after 2050?
This increased asset exposure is caused not only by the rise, but by the change in the
assets themselves due to projections of urbanization, and therefore have an unspecified
impact. Even more precariously, we do not suppose that a sea-level rise of 0.45 m is
going to be without increased asset exposure. A reasonable naive assumption would be
to assume a linear increase in exposure, but it’s hard to expect that to be true. Instead,
we should expect any number of bursts in possible exposure corresponding to the assets
of the ports submerged or subjected to maritime weather.
Admittedly, it is unfair to analyze a single sentence closely in isolation. To build an
accurate progression of events takes paragraphs, and this sentence illustrates what a
good executive summary should do: take you immediately to the conclusion so that you
can evaluate for yourself if the chain of events is worth understanding. Nonetheless, this
sentence demonstrates exactly what is deficient about point predictions, no matter how
accurate: they leave us without the content of the processes that produced them.
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Future Work
In many ways, this project raises more questions than it answers. This is both a success
and a failing for a project developing analytical methods. One purpose for pursuing
formal methods in the first place is so that we may find issues in our previous conceptions.
In this regard, this project is a solid success. To review the opportunities resulting from
this paper, we first look at follow-on technical developments suggested by the work
within the paper. Then, we will look at possible future directions for expanding this
work into other domains.
Follow-on Technical Developments
First of all, I look forward to implementing, evaluating, and using the model developed
in the section entitled Assembling Pragmatic Causal Categories. A suitable language
for such an implementation is MIT’s Church programming language [Goodman et al.,
2008a], which supports the probabilistic programming of non-parametric Bayesian mod-
els in a straightforward way. Although Church is currently a self-contained environment,
I have every confidence that it can be extended to be an effective utility program.
One important change is to add contingent presents and histories. Right now, we take
the current state of affairs to be a simple assertion by the participant, but this is not
true. They may not know what happened, but have suspicions. Alternatively, they may
be prepared to admit that the histories they’ve learned may yet be wrong. Therefore, the
relationships between structures and their temporal indexes are also subject to likelihoods
and dependencies.
Another implementation I will be pursuing immediately is to write a causal, instead of
time-series, baseline for Tetlock’s sophisticated competition. In this approach, instead
of looking to the most immediate preceding factors that could have made an inference,
we will look to discover latent common causes between the factors. In short, for each
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factor identified as a term in Tetlock’s model, we will look to see if that in fact was
the cause, or if another term in the model, perhaps further back in the series could act
as a common cause. This project will also present an opportunity to use the toolkit of
known causal discovery algorithms.
There are also any number of possible improvements to the simulator itself. One such
improvement includes making the simulation more realistic (such as supporting events
that take different durations using an event calendar). Another application includes
implementing more algorithms to improve agent learning. Of course, usability and
visualization also present key opportunities.
In order for it to come to widespread use, we will have to provide interfaces that practi-
tioners can use easily. These include tools to support running simulations and analyzing
the results, as well calculating and reporting on the likelihood of different model cate-
gories. Right now, the interviewing application provides one easy way to gather model
data, but as for coding it and running analysis methods, one right now needs to work at
the level of the code itself. Just as the code requires interfaces, so does the documenta-
tion on how to use it. Although this document serves to present the academic merit of
the model and as a fine reference for technical purposes, it is not an easy-to-read guide
for the practitioner.
Potential Future Directions
This paper proposed an interviewing technique suitable for engaging a distributed set
of stakeholders with contradictory worldviews. This method should be undertaken and
refined based upon its findings. However, I am not yet sure in what context these
interviews will be undertaken.
There are many circumstances where interviewing is not a viable alternative. There are
a variety of reasons why one may not be able to conduct an interview in good faith,
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including stakeholder distrust of the participant’s institution, organizational restrictions
against interviewing practices, or just a failure to be able to coordinate on a reasonable
timescale. In the case where direct elicitation is not possible, it still may be possible
to learn a substantial degree about the perspective of a stakeholder from the analysis
of open data sources, such as documents posted to the public on the internet. There
has already been some very promising work on discovering causal assertions in text (for
example, see [Riaz and Girju, 2010]).
However, text analysis is an exceptionally challenging domain. It is itself a very broad
and well-studied area, enmeshed in brutally hard research challenges. It is daunting to
include a field that includes intelligence analysis, linguistics, library science, computer
science, the methodologies for interpreting historical documents, and so forth. Even
more challenging than this, however, is the way the documents are provided: they are
provided indirectly, with no promises of answering the kinds of questions one wishes to
pose, and with no guarantees of having been produced in the kinds of conditions which
guard against biases. In this paper, we have already demonstrated that even the most
concrete of sentences open up semantic ambiguities that impede a cohesive understand-
ing. For this reason, I am extremely pessimistic about textual analysis methods reaching
any kind of resolution of problems such as those posed in risk-governance deficits. How-
ever, I do think that document analysis can contribute to an exploratory workflow and
could supplement a multi-modal means of inquiry. In particular, I think that questions,
similar to those of the interview protocol, can be used to annotate documents, revealing
questions that the document does not answer.
Implications
Now that the project has been described completely, let us review the implications of
this work. We will see that this work has much to say about using design methods
to build regulatory connectivity, how to distribute design methods, the application of
new quantitative approaches to design and the implication of these approaches to design
thinking, the role of quantitative methods in foresight, and the impact of design methods
on the quality of foresight.
This project operated on the assumption that an appropriate design strategy for the
mitigation of distributed risk problems is the development of regulatory connectivity.
Activities that involve increasing risk, such as living near tropical beaches, need to
have the cost of this increasing risk captured and spent to mitigate this growing risk.
In particular, insurance that is subsidized both incentivises risky activity and fails to
capture the resources that could mitigate those risks, assuring that when catastrophe
strikes more will be in the position to be harmed by it, and will have few resources
to cope. This project has offered at tool to assist building regulatory connectivity by
attempting to infer shared models among disparate stakeholders and any chance that
this tool has in doing so is a sufficiently powerful motivating implication for me.
I am very pessimistic at this point that the kind of analysis necessary to fully assess the
appropriate regulatory connectivity can be built. Models of this kind will inevitably dis-
cover any number of incompatibilities and incompletenesses in the available knowledge,
as well as any number of flaws in their own formulations. Yet as pessimistic as I am
about any ultimate findings, I am equally as optimistic that improvements in discovery
and analysis will make marginal contributions. That is, even scattershot and coarse
connections between the costs of harm and the funding of mitigation will have positive
impacts. We do not know where this kind of technological forcing may take us, but
in the face of uncertainty it is appropriate to hedge. Hedging, and learning from our
hedges, is surely as much a part of our exploratory portfolio as design and modeling
activities are.
This project demonstrated that design methods can be applied on a continuous and
adaptive basis, instead of on the individual meeting, project, or milestone. Furthermore,
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these methods can be applied with an unknown and changing pool of participants.
Such methods, like the problems that they attempt to tackle, are distributed, and are
not necessarily linked to a particular place. The method explored here is limited in
this capability, as it is strongly constrained to a particular “logical time” due to the
constraint of exchangability. Having said that, this approach lights a path for methods
more suitable to non-exchangeable processes, while using the same causal abstractions.
Practitioners in design methods should take this project as an early warning sign that
a flood of structural and semi-quantitative methods and tools will be developed in the
coming years. In particular, a whole new class of statistical methods may be opening up
for designers. By being able to use non-parametric Bayesian methods to reason about
what we do not know, the designer can use what they have discovered so far to make
compelling arguments for further exploratory activity. Additionally, design practitioners
who regularly use particular design processes acquire hard-won deep tacit knowledge
about the character of the discovery process. It is my suspicion that these designers are
implicitly learning inductive constraints appropriate to those methods of inquiry, and it
is this learning that explains the discovery power of design, instead of the more generic
“generate and evaluate” explanation of design thinking, which explains the capacity of
practitioners to learn in a much more limited way. If the generic explanation were true,
then uniquely powerful mediums that draw on human capabilities, such as visual thinking
and storytelling, should have no special force. Methods like these hope to capture the
inductive power of human capabilities.
I was only able to scratch the surface in demonstrating the kinds of tools that will
capture capabilities, giving a hypothesis that a particular kind of inductive constraint
(causal constraints) might be appropriate for certain kinds of inquiry (open-ended inquiry
aimed at sensemaking) in a given stage of risk governance (early stakeholder discovery)
for a specific class of problems (those with cross-culturally recognized harms which are
likely irreversible in nature).
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Over time, foresight and design practitioners alike may find these statistical tools not
only aide design processes, but assess the degree to which they managed to discover the
relevant criteria effectively. However, as things stand now, I think designers should argue
that it is to preliminary to judge the success of design approaches, but instead should
be used to demonstrate the success of deciding to design. The question “How is it that
the information informing designs is discovered and accumulated by design processes?”
should yet challenge statisticians, computer scientists, and psychologists. I personally
suspect that the advances in causality, far from being limited to the catastrophic risk
domain, will come to serve as conceptual underpinnings for many new design and analysis
methods. Introducing causal concepts will help to escape early-stage clustering and
categorization, which are blunt instruments for bringing ideas together (a view shared
by [Christensen and Raynor, 2003]).
This project also sought to apply the qualitative insights of technical methods to fore-
sight. This is comparatively rare, as the uncertain relationship between forecasting and
foresight recapitulate other academic divides between quantitative and qualitative ap-
proaches. In the course of this project, I came to a position on the subject. While
foresight is distinct from forecasting, the relationship between forecasting and foresight
is common-sense: forecasts are source materials for foresight. Any forecast could serve
as the source material for a sufficiently discerning and critical foresight scholar. Fore-
sight can hold forecasting to a critical standard by tracking when, and more importantly
why, forecasts succeed and fail. Forecasting methods also contain, and fail to contain,
concepts about how the future should be represented, and these concepts should be
available to foresight scholars.
This project also has implications for the interaction between design and foresight.
Design already has a role in prototyping the human changes, allowing us to select more
desirable futures. However, design has a further role, in that the design of how we ask
changes the content of people’s understanding about the future. How we ask people to
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predict helps determine what they predict, so it is better to ask in ways that help people
be nuanced and wise.
Conclusion
This project is a foresight project, and as such examined concepts from which to build
possible futures. This project found a rich conceptual material, namely the risks of
infrastructure transition, which affect and are affected by almost all aspects of our
ordinary lives. We found that these transitions would lead to certain regret, and that
any appropriate risk governance policy should strive not only to mitigate that regret,
but to survive past failures to continue to offer reasonable guidance. However, what
reasonable consists of depends on one’s worldview, and so risk governance must concern
itself with taking the worldviews of the governed into full consideration.
Foresight has methods for representing multiple worldviews, but there is some question
if they are appropriate foundations given our psychology. Therefore, this project looked
to psychology and found new conceptual materials lurking in the study of an ancient
philosophical problem: causality. Out of this material, we found ways of represent-
ing, simulating, modeling, and eliciting the future that could both withstand the most
common problems within risk governance and offer better design interfaces for eliciting
the most basic of predictive measures. These methods speak to new ways to represent
possible futures that offer us the consolation of competence despite inevitable regrets.
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A: Coding Grammar
“...a computer language is not just a way of getting a computer to perform
operations but rather that it is a novel formal medium for expressing ideas
about methodology.”
-from “The Structure and Interpretation of Computer Programs” by Harold
Abelson, Gerald Jay Sussman, and Julie Sussman [Abelson et al., 1996]
This grammar uses ANTLR notation [Parr, 2007] and was developed in ANTLRWorks
[Bovet and Parr, 2008].
model : ’model’ (’current’ absolutetime)?
(structure|observation|stakeholder|sense|action
|event|impact|deference|anticipate|criteria|dependence)+
Our model consists of one or more structures, observations, stakeholders, sensings,
actions, events, impacts, deferences, anticipations, criteria, and dependences. It may
be specified in reference to a particular time, taken as the time when the model was
elicited.
absolutetime : ’absolutetime’ ’[’ (integerstring)+ ’]’
An absolute time is a date given by a sequence of one or more decreasingly large
calendar units, where the first corresponding absolute time is assumed. For example,
absolutetime [2005 11] would be November 1, 2005, midnight.
criteria : ’criteria’ criteriaName=STRING (desc=description)?
(’minimize’|’maximize’) ’.’
A criteria is identified by a string, and a description can optionally be provided. Criteria
either correspond to rewards and other positive notions, or losses and other negative
notions, and thus should be maximized or minimized, respectively.
structure : ’structure’ stateName=STRING (structuredcloud)?
(description)? (’current’ stakeholderClause )? ’.’
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A structure is identified by a name, and a description can optionally be provided. Struc-
tures correspond to various aspects of overall states-of-affairs that are, could be, or
could have been. Structures can be as simple as their name, or can be described by
more complicated structures called structured clouds. Structures can be designated as
currently the case according to one or more stakeholders.
observation : ’observation’ observationName=STRING
(desc=description)? (’current’ stakeholderClause)? ’.’
An observation is identified by a name, and a description can optionally be provided.
Observations describe aspects of the world which could be directly observable. Obser-
vations can be designated as currently the case according to one or more stakeholders.
impact : ’impact’ impactName=STRING (desc=description)?
magnitude crit=STRING
’to’ stakeholderName=STRING ’if’ ce=cloudexpression
(’when’ te=temporalExpression)?
stakeholderClause ’.’
An impact is some magnitude along a particular criteria felt by a stakeholder under
particular conditions (where such descriptions would logically match a cloud expression).
This may not be their own assessment, but the assessment of another stakeholder.
temporalExpression : temporalOp=STRING absolutetime
A temporal expression is a temporal operator compared against an absolute time.
magnitude : (qualMagnitude|weight)
Magnitudes can be expressed qualitatively or quantitatively.
stakeholder : ’stakeholder’ stakeholderName=STRING (structuredcloud)?
(description)? (’current’ stakeholderClause )? ’.’
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A stakeholder is an individual in the overall state of affairs that may be impacted by
events and have assertions and opinions about what is the case.
action : ’action’ actionName=STRING (desc=description)?
(’typically’ duration)? ’.’
An action is something a stakeholder can do, sometimes with a characteristic duration
which will carry to events the action is undertaken within, unless otherwise specified.
sense : ’observe’ name=STRING observationName=STRING ’when’
stateName=STRING (’with’ prob=likelihood)?
’according’ ’to’ stakeholderName=STRING ’.’
A particular observation is sensed when a given state occurs, possibly only with a given
likelihood, according to a particular stakeholder. The default likelihood for all units is
almost certain, reflecting the convention of speaking deterministically unless otherwise
qualified.
event : ’event’ eventName=STRING ’if’ orc=orclause





If some events happen or stakeholders undertake actions, given the current state of
affairs, then some new state of affairs comes into effect, possibly only with a given
likelihood, according to a particular stakeholder.





(’mutually’)? (’exclusive’|’independent’ | likelihood) ’.’
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For all units for which likelihood may be expressed, it may also be appropriate to express
a conditional likelihood between them and units of a similar type. These conditional
likelihoods can be mutually exclusive, mutually independent, or dependent to a given
degree. The current default is mutual independence.
jointDependenceTerm : ’joint’ ’[’ term=STRING
(’,’ term2=STRING)* ’]’
Joint terms reflect a composite condition over which conditional likelihoods can be
expressed.
consequence : ((’becomes’ result=structuredcloud
(’from’ from=structuredcloud )? )
| ’stops’ ’being’ result2=structuredcloud
| ’shifts’ cloudMathExpr (’,’ cloudMathExpr)*)
(’within’ duration)?
Consequences cause structures to transition from one state of affairs to another, usually
as the result of an event. These consequences can optionally take some duration.
cloudMathExpr : tag=STRING ’=’ argtag=STRING
(’+’|’-’|’*’) value=weight
Cloud math expressions take the weight of a argument tag from a structure, change it
according to some mathematical expression, and set the value of a tag in the structure
with that new value.
duration: (weight calendarUnits (’varying’ duration)?)
| calendarUnits






Calendar units are conventional measures of time.
structuredcloud : cloudchild
A structured cloud is a cloud-child with no parents.
cloudchild : ’(’ (wt)* (cloudchild )* ’)’
A cloud child is a set of weighted tags and a set of cloud children.
wt : STRING (’:’ weight )?
weight : weightstring
weightstring : (’-’)?
(((INTEGER )+ (’.’ (INTEGER )* )?)
| (’.’ (INTEGER)+ ))
Weighted tags are pairs of names with numerical values.
orclause : andclause (’or’ andclause)*
andclause : notclause (’and’ notclause)*
notclause : ’not’ notclause | parenclause
parenclause : ’(’ orclause ’)’ | condition
| ’True’ | ’False’
Boolean expressions are supported with precedence given to parenthesis, then logical
not, then logical and, and finally logical or.
condition : conditionalvariable STRING
’[’ (value (’,’ value)* )? ’]’
conditionalvariable : VARIABLE




Conditions are predicates on variables and constants.
cloudexpression : ’(’ (var
| cloudexpression
| STRING)* ’)’
Cloud expressions are logical conditions applicable to structured clouds.
deference : ’defer’ ’to’ knowledgeHolder=STRING
’on’ phenomena=STRING stakeholderClause
(’with’ prob=likelihood)? ’.’
If a given state, observation, event, or action has taken place, one stakeholder trusts or











Some events will happen or some stakeholders undertake actions with a given likelihood
if a given condition holds, according to a particular stakeholder or stakeholders.
stakeholderClause : ’according’ ’to’
stakeholderName=STRING (’,’ STRING)*












Probabilities and related quantities can be expressed in a qualitative way. Almost certain
is reserved for if it is ontologically possible or impossible, but the observer is certain it
will not occur.
quantProb : ’between’ weight ’and’ weight
| (’about’|’near’|’exactly’) weight
Probabilities can be given by a range or approximated as near a particular value.
description : ’"’ (STRING|punct)+ ’"’
Descriptions are double-quoted strings.
COMMENT : ’/*’ (options {greedy=false;} : . )* ’*/’
Additional comments, not included with in the model, can be included in the model text
if surrounded by C-style comment delimiters.





punct : (’.’ |’,’ )
WHITESPACE : (’ ’|’\t’|’\r’|’\n’) {$channel=HIDDEN; }
Numbers, strings, and punctuation are defined in terms of particular allowed characters.
Whitespace characters help delimit tokens but are otherwise insignificant.
B: Notational Shorthand Examples
Structure to possible observation: structure
o
−→ observation
Structure to stakeholders: structure
p
−→ stakeholder
Structure to potential actions: structure
a
−→ action
Stakeholder to potential actions: participant
a
−→ action
Stakeholder to criteria: participant
c
−→ criteria




This section includes a complete example of how to conduct an elicitation session in the
domain of climate change and greenhouse gas emissions. The following script uses the
convention of italics to represent information specific to the interview, such as statements
the interviewee has already made in the course of the interview, the interviewee’s specific
role or profession21, and question number.
21Interviewee role only referenced in pre-interview topics and in grounding questions
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Greeting: “Hi. I’m interviewer name. I’m role played within study. Am I speaking
with participant name? Good. Previously we had discussed having an interview at this
time for my study “Addressing Risk Governance Deficits through Scenario Modeling
Practices”. Does that still work for you? wait for response Excellent.”
Disclaimer: “Thank you for agreeing to take part in this study. If you wish, you may
decline to answer any questions or participate in any component of the study. Further,
you may decide to withdraw from this study at any time.”
Instructions: “I’m going to be asking you a number of questions. During this interview,
I will frequently ask you follow-on questions about answers you have given previously,
sometimes quite a long time ago in the interview. In order to make this easier for both
of us, I will give each question, or occasionally a few questions, a number, so that we
have a common reference. In our email correspondence, you have been sent a form of
numbered blanks. Have you either printed that form, or do you have another way you
can take numbered notes for yourself?” (If no, have them get some blank paper or open
a word processing program and make numbered entries.)
For each question, first say “question number number.
First prompt question:
Consider climate change broadly, including its ongoing causes, the effects it
is causing or is progressing toward causing, and the policies that are being
developed as a result. What does climate change look like today?
Second prompt question:
What is the current involvement of people in area of expertise with mitiga-
tion technologies that tackle mitigating greenhouse gasses directly, such as
carbon sequestration, and how might that involvement change?
Generic prefix for all non-prompt questions: Now, going back to question number, where
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I have you saying participant answer,
If the questioning takes the full hour: “It’s been an hour and I’m mindful of your time,
so let us wrap this up.”
If questioning is completed before end of hour: “That’s all the questions I have.”
Revision: “Are there any of your previous answers you’d like to make additional com-
ments about or revisions to?”
Closing: “Thanks for participating in this study. I hope to provide a report of my results
by report deadline. Have a great day. Bye.”
D: Mathematical Notation
∈ indicates set membership, or ’is one of these’, such that fluffy ∈ Cats.
⊂ indicates set subset, or ’all of these are instances of those’, such that Cats ⊂ Animals.
Curly braces indicate a set that is specifically given, such that fluffy ∈ {fluffy,garfield,whiskers} ⊂
Cats
P (V ) is a probability distribution over the members of a set, V . For example, if
V = {0, 1}, then P (V ) might be the Bernoulli distribution with p = 0.5, in which
case a draw from P (V ) would produce 0 or 1 with equal odds.
P(V ) is the power-set of V , i.e. all sets that can be formed from combinations of the
set’s members, such that if V = {0, 1}, then P(V ) = {{}, {0}, {1}, {0, 1}}.
∞ is infinity, used for cases that become arbitrarily large in magnitude.
; separates members of a sequence, while , indicates sequence elements that are pro-
ceeding concurrently
x∗ indicates an arbitrary sequence of members in a set (in this case X)
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→ is a rewrite relation, or ’changes thing on the left to the thing on the right’, except
when used in limits.
7→ is the same thing as →, only for specific cases, instead of as a general rule.






= 1, as the fractional term becomes arbitrarily small, when the
denominator becomes arbitrarily large.
× means binary relation, or ’these two sets taken together as a unit’.
∀ means for all instances of that class, while ∃ indicates that there is at least a single
instance of that class.
∧ means ’and’.
N is the set of natural numbers, i.e. {1, 2, 3, . . .}
ℜ is the set of real numbers, i.e. the numbers that can be represented with arbitrarily
long decimal sequences
∑




i2 is the sum of the first five squares (i.e. 12 + 22 + 32 + 42 + 52 = 55),
but is sometimes taken over sets, as in
{1,5,8}∑
i
i2 = 12 + 52 + 82 = 90
∏
is the equivalent to
∑
for multiplication.
b|c is b conditional on c, or the state of b given that c is the case.
⊥⊥ is independence, such that b ⊥⊥ c means that knowledge of the state of b gives no
information about the state of c, and vice-versa
∼ either means “distributed according to” or “similar in some way”, depending on
context
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E: Assembling Structural Elements into Simulable Processes
This appendix provides formalisms for the content discussed in the section entitled “The
Challenge of Loss Over Time”.
Imagine the set of sequences of complete temporally-confined states-of-affairs, . . . ;X[−1];
X[0]; X[1]; . . ., where each indexed state is separated by a distinguishable change, where
we interpret zero as the current or present state-of-affairs, and where the index denotes
some distinguishable change. We can call such a sequence a state-indexed timeline,
←→
X ,
where a particular timelines over state can be represented as . . . ;x[−1];x[0];x[1]; . . .,
such that ←→x ∈
←→
X .
The complete state-of-affairs is a curious structure to build timelines over, as it does
not allow any other phenomena to proceed concurrently. However, if we are looking
at a more structural level, then we can experience concurrent effects, where multiple
changes occurred at effectively the same time. In this case, it makes sense to define
the set of possible timelines over the power-set of structures, such that ←→sP ∈
←−→
P(S) =




P(S) = P(S)[0];P(S)[1];P(S)[2]; . . . and histories:
←−−−
P(S) = . . . ;P(S)[−2];P(S)[−1].
We can also talk about relative timelines, as defined over an indexing interval in




P(S) = . . . ;P(S[i −
1]);P(S)[i];P(S)[i + 1]; . . ..
Further, we can also talk about relative futures
−−−−→
P(S)[i] = P(S)[i];P(S)[i + 1]; . . .,
as well as relative histories:
←−−−−
P(S)[i] = . . . ;P(S)[i − 2];P(S)[i − 1]. We can also
talk about doubly-indexed segments of timelines, or time-slices, such that sP [i, j] ∈
P(S)[i, j] = P(S[i]);P(S)[i + i]; . . . ;P(S)[j − 1];P(S)[j]. Let us designate some
arbitrary subsequence or timeslice of structure timelines as s∗P ∈ P(S)
∗, in loose analogy
to the closure operator of automata theory. This notation also includes empty timelines,
which will be useful for indicating that nothing has happened in the timeline.
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Timelines, futures, histories, and other structures need not only apply to structures. We
can also refer to the timelines of events
←−−→
P(E), or of impacts to particular stakeholders
←→
ℜcsk, or of any other aspect of the model which can be said to happen within a particular
time.
We can say that the present value to a stakeholder for being in a given state-of-affairs
is the sum of the value of all structures that hold in that state, or r(x[i], sk) =
x[i]∑
s
r(s, sk). However, this vector quantity, although already laden with trade-offs
across different criteria, is insufficient for making judgments. Instead, they should
then expect, on average, to experience some E[
−−−−−−→
r(x[i], sk)], which is recursively de-
fined as E[
−−−−−−→




r(x[t+ 1])P (x[t + 1]|x[t], a)
)
over fu-
ture conditions, where fa is the function by which they actually do end up select-
ing actions. In the worst case will experience a minimum reward (i.e. a maximum
loss) of min(
−−−−−−→










ties may diverge substantially from either what they would expect given their antic-
ipation of how they will act a = an(x[i + 1], sk) ∈ Ansk, the anticipation of any
other stakeholder for how they should act a = an(x[i + 1], sk1) ∈ Ansk2, or the






r∗(x[t + 1])P (x[t + 1]|x[t], a)
)
. Given this formulation, we
are now within the realm of planning algorithms [LaValle, 2006], which much of this
section references.
Oftentimes, when interested in an arbitrary sequence of events, we will not be interested
in the fact that events could be occurring concurrently, but merely that there exists a
sequence of events. In that case, we will talk about e∗ instead of e∗P . This is not to
neglect that concurrency can occur, but merely to simplify the notation. Similarly, we
might not talk about a particular stakeholder, but a stakeholder population, which is a
sequence of overlapping set of stakeholders holding roughly similar interests (sk∗).
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Given this, we can express the average reward for a stakeholder group as the average of
the sum of temporal indexes: E[
−−−−−−−−→








Alternatively, one can also talk about the discounted reward instead of the overall average
using a discount parameter, α ∈ (0, 1), which geometrically reduces the estimates of
rewards and losses as time goes on. Given this, one can describe a discounted expected
value of a given state-of-affairs to a stakeholder population:
E[
−−−−−−−−→
r∗(x[t], sk∗)] = r(x[t], sk) + αfa
( ∑
x[t+1]
R∗(x[t+ 1])P (x[t + 1]|x[t], a)
)
Algorithm 3 Scenario Model Simulation Run (Elaborated)
(Get the initial conditions)
Ssim[0] = sample(P(S[0]))
t = 0
(Keep going while the possible absolute discounted risk is greater than some small




|value(r)| > ǫc do
(Evaluate the rewards and losses for each stakeholder)
Rsim[t] = R(Ssim[t], Sksim[t], C)
(Sample the actions that stakeholders will take)
{Sk,A, Se}[t] = sample(An(Ssim[t]))
(Sample the events that result from the current state and those actions)
Esim[t] = sample(E({Sk,A, Se}, Ssim)[t])
(Based on those events, determine the resulting state-of-affairs)
Ssim[t+ 1] = Esim(Ssim)[t]
t = t+ 1
end while










F: A Non-Parametric Scenario Discovery Model
This section provides the mathematics for the section described in “Assembling Prag-
matic Causal Categories”. Let us begin by looking at the complete picture of the model
presented here (see Figure 7). For each model element (say the set of elicited stake-
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holders, Sk), we say that it was generated from some unknown set of true categories for
that element that we are sampling, which we will indicate with overline notation (Sk).
Figure 7: A Non-Parametric Model for Scenario Discovery
First of all, we would hope to discover approximate categories of stakeholders, the
kinds of general situational structures they will encounter, the different reward and loss
criterion that they have, and the sorts of actions they might take. There could be
an infinite number of each of these, but will be found in different percentages in the
population with diminishing returns, so let us say they are distributed according to the
CRP. The choice of γ for each of these is interesting, as they determine the overall level
of exploration, which is discussed in the main text.
Sk|γSk ∼ CRP (γSk)
S|γS ∼ CRP (γS)
C|γC ∼ CRP (γC)
A|γA ∼ CRP (γA)
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Although each structure category may vary in terms of the tags that describe it22,
we expect that some will be used more frequently than others, again with diminishing
returns, and thus we can say that the tag distribution is IBP (tag|S ∼ IBP (γtag,s)),
where γtag,s is small, reflecting the fact that we expect the most salient details to be
applied readily and more subtle insights to be rare.
Does a stakeholder experience an impact relative to a concern in a particular stage? We
can say that 1R is the distribution over a reward indicator function, specifying that a
given criteria is in fact a criteria for a particular stakeholder given a particular structure.
1R(S, Sk,C)|γ1R ∼ Beta(γ1R , γ1R)
Here, we can see that γ
1R
should be very small, say 0.1, as we want it to be very likely or
very unlikely that a stakeholder category should have a particular stake given particular
conditions, that being the definition of a stakeholder category.
For simplicity, we can treat the magnitude of concern23 as a multinomial over the
discrete categories “strong reward”, “weak reward”, “no reward, no loss”, “weak loss”,
and “strong loss”. We will use a uniform prior.
Mg(R(S, Sk,C)) ∼Multinomial(0.2, 0.2, 0.2, 0.2, 0.2)
We can say that a state-of-affairs consists of all of the structures that are currently the
case within it. We expect to receive different lists of structures each time we elicit,
but again that the variation of structures we find has diminishing returns. Therefore,
states-of-affairs could reasonably be represented as a IBP mixture model from a CRP
mixture model.
X|γx ∼ CRP (γx)
22We know that structures contain more, well, structure, than is captured by a tag set. We will save
a model that probabilistically builds predicates for future work.
23You may wonder why we would represent “no reward, no loss” as a magnitude of concern, and the
answer is that it is a matter of relative comparison to the conditions connected by events; consider the
phrase “stop hitting me” for example.
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S|X, γx,s ∼ IBP (γx,s)
How should γx and γx,s be chosen? If set smaller, it assumes that structures are more
likely to be concurrently the case, while if larger, it presumes that different structures
are more likely to correspond to different states of affairs. As it stands, we expect
both that the states-of-affairs are highly-overlapped, but also that when the stakeholder
is describing different outcomes, these descriptions are largely similar except for key
factors24
The multiplicity of structures in states-of-affairs is not the only time we will want to talk
about combinations of elements occurring together. For example, we might want to say
some set of events is dependent upon another set of events. For this reason, let us also
refer to categories within states-of-affairs as categories of structural combinations (X as
Φ(S)). So, when we say Φ(E), we mean that sets of events categories occur together
in such a way that they can be sampled as an IBP mixture model with a CRP prior,
with exploration constants γΦE,E and γΦE , respectively.
Given that we can talk about states-of-affairs, we would like to be able to talk about
which actions are possible and relevant for stakeholders in those states-of-affairs, no
matter how likely they are. The anticipation indicator function indicates whether an
action is anticipated, no matter how likely it is.
1An(X,Sk, a)|γ1An ∼ Beta(γ1An , γ1An)
If a given action is possible, how likely is to to be undertaken? We would say that it is
likely that if the observer knows how to specify it as a possibility, they also likely have a
suspicion of whether or not it will be undertaken. For that reason, we can say that the
distribution is almost uniform, but not quite, and thus γP (An)) is less than, but close
to, one.
P (An)|1An(X,Sk, a), γP (An) ∼ Beta(γP (An), γP (An))
24Indeed, this similarity between possible worlds is a popular philosophical framework for counterfac-
tuals [Lewis, 1973], although it is prior to the intervention-based conception used here.
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Of course, as established before, actions do not stand alone, but they are anticipated to
have their compliments and substitutes, so there might be a dependence between sets
of anticipations, where were need to specify both a likelihood of the dependence (or the







P (DAn(Φ(An),Φ(An))) ∼ Uniform(0, 1)
Given a categorical state-of-affairs and some combination of actions, we can ask if
another state-of-affairs is the result of that event, and if so, how likely that is:
1E(Φ(An),X,X)|γ1E ∼ Beta(γ1E , γ1E )
P (D(Φ(An),X,X)) ∼ Uniform(0, 1)
Event categories may also have dependencies with both presence and their likelihood,
as described before.
1DE (Φ(E),Φ(E))|γ1D ∼ Beta(γ1D , γ1D)
P (DE)(Φ(E),Φ(E)) ∼ Uniform(0, 1)
The distribution of sensings given observations and underlying structures is similar to
anticipations and events, and has similar dependencies.
1Θ(S,O)|γ1Θ ∼ Beta(γ1Θ , γ1Θ)







P (DΘ(Φ(Θ),Φ(Θ))) ∼ Uniform(0, 1)
Finally, a category of deferences means that over any set of model elements a deference
may be given to a particular category of stakeholders. This deference also has a like-
lihood, where negative deference is to cast suspicion on the knowledge of a particular
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stakeholder.
1Df (Φ(M), Sk)|γ1Df ∼ Beta(γ1Df , γ1Df )
P (Df)(Φ(M ),Φ(Sk)) ∼ Uniform(0, 1)
G: Converting Contingency Paths to Probability Scores
This appendix provides the formalism to support the section “The Relation between
Classical and Causal Bayesian Norms” and presumes a strong familiarity with that sec-
tion. Given this, let us get started with the formalization. Suppose that we are trying to
predict some aspect, attribute, or factor, f , which can take one of a discrete number of
possible conditions f1, f2, . . . , fn at a given time t. We can say that the states of affairs
in which a given fi holds is Xfi ⊂ X, and that Xf1 , . . . ,Xfn form a partition over X.
Further, let us say that there is a set of structural expressions where each structural ex-
pression indicates exclusive membership in each of these factor sets, sef,i ∈ Sef ⊂ Se.
Therefore, the prediction of an outcome is that a particular expression will be true at
time t, or in other words sef,i holds for x[t], and the likelihood given in a prediction
is p(sef,i(x[t])). Rescober and Tetlock’s analysis often focuses on cases that can be
resolved from single structures. Given that Sf,i is the set of structures that occur only
in Xf,i, then this simple case implies Sf,i has at least one member for all i ∈ n, and we
can say that the prediction is in reference to that structure, or p(sef,i(s[t])).
When we are establishing the dependencies that would determine a point prediction, we
are talking about the set of events that would bring about that point, or PostSet(sef,i).
We can call a point prediction a likelihood given no event, or the null event prediction,
where we say that e∅ is this null event, and that e∅ ∈ PostSet(sef,i) by convention. We
also need to account for all dependencies that would boost or sever the event’s deter-
mination of that point, or DepSet(PostSet(sef,i)). Let us say that each phenomena
here is weighted according to how strong the events that that produce it are, and how
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weak the dependences could sever it.







The weight normalized weight of the point prediction is determined by the weighted
average25 of the probabilities that could have produced it, including the null event,
moderated by the weights of those events. Each single event is the likelihood of that








The likelihood of the preconditions is the sum over the likely durations of the vent times










The likelihood of each of the precondition expressions (p(see(s[t− tδ]))) is determined
recursively, treated as a point prediction at least until t − tδ ≤ 0, at which point the
event is in the present or past. Even then the expression may be unknown. For example,
it may be a political decision made in secret, or the quantity of undiscovered reserves
of a particular resource. In this way of thinking, agreeing that a particular condition did
nor did not occur is making an almost certain prediction about the present or past.
The weight of each event is determined the minimum value permitted by the dependen-
cies that determine it (in other words, we choose the maximum severability among those
specified). If a combination of events have a stronger severability, then it is appropriate
25The weighted average is used because each path is an independent prediction. If each path was
not an independent prediction, but instead were predictions of independent causes, there would be a
dependency between causes, where the dependency would be 1− p(c1)p(c2), or the joint probability.
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to introduce a joint event as the antecedent of that dependency. The severability of each






As a practical matter, we can see that cycles of dependencies can lead to oscillations in
this calculation. Therefore, these weights can be calculated iteratively with a dampening
constant η, where 0 < η < 1, stopping the iteration when the change of weight reaches
some ǫ≪ η, yielding the following expression for the sequence of weight changes.
w(e)[t] = w(e)[t − 1] + η(w[e] − w(e)[t − 1])
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